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Abstract 
This thesis empirically examines the cyclicality and impact of macroprudential policies on 
various macroeconomic aggregates, capital flows, and financial inclusion mainly in Emerging 
Markets (EMs).   Using Structural Vector Autoregressions, the first chapter studies the effect 
of macroprudential policies on several indicators of economic activity, credit, and prices, and 
finds that the effectiveness of macroprudential policies differs depending on the tool being 
used, the type of shocks macroprudential policies respond to, and that the responsiveness of 
macroprudential policies could be either counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical. Generally, however, 
macroprudential policies were found to help lower credit growth, particularly mortgage credit, 
as well as housing-specific inflation. The second chapter uses System Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) to examine the impact of changes in sovereign ratings – a proxy for 
sovereign risk – on foreign direct investment and portfolio flows across a panel of 24 EMs, 
whether a change in sovereign ratings displayed a contagion effect across countries, and the 
interaction between sovereign ratings and macroprudential policies, both as proxies for 
sovereign and systemic risk respectively. This chapter sheds light on the important role of 
sovereign ratings for attracting FDI and portfolio flows, while the interaction between 
sovereign ratings and macroprudential policies highlights the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policies in reducing the volatility of capital flows, especially portfolio flows.  The third chapter 
also uses system GMM to shed light on redistributive impact of macroprudential policies, 
mainly through their impact on financial inclusion. This chapter finds that while 
macroprudential policies have a mixed impact on both usage and access to financial services, 
macroprudential policies, conditional on increased financial development and better 
institutional quality, help increase financial inclusion. Each chapter in this dissertation 
contributes to the ongoing debate on the effectiveness of macroprudential policies; the first by 
examining the cyclicality of macroprudential policies, the second by examining the interaction 
of macroprudential policies (a proxy for systemic risk) and sovereign ratings (a proxy for 
sovereign risk) and the third by examining their distributional impact.  The three chapters shed 
light on the fact that different macroprudential policies operate differently, both in terms of 
their cyclicality and effectiveness, in such a way that that these policies cannot operate in a one 
size fit all pattern, and that country-specific characteristics matter. 
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The global financial crisis, the subsequent increase in systemic risk, the slowdown in global 
economic activity, rise in unemployment and the great retrenchment in capital flows 
(Milesi-Feretti and Tille, 2011) were among the factors that shifted the attention of policy 
makers towards macroprudential policies as a tool to achieve financial stability. This was 
particularly the case as targeting price stability – and the use of monetary policy – 
accordingly, was no longer deemed as appropriate to achieve financial stability. Hence, 
macroprudential policies re-surfaced as an essential instrument to achieve financial 
stability, with Basel III advocating the counter-cyclical implementation of these policies. 
Emerging Markets (EMs) have had a longer history in using macroprudential policies given 
their history of financial crises, and given their susceptibility to boom and bust cycles, more 
so than advanced economies (AEs).  Thus, the majority of this thesis focuses on EMs.  This 
thesis consists of three main chapters which broadly aim to contribute to the debate on the 
role, cyclicality, and impact of macroprudential policies, within an EM context, their 
interaction with monetary policy, their redistributive effects, and their impact on capital 
flows.   
Using Structural Vector Autoregressions (SVARs), the second chapter assesses the 
effectiveness and cyclicality of different macroprudential tools in 15 EMs over the period 
2000-2012. Research on the impact of macroprudential policies has been gaining attention 
over the last few years, both theoretically and empirically, but the empirical work on their 
effectiveness remains in its infancy (Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018), and to our 
knowledge even less work on their cyclicality. Using existing macroprudential policy 
databases (from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS)), and supplementing them with data from Central Banks’ Financial 
Stability reports, various news sources, and statistical databases, we collect data on various 
macroprudential policies on a monthly basis particularly for required reserve ratios 
(RRRs), Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios, provisionings, capital requirements, liquidity ratios, 
and sector-specific risk weights, and we examine the dynamic impact of these tools on 
macroeconomic activity, prices, and credit in 15 EMs. Unlike most empirical work on 
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macroprudential policies, this chapter does not use dummy variables to capture the use of 
macroprudential policies.  We construct numerical series using announcements from the 
above-mentioned sources to capture the magnitude of changes in macroprudential policies 
and their impact. This helps to identify the magnitude of the policy change and its impact 
on the various macroeconomic aggregates.  Our findings are in line with the growing body 
of literature on this topic. That is, while macroprudential policies yield equivocal results 
across various macroeconomic aggregates, and countries, in terms of their impact, they 
generally help lower credit growth, particularly mortgage credit, as well as housing-
specific inflation. We also test whether macroprudential policies respond counter-
cyclically or pro-cyclically after a shock to macroeconomic activity, prices or credit. Our 
equivocal results point to the fact that there is no particular pattern in which 
macroprudential policies behave, a result which should not be surprising as the use of these 
policies is 1) discretionary; 2) depends on country-specific characteristics; and 3) the 
macroprudential toolkit involves the use of one or more tools at the same time.  Certain 
shocks could lead to a counter-cyclical response, while others yield a pro-cyclical response. 
In some cases, the same shock could lead to a counter-cyclical response from one 
macroprudential instrument, and a pro-cyclical response from another. The cyclical 
response of macroprudential policies did not receive much attention either by academics 
or policy makers, and it does not point to a pattern about the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies. That is, a counter-cyclical policy—as advocated by Basel III—
is not necessarily effective in reducing credit growth or inflation.  In terms of policy 
effectiveness, RRRs had the most impact in terms of affecting economic activity, and 
credit. The contribution of this chapter is twofold; to our knowledge, very rarely has the 
cyclicality of macroprudential policies been examined, and whether the counter-cyclicality 
of macroprudential policies implies their effectiveness or not is indeed still questionable.  
The third chapter revisits capital flows, sovereign risk—proxied by sovereign ratings—
financial contagion in EMs, and their interaction with macroprudential policies. The 
literature on the determinants of capital flows was already sophisticated ahead of the 2007 
– 2009 global financial crisis. This is in light of the surge in capital flows to EMs in the 
1990s, and the subsequent capital flight—in some cases sudden stops—that followed. 
However, the decline in capital flows in EMs around the global financial crisis re-ignited 
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the interest in the determinants of capital flows, particularly concerning the use of 
unconventional monetary policies, on the one hand, and dealing with the volatility of 
capital flows on the other. One aspect that largely goes unnoticed in this literature has been 
the role of sovereign credit ratings as a determinant of capital flows to EMs, even though 
their ratings actions are important for the ability of EMs to access international capital 
markets. Sovereign ratings provide information on the ability and willingness of countries 
to repay their debt in a timely manner and in full. Sovereign ratings are thus a proxy for a 
country’s sovereign risk1, and sovereign ratings agencies tend to emphasize their ability to 
lead the market. However, sovereign ratings agencies came under severe scrutiny in light 
of the repeated EM crises in the 1990s, and then again during the global financial crisis, 
for failing to lead the market, and predict the deterioration in economic and financial 
conditions. Accordingly, the downgrade of their ratings after the fact was envisaged as a 
contributing factor to deepening crises or instances of distress. Using the Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM estimator, this chapter analyses how 
changes in sovereign ratings influence different types of capital flows to 24 EMs, with a 
particular focus on FDI inflows, and portfolio inflows. This chapter also examines cross-
country—or contagion—effects of sovereign ratings by testing whether changes in the 
sovereign ratings in any of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa) can explain changes in the different kinds of capital flows in other EMs.  Results 
of this chapter point to the importance of sovereign ratings as a determinant of EMs’ access 
to international capital markets. We show that the impact of ratings changes is stronger 
during crisis times, both for country-specific crises, or broader cross-country crises, such 
as the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.   As for contagion, this chapter shows that a 
sovereign ratings upgrade (downgrade) in one of the BRICS countries leads to more (less) 
capital inflows to the other EMs in the sample. Given the recent rise of capital flow 
management tools—both macroprudential policies and capital controls—to reduce 
systemic risk and cope with the volatility of capital flows, we test for the interaction 
between these tools and sovereign ratings. In this sense, sovereign ratings are a proxy for 
sovereign risk, while macroprudential policies are a proxy for financial stability (or even 
systemic risk) to test for their joint impact on capital flows. There has been a rise in 
 
1 Or simply indicative of it. 
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literature discussing the link between sovereign and systemic risk, as well as the sovereign 
component of systemic risk, so this part of the chapter is a minor contribution to this area. 
The results show that macroprudential policies alone yield mixed results—similar to the 
findings of the first chapter, and of the broader literature—but the interaction of these tools 
with sovereign ratings does impact capital flows to EMs. The broader importance of this 
chapter lies in the fact that it clarifies the importance of macroprudential policies alongside 
some of the other important push and pull factors in the literature, as well as highlighting 
the cross-border impact of ratings changes even beyond the region that witnessed a rating 
change in one of its countries.  
The fourth chapter relates to the recent literature on the redistributive impact of 
macroprudential policies. This chapter contributes to this novel area, but from a previously 
unexplored aspect: that of financial inclusion. Theoretically, there has been an increase in 
research that points towards the effects of macroprudential policies on income and wealth 
distribution (Monnin, 2017; Canova et al., 2015; and Korinek and Kreamer, 2013, among 
others). Yet the empirical evidence on the link between macroprudential policies and 
inequality is quite scarce. We highlighted above the re-emergence of macroprudential 
policies as an important toolkit to achieve financial stability. Financial stability has been a 
priority for policy makers since the onset of the global financial crisis. Financial inclusion, 
on the other hand, is one of the main, albeit challenging priorities, for policy makers, 
particularly among EMs. Given the ability of financial inclusion to facilitate consumption 
smoothing, lower income inequality, and enable risk diversification, this chapter studies 
the impact of macroprudential policies on financial inclusion in a panel of 67 EMs and 
AEs, as a proxy for income inequality. On the one hand, the Bank of England (2009) held 
that one of the goals—although largely not discussed—of macroprudential policies is the 
stable provision of financial intermediation services, i.e. access to finance.2 On the other, 
there has been a recent rise in literature concerning the link between financial inclusion 
and income inequality (IMF, 2018), as well financial inclusion and financial stability (Han 
and Melecky, 2013). This literature points towards the potential existence of a link between 
macroprudential policies and financial inclusion, and to our knowledge, only Kara (2016) 
 
2  Access to finance is a reflection of financial inclusion, but inclusion additionally involves the use of financial 
intermediation services, beyond just their availability. 
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and Ayyagari et al. (2017) touched upon this. Kara (2016) asserted that one of the 
consequences of tighter prudential regulations in Turkey resulted in lower bank branches 
and less (new) bank entry, while Ayyagari et al. (2017) held that one “unintended” 
consequence of macroprudential policies is lower firm access to finance.   Our results 
continue to point towards the mixed effects of macroprudential policies. The use (and 
tightening) of some tools, such as the debt-to-income ratio, appears to reduce financial 
inclusion whereas others, such as the RRR, increases it. Our results differ once we split the 
sample into AEs and EMs, given the different levels of financial development and 
institutional quality among the two groups. Specifically, both institutional quality and 
financial development appear to increase the effectiveness of macroprudential policies on 
financial inclusion relative to their impact in the absence of financial development or 
regulatory quality. Institutional quality, in particular, helps macroprudential policies boost 
financial inclusion. This leads us to believe that macroprudential policies conditional on 
better institutional quality and financial development improve financial inclusion. This has 






On the Impact and Cyclicality of Macroprudential Policies: 
Evidence from Selected Emerging Markets3 
Abstract 
Macroprudential policies re-emerged in the post global financial crisis world as an 
important policy tool to reduce systemic risk, achieve financial stability, and support 
monetary policy. The combination of monetary and macroprudential policies could help 
prop up economic growth if both tools are complementary or hinder economic recovery if 
both policies are conflicting. Using structural vector autoregressions, this chapter evaluates 
the effect of macroprudential policies on macroeconomic activity, inflation, and credit 
growth in selected Emerging Markets (EMs) over the period 2000 – 2012, and whether 
these policies were implemented in a counter-cyclical manner. Our results point to the 
equivocal pattern in which macroprudential policies operate. This, nevertheless, points 
towards some insight on their effectiveness in achieving their desired objectives. We find 
that loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and required reserves in general are key to curtailing credit 
growth and house price appreciation, while required reserves restrained total credit growth. 
Our key conclusion is that monetary policy solely is insufficient to inhibit 
business/financial cycles. Economies experiencing overheating, property bubbles, or credit 
expansions, are the ones that ultimately benefit the most from the implementation of 
macroprudential policies. Countries implementing sound and prudent macroprudential 
policies are the ones that did not experience a significant change in their macroeconomic 
aggregates as a result of a macroprudential shock. We also shed light on the cyclicality of 
how macroprudential policies operate showing that they have been already implemented 
counter-cyclically in some cases in selected EMs. However, their counter-cyclical 
operation does not automatically translate into them being effective, with sometime 
procyclical policies more effective in curbing credit growth or inflation. 
 
3 This chapter is based on a much simpler and shorter version of this chapter – only focusing on Turkey, and Brazil – in 
2013. In 2015, this methodology was employed to address macroprudential policies in the Middle East and North Africa 
countries, presented in the 35th Annual Meeting of The Middle East Economic Association Allied Social Science 




The onset of the global financial crisis, and the subsequent rise of systemic risk, 
underscored the role, and significance, of macroprudential policies to reduce systemic risk, 
and ensure financial stability. Even more so, the recurrence of financial crises and their 
dire consequences implied that the regulatory framework was no longer enough to 
guarantee financial stability.4 Relatedly, traditional macroeconomic stabilizers – where 
monetary policy took center stage – have become insufficient to respond to financial 
imbalances. In fact, price stability was no longer seen as a sufficient target for policy 
makers as it no longer guaranteed financial stability, and that financial stability needed its 
own policy tool.5 
Emerging Markets (EMs) have been utilizing macroprudential tools for at least two 
decades. After the global financial crisis, however, more advanced economies (AEs) 
employed macroprudential policies, and the role of monetary and macroprudential policies 
came under the limelight under the auspices of financial stability. In this context, 
macroprudential and monetary policies became viewed as ones that should have different 
policy objectives: monetary policy should pursue price (and possibly output) stability, 
while macroprudential policies should pursue financial stability (BIS, 2016), and reducing 
systemic risk.6     
The main types of systemic risk that macroprudential policies seek to curtail include risks 
related to rapid credit growth, credit-driven asset price inflation, substantial leveraging and 
the ensuing deleveraging process that tends to occur (Lim et al., 2011).7  The best possible 
combination of macroprudential tools tends to be decided upon by the appropriate 
supervisory authorities (and/or the central bank) in respective countries, and preferably 
macroprudential and monetary policies should be complementary. However, in reality, 
 
4 See Davis (1999), Kahou and Lehar (2017), and Knight (2006).   
5 See Bean et al. (2010), Blanchard et al. (2010) and Mishkin (2010), who were among the first to shed light on the 
argument that financial stability should be a separate target from price stability. 
6 Prior to the global financial crisis, Bernanke and Gertler (2000) believed that monetary policy should prioritize price 
stability without leaning against the wind, while eliminating any adverse impacts of bursting bubbles.   
7  Thus, the macroprudential toolkit can either be credit-related instruments, liquidity-related, or capital-related. Credit-
related instruments include caps on the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, caps on the debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, caps on foreign 
currency lending and limits on credit or credit growth. Liquidity related tools include reserve requirements, limits on net 
open currency positions/currency mismatch (NOP), and limits on maturity mismatch, while capital-related tools include 
counter-cyclical/time-varying capital requirements, time varying/dynamicprovisioning, and restrictions on profit 
distribution (Lim et al., 2011). 
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they may conflict on another. There is also the possibility that macroprudential policies 
end up being implemented in a pro-cyclical way, rather than counter-cyclically, which 
could reduce their effectiveness. 
Although both policies are interconnected (see Beau, Clerc and Mojon, 2012), 
macroprudential policies may clash with monetary policy. Specifically, the pro-cyclical 
nature of macroprudential policies (see Danielsson et al., 2016) appears to be at stark 
contrast from the counter-cyclical nature of monetary policy, which has the capacity to 
defer economic recovery, if indeed they do conflict (see Fisher and Gai, 2003). 
Furthermore, allocating a number of – and sometimes conflicting goals to one institution – 
if both are under the central bank auspices—could stifle the effectiveness of both policies, 
and lower both credibility and accountability (see IMF, 2013).  
It is important to note that the literature on the impact of monetary policy – both theoretical 
and empirical – is  substantial (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996 and 1999, 
Gordon and Leeper, 1994, Bernanke and Mihov, 1998, Catao and Pagan, 2010, Luporini, 
2008, and Kamal, 2010), but the literature on macroprudential policies—especially 
empirical—continues to be in its infancy (see Glocker and Towbin (2012) and Vegh and 
Federico and Vuletin (2012) among others).   Lacking empirical work on this topic is a 
result of the complexities of understanding the channels through which macroprudential 
policies function, the difficulty in identifying systemic risk ex-ante, and the fact that the 
use of macroprudential tools remains in its early stages in many countries. The contribution 
of this chapter is twofold. As it assesses the effectiveness of some of the macroprudential 
policies employed in selected EMs, it goes beyond the usual use of dummy variables to 
capture the extent of changes of macroprudential policies by using data to capture the extent 
of tightening (and loosening) of these policies. It also addresses the question of 
effectiveness in relation to whether or not macroprudential policies have been implemented 
in a countercyclical manner.  
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to study the effect of selected macroprudential policies on 
a number of macroeconomic aggregates, relative to monetary policy in 15 EMs.8 Using 
 
8 Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, China, Egypt, India, Poland, South Korea, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, Poland, and Malaysia. Due to anomalies, we exclude Saudi Arabia, 
Philippines, and Malaysia from the results, but they are available upon request. 
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structural vector autoregressions (SVARs), this chapter will try to solve the following 
queries: how do various selected macroprudential tools affect macroeconomic activity, 
credit growth, and inflation among the countries of our interest? How is this effect distinct 
from the effect of monetary policy? Are macroprudential policies implemented counter-
cyclically or pro-cyclically? The choice of countries has been driven by data availability, 
especially in countries with a longer history employing macroprudential policies. This 
provides us with an interesting sample as these countries represent a useful laboratory in 
which the effect of macroprudential policies can be investigated.9 
The significance of this topic lies in the fact that monetary and macroprudential policy 
interaction has substantial policy and institutional implications.  To our knowledge, it is a 
topic that continues to be under-researched, 10  with only a few studies empirically 
evaluating the impact of macroprudential policies.11 In this context, they only focused on 
a particular macroprudential tool rather than testing several tools in tandem (see Glocker 
and Towbin, 2012, for example), and none has examined the cyclicality of macroprudential 
policies. Testing both several policies in tandem, as well as the cyclicality of this toolkit is 
of utmost importance. 
This rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section II highlights the main 
macroprudential policies, their usage, and functions12; Section III reviews the literature we 
are concerned; Section IV highlights the methodology; Section V discusses our results and 
robustness checks; and Section VI concludes.
 
9 This exercise is implemented with a certain degree of caution as results may be partly affected by certain- and sometimes 
peculiar- aspects of their emerging market nature. Nevertheless, some general lessons may be drawn. 
10 See IMF (2013) for more detail.  
11 Recently, however, there has been a rise in the usage of indices that capture the usage of macroprudential policies. For 
more information, see Cerutti et al. (2015 and 2016), and Akinci et al. (2016).  
12 With more details in the annex on country-specific instances of macroprudential policies, and their impact.  
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2. Macroprudential policies: A Primer on their Types and Functions 
As previously highlighted, the overall objective of macroprudential policies is to achieve 
financial stability. However, there is a lack of consensus on what constitutes financial stability 
(Galati and Moessner, 2011).  In this sense, macroprudential policies aim to achieve financial 
stability through:  
1) Increasing the strength of the financial system in response to external shocks 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2003, and Allen and Wood, 2006); or  
2) Boosting financial system resilience in the face of domestic shocks (created within 
the financial system) (Schinasi, 2004); or  
3) Reducing the vulnerability to financial distress as a result of standard-sized shocks 
rather than large shocks (Borio and Drehman, 2009 and Galati and Moessner, 
2011). 
As previously mentioned, among the main risks that macroprudential policies tackle are risks 
related to rapid credit growth, credit driven asset price inflation, liquidity risks, excessive 
leveraging, and the ensuing deleveraging, as well as risks associated with capital flows, 
especially their volatile component (Lim et al., 2011).  Relatedly, macroprudential policies 
should also act as a buffer during booms (busts) against declines (increases) in measured risks 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2009), 13 and stabilize the provision of financial intermediation services14 
within an economy to limit the boom-bust cycles in delivering both credit and liquidity (Bank 
of England, 2009, and Galati and Moessner, 2011). Simply put, the macroprudential toolkit 
should work to limit risks from episodes of system-wide distress that could have substantial 
macroeconomic costs, (Borio 2003, Borio and Drehamn, 2009, Galati and Moessner, 2011). 
As such, there is a fairly large number of macroprudential policies, the choice of which 
depends on the target of the central bank and financial regulator, the country’s extent of 
financial and economic development, type of exchange rate regime, and susceptibility to 
shocks (Lim et al., 2011).   
 
13 Which tends to be low during the peaks of booms, underestimated actual risks (Brunnermeier et al., 2009) 
14 In other words, macroprudential policies should aim to increase financial inclusion. See Chapter Four for more on this 
aspect of macroprudential policies.  
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The implementation of macroprudential policies varies across countries and should ideally 
address the above risks across two dimensions: over time, and at a specific point in time across 
the financial system (Galati and Moessner, 2011, and Kahou and Lehar, 2017). As such, there 
are tools that focus on tackling the time-series dimension of financial stability and the pro-
cyclicality in the financial system that capture the change of risk over time (Borio, 2001, Borio 
et al., 2011, and Brunnermeier et al., 2009, for examples),15 and others that focus on the cross-
sectional dimension. Among the most commonly used tools that focus on the time-dimension 
of macroprudential policies are the counter-cyclical capital buffers, dynamic provisioning, 
changes in risk weights for exposure to specific sectors, caps on loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-
to-income (DTI) ratios. Those that focus on the cross-sectional dimension16 include systemic 
capital and liquidity surcharges, deposit insurance risk premiums, and restrictions on 
permissible activities such as limits on proprietary trading for systemically important banks 
(Kahou and Lehar, 2011). Table (1) highlights the main types of macroprudential policies and 
how they operate.  
Table (1): Types and Functions of Macroprudential Policies 
Tool Description 
Caps on the LTV Ratio  
Limits highly levered mortgage down payments by 
imposing limits or regulatory risk weight, normally 
imposed on new loans, with the goal of lowering housing 
loan growth.  
Caps on the DTI Ratio17 
Limits household indebtedness by imposing a limit to the 
debt that can be obtained based on the income. Also 
imposed with the target of lowering credit extension, 
mainly for house purchases.  
Caps on Foreign Currency (FC) 
Lending 
Lowers susceptibility to foreign-currency risks. 
Ceilings on Credit or Credit 
Growth (CG) 
Imposes a celining to limit credit growth directly. Could 
be set either per month, or year. 
Limits on Net Open Currency 
Positions/Currency and Maturity 
Mismatch 
Helps lower common exposures across institutions and 
markets. More relevant for EMs with limited 
consequences of capital inflows. 
 
15 Via Galati and Moessner (2011).  
16 Across the banking sector at one point in time.  





Minimum ratio for highly liquid assets to ensure that 
banks can endure episodes of significant cash outflows 
and distress. 
Reserve Requirements/RRR 
Limits credit growth; can be used to limit foreign-
currency credit growth. Operates by holding a fraction of 
a bank's liabilities as liquid reserves.  
Counter-cyclical Capital 
Requirements 




Requires banks to hold more loan-loss provisions during 
upturns. 
Leverage Ratio 
Limits banks from exceeding a fixed minimum leverage 
ratio. 
Capital Surcharges on 
Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFIs) 
Requires SIFIs to hold a higher capital level than other 
financial institutions. 
Limits on Interbank Exposures 
Limits the fraction of liabilities held by the banking sector 
or by individual banks. 
Concentration Limits 
Limits the fraction of assets held by a limited number of 
borrowers. 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions Taxes revenues of financial institutions. 
Source: Lim et al. (2011), Galati and Moessner (2011), Shim et al. (2015) and Cerutti et al. (2015). 
The global financial crisis has prompted more countries, especially AEs, to use more 
macroprudential policies. As Figure (1) shows, the use of macroprudential policies has been 
more commonly used in EMs. This is the case given their history of repeated financial crises, 
and their susceptibility to external shocks, particularly from capital flows, and the most 
commonly used tools have been concentration limits, limits on interbank exposures, LTV and 






18 Annex IV highlights the main instances in which macroprudential policies have been implemented and their impact in the 
selected EMs under examination in this chapter.  
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Figure (1): Usage of Macroprudential Policies by Income Level19 
 
Source:   Cerutti et al. (2015) 
 
19 Macroprudential policies in this chart are aggregated using an overall macroprudential policy index. For more information, 




The literature review in this section will examine several strands; it will succinctly review 
the (empirical) effects of monetary policy on macroeconomic aggregates, and proceed to 
examine the impact of macroprudential policies, their cyclicality, and their interaction with 
monetary policy both empirically and theoretically to validate our methodology of choice.  
First, we should note that a significant literature on the impact of monetary policy exists, 
both empirically, and theoretically. However, the literature on the impact on 
macroprudential policies, and their interaction with monetary policy—despite its rise—is 
not as extensive. More importantly, the effectiveness of macroprudential policies continues 
to be mixed (Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey, 2018). Even more so, much less is available 
on the cyclicality of macroprudential policies, and whether their effectiveness was indeed 
as a result of their cyclicality.20 
3.1. Impact of Monetary Policy  
As previously mentioned, there is a significant literature on the dynamic impact of monetary 
policy, both theoretical and empirical. The use of structural vector autoregressions (SVAR) 
has also received considerable attention to assess the effects of monetary policy shocks, and 
most of this research only examined interest rates only as the conventional monetary policy 
tool (El Said, 2013).   
Sims’s prominent work (1980) laid the grounds for studying the impact of monetary policy 
on macroeconomic aggregates using vector autoregressions (VAR).  The “classical” work 
on the dynamic impact of monetary policy was mostly examined within an AE context, 
rather than for EMs, particularly for the U.S. Among the most pioneering work was that of 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) who studied the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on the U.S. economy, finding that a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to 
persistently falling real GDP, retail sales, non-financial corporate profits, as well as 
commodity prices, and resulted in rising unemployment and manufacturing inventories.  
 
20 There are other strands in the literature that focus on the cross-border effects of macroprudential policies, as well as 
their distributive effects, sometimes referred to as unintended consequences, which we shall explore in Chapters Three 
and Four.  
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Bernanke and Mihov (1998) employed the Federal Funds Rate, non-borrowed reserves 
among other indicators – that capture the monetary policy toolkit - to determine the effect 
of monetary policy in the U.S. economy. They found that expansionary monetary policy 
shocks raised output, but the extent of output increases varied based on the different 
identification schemes employed.21 
Beyond the U.S. economy, Peersman and Smets (2001) also used VARs to examine the 
impact of unanticipated changes in monetary policy on the Eurozone. The three-months 
interest rate was employed as the monetary policy tool, and the authors found a comparable 
impact of monetary policy shocks compared to the U.S. Specifically, transient and 
unanticipated policy tightening leads to short-term drops in output and currency 
appreciation.  Prices, however, were found to react with a lag compared to output and 
exchange rates.   
More recently, structural VARs (SVARs) became mainstream to examine the dynamic 
impact of monetary policy shocks in EMs. Rabanal and Schwartz (2001) employed SVARs 
to study the effect of the overnight interest rate (SELIC) on output and prices in Brazil over 
the period 1995-2000.  The authors employed a recursive Cholesky decomposition and 
found that the SELIC rate has a robust and persistent effect on output and lending spreads, 
but the prize puzzle persisted, as interest rate shocks led to higher prices.  More recently, 
Jiranyakul (2016) employed structural VARs to examine the effects of monetary policy 
shocks on output and prices in Thailand over the period 2005-2016 and found that monetary 
policy shocks drive cycles for both real GDP growth, and inflation.  
3.2.  Impact of Macroprudential Policies: Theory and Interactions with Monetary 
Policy 
Once again, the 2007-2009 global financial crisis rekindled the interest in macroprudential 
policies, their effectiveness, and how they can operate to attain financial stability. Most 
research in this area has been theoretical, with a significant focus on dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models. 22 Despite the significant rise in the use of DSGE 
 
21 See Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for further details on the different identification schemes.  
22 Including the works of Kannan et Al. (2009), and Angeloni and Faia (2009), whereby capital ratios were employed as 
the macroprudential policy tool in DSGE models. Both found that counter-cyclical capital ratios have a positive effect on 
the real economy. 
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models to assess the impact of macroprudential policies, substantial cracks exist that 
hinders the employment of DSGE models.  Specifically, theoretical work of 
macroprudential policies must encompass systemic risk and the ensuing externalities 
associated it (Angelini et al., 2012).  Yet modeling systemic risk continues to be in infancy 
given its intangibility, the fact that its driven by more than one type of risk, and the absence 
of clarity on the relationship between macroprudential policies and systemic risk (El Said, 
2013 and Smaga 2014).23 24 In fact, Smaga (2014) holds that there is no consensus on both 
systemic risk, and financial stability as concepts. Furthermore, the fact that DSGE models 
are highly dependent on linearization techniques, whereas most asset price misalignments 
and financial crises have nonlinear effects (Angelini et al., 2012) implies an element of 
imprecision that needs to be tackled.  In other words, DSGE models are typically solved 
through local perturbation methods while the effects of financial crises may be highly 
nonlinear, rendering such research as highly difficult (El Said, 2013).  
Thus, despite their limitations, the theoretical literature sheds light on the significance of 
macroprudential policies in reducing systemic risk and achieving financial stability. 
However, the complexities associated with defining and modeling the types of systemic 
risk, the associated nonlinearities, incorporating both their macro and micro dimensions 
(Smaga, 2014), and the calibration of macroprudential policies, as well as their potential 
unintended consequences (Angelini et al., 2012) imply the difficulty of reaching strong 
policy implications. It is thus more beneficial to assess the effect of macroprudential 
policies within an empirical context.
 
23As El Said (2013) put it, systemic risk can take variety of forms depending on the players involved; systemic risk could 
take the form of a bank run or a default of an investment firm, stock market crashes or currency crises. It could also be 
contained within one country or spread to other countries via the different trade and financial linkages, making it difficult 
to develop a general modelling framework for systemic risk. Smaga (2014) thus held that system risk arises from the 
interaction of more than one type of risk; liquidity, credit, or operational risks, and that systemic risk develops alongside 
the development of financial markets. 
24 Hellwig (2018) highlights the unclear relationship between macroprudential policies and systemic risk, and the fact that 
some macroprudential policies operate in conflicting ways to one another.   
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3.3.Impact of Macroprudential Policies: Structural Vector Autoregressions  
We reiterate the fact examining the impact of macroprudential policies empirically is still 
a relatively new area of work, with much less work on their interaction with monetary 
policy relative to the theoretical literature (El Said, 2013). This is partially due to the 
absence of data over an appropriate financial/business cycle.  Thus,  only a limited number 
of studies examined the impact of different macroprudential tools (IMF, 2013), and barely 
any empirical work has been conducted to assess the cyclicality of macroprudential 
policies.  
Loungani and Rush (1995) examined the impact of changes in reserve requirements on 
investment and output in the U.S. economy. This is one of the first studies to focus on the 
macroprudential toolkit, finding that tighter reserve requirements lower investment, real 
GNP, and commercial and industrial loans. Yet this paper did not investigate monetary and 
macroprudential policy interaction.   
As mentioned previously, selected EMs have been using reserve requirements as a 
macroprudential policy instrument since the nineties, but only limited empirical work was 
conducted to test the impact of such a tool (El Said, 2013). Even more so, the recent 
employment of macroprudential tools by Advanced Economies (AEs) meant that have a 
long time series for estimating their impact is almost unfeasible (Glocker and Towbin, 
2012). 
Within an EM context, Glocker and Towbin (2012), and Federico et Al. (2012) were 
amongst the rare works to assess the effect of macroprudential policies and test their 
interaction with monetary policy using vector autoregressions. Glocker and Towbin (2012) 
focused on required reserves to test for their impact on credit, the exchange rate, external 
balances, inflation and economic activity in Brazil. SVARs were employed, and both a 
monetary policy and a required reserve shock were introduced. They found that monetary 
and macroprudential policy tightening lowered credit. Otherwise, the impact on other 
macroeconomic aggregated yielded mixed results. For instance, tightening required reserve 
ratios resulted in currency depreciation, and higher inflation, leading them to conclude that 
required reserves – as part of the macroprudential toolkit – was an appropriate instrument 
to complement monetary policy to achieve price and financial stability.  
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Vegh, Federico and Vuletin (2012) examined the effects of changes in legal reserve 
requirements in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay, and examined the interaction 
between the RRR and monetary policy using a panel VAR and concluded that tighter 
required reserve ratios reduced output. Furthermore, in an implicit quest for cyclicality, they 
deduced endogenous changes in required research ratios significantly responded to 
macroeconomic shocks, particularly output. 
Similarly, Ma, Xiandong and Xi (2011) employed a VAR model to test the effect required 
reserve ratio changes on the money multiplier in China. A 100-bps tightening of the 
required reserve ratio curbed bank credit and shrank the money multiplier by 0.075, 
concluding that required reserves can help lower systemic risk, and achieve financial 
stability. 
Using capital requirements, limits on LTV ratios, and caps on DTI ratios, the IMF (2013) 
employed a dynamic panel data vector autoregression to calculate the effect of changes in 
these policies on selected financial and macroeconomic variables in 36 EMs and AEs. 
Using data over the period 2000 – 2011, caps on LTV and DTI ratios were found to to lower 
credit growth while LTV caps and capital requirements were found to lower house prices, 
and output growth.  In contrast, caps on DTI ratios and RRs did not have a considerable 
effect on output growth.25  
As a word of caution, the empirical analysis of macroprudential policies also has its own 
limitations. Data availability and quality is still challenging given their recent employment 
in a lot of countries.  Ideally, such work would be done using firm level data as 
macroprudential instruments affect the balance sheets of financial institutions but obtaining 
such data both cross-sectionally over an extended period of time is difficult.  Furthermore, 
the limited employment of macroprudential policies by AEs restricts the number of 
countries on which such analysis could be made, limiting the strength of the empirical 
results (Lim et al., 2011 and El Said, 2013).   Despite all these caveats, Lim et al. (2011) 
held that empirically studying the effect of macroprudential policies is crucial.   
3.4. Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies Beyond Vector Autoregressions  
 
25 However, the authors held that capital and required reserves could have statistically significant effects on output growth 
if a larger sample was used, or if a different methodology was employed.  
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There has been a rise in the number of cross-country studies, using panel regressions—
mainly Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM)—to evaluate the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies. Most such work resorts to using dummy variables to represent 
whether a macroprudential tool has been employed. This is understandable in the cases of 
certain caps/ceilings, but in a lot of other cases, such as provisioning, there are data points 
that could give better—or rather more accurate—results concerning the macroeconomic 
impact of changes of macroprudential policies.26 
Lim et al. (2011) were among the first to test for the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policies using such dummy variables to reflect the use of macroprudential policies. This 
involved using panel regressions over the period 2000 – 2010 for 49 countries to test for 
the effectiveness of macroprudential policies and find that macroprudential policies are 
effective in lowering the correlation between GDP growth and credit growth. Specifically, 
caps on LTV and DTI ratios, RRs, and dynamic provisioning were found to lower the pro-
cyclicality of credit growth and bank leverage.  
Using bank level data for 2800 banks in 48 countries over the period 2000 – 2010, Claessens 
et al. (2013) use Lim et al.’s (2013) dataset using bank level data for 2800 banks in 48 
countries over the period 2000 – 2010. Using GMM panel regressions, they find that 
borrower-targeted instruments (particularly caps to LTV and DSTI ratios), and financial-
institutions targeted instruments (caps on credit growth ceilings), helped decrease asset 
growth particularly during boom times, while counter cyclical buffers—such as RRs, 
provisioning, and limits on profit distribution—limited the increase in bank leverage. They 
found that the effectiveness of the tools implemented fluctuate according to the intensity of 
the cycle, with macroprudential policies having a bigger impact when financial 
vulnerabilities increased. Counter-cyclical buffers, RRs, profit distribution and 
provisioning, while effective in limiting increases in bank leverage, were found to have less 
effectiveness throughout the cycle given the ex-ante nature of these tools, and their design 
to reduce the stockpiling of bank risks in good (or tranquil) times.  
 
26 Vandenbussche et al. (2015) is one of the papers that use such dummies, but they recognise the drawbacks of their 
usage, which undermines the extent of macroprudential loosening and tightening instances.  
26 
 
IMF (2012c) examined the relationship between monetary and macroprudential policies, 
and the effect of macroprudential policies on credit, asset prices, and the real economy. 
Focusing on capital requirements, limits on LTV ratios, caps on DTI ratios and RRs over 
the period 2000 – 2011 in 36 countries,27 and employing a fixed-effect dynamic panel 
regression,28 they found that capital requirements have a stronger effect on credit growth 
during credit busts, and limits on LTV and DTI ratios helped lower credit growth. LTV 
ratios and capital requirements also had a strong impact on house-price appreciation, but a 
limited impact on output.  
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) constructed an aggregate measure of macroprudential policy to 
capture discrepancy in the treatment of deposit accounts, reserve requirements, liquidity 
requirements, interest rate controls, credit controls, and open foreign exchange position 
limits. They found that harsher implementation of macroprudential policies—based on the 
number of macroprudential implements employed, or in aggregate—lowers the incidence 
of credit booms and lowers the probability of bad booms.29 In other words, the buffers built 
during episodes of macroprudential tightening helped limit the consequences of busts when 
they occurred. 
Kuttner and Shim (2013) used data from 57 countries to examine the effectiveness of nine 
tools in alleviating house price appreciation and housing credit growth. Using fixed effect 
panel regressions, housing credit growth was found to be strongly affected by changes in 
the DTI ratio, the LTV ratio, limits on exposure to the housing sector and housing-related 
taxes.30  
Using event studies, cross-country (macro) panel regressions, and bank level (micro) panel 
regressions31, Zhang and Zoli (2014) examined the use of macroprudential tools—as well 
as capital flow measures—in 33 other countries, over the period 2000 – 2013. Using an 
index that distinguishes between housing and non-housing related measures, they found 
 
27 Also using the Lim et al. (2011) database and focusing on an index that increases by one to capture a macroprudential 
tightening, and decreases by one to capture a loosening. 
28 They used time-fixed effects to account for cross-country variation, and country-fixed effects to account for time-
invariant characteristics.   
29 That is, booms that culminate with financial crises, according to Dell’Arriccia et al. (2012).  OLS regressions were 
employed in this analysis.  
30 Using event studies, only the DTI ratio appeared to be a significant tool, however. 
31 GMM regressions. 
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that Asian countries made most use of macroprudential tools, and that caps on LTV ratios, 
housing-related taxes, and foreign currency-related measures helped lower credit growth 
and house price growth. LTV ratios, housing tax measures, and foreign currency-related 
measures were the most effective measures in their sample.  
Cerutti et al.  (2015) examined the impact of macroprudential policies on house prices and 
credit market development for 119 countries over the period 2000-2013. Using GMM, they 
found that the employment of different macroprudential tools leads to lower credit growth, 
but the effects are less pronounced in advanced and open economies. However, they find 
that there is a weaker negative impact on house prices.  They deduce that macroprudential 
policies are more effective in good times, rather than in bad times. The caveat in this dataset 
is that the authors use survey data and employ a dummy variable to reflect the use of 
macroprudential policies.  
Vandenbussche et al. (2015) examined the impact of macroprudential policies32 on house 
price inflation and household credit growth in sixteen CESEE countries between the late 
1990s and 2011 and found that only changes in the minimum capital adequacy ratio and 
credit growth ceilings had a substantial effect relative to the larger set of macroprudential 
policies examined. To our knowledge, Vandenbussche et al. (2015) is among the few 
studies to assess the cyclicality of macroprudential policies, and they hold that some 
countries’ (Bulgaria, Croatia and Latvia) macroprudential policies clearly had a counter-
cyclical pattern, while others (Latvia, Romania, Hungary and Lithuania) were at times pro-
cyclical.  
Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) construct an index for macroprudential policies in 57 
AEs and EMs over the period 2000 – 2013, to test for the impact of this index on credit and 
house price inflation. Within a dynamic panel context, they found that macroprudential 
tightening is linked to lower bank credit growth in general, particularly housing credit 
growth, and house price inflation. They found that caps on LTV and DTI ratios, alongside 
 
32 An index for macroprudential policies was constructed to represent instances of loosening and tightening rather than 
the general use of dummy variables, and they acknowledge the drawbacks of 1) the use of dummy variables; and 2) the 
assumption that a 1% change in reserve requirements yields the same impact as a 10% change in the same variable, so 
they conduct a linear transformation to capture loosening and tightening.  
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capital requirements were the most effective macroprudential tools, and that countries that 
did not use these policies witnessed house price inflation particularly during 2011-2013. 
On the interaction between macroprudential policies and monetary policies, Lim et al. 
(2013) used data for 39 countries to examine the response time across several types of 
institutional arrangements of macroprudential policies. Both monetary policy and 
macroprudential policies were found to ultimately affect the demand and supply of credit 
and risk appetites (IMF, 2013b). 
Region-specific studies include the work of Dassati Camors et al. (2014), who found that 
macroprudential tightening reduces the supply of credit to firms. Tovar et al. (2012) 
employed event studies and dynamic panel VARs to examine the role of RRs and other 
macroprudential policies and found that these tools have a reasonable yet temporary effect, 
while complementing monetary policy. For Asia, Ahuja and Nabar (2011), and Igan and 
Kang (2012), highlighted that tightening the DTI and LTV ratios lowered either housing or 
household credit growth in Hong Kong and Korea, with similar findings found in Eastern 
Europe, particularly in Estonia (Sutt et al., 2011)), Romania (Neagu et al., 2015), Hungary 
(Banai, Király, and Nagy, 2011)), Macedonia (Celeska et al., 2011)), and Poland (Kruszka 
and Kowalczyk, 2011).  
3.5. Cyclicality of Macroprudential Policies  
Despite the rise in analysis on the effectiveness on macroprudential policies, even fewer 
studies attempted to examine whether macroprudential policies were implemented counter-
cyclically or pro-cyclically.  Danielsson et al. (2016) highlight the likelihood of the pro-
cyclicality of macroprudential policies. Firstly, smoothing the credit cycle leads to a 
perceived low-risk environment, which boosts additional risk taking, and macroprudential 
policies should prevent costly build-ups rather than smoothen natural volatilities that echo 
fundamentals. Secondly, close monitoring of aggregate credit expansion implies closely 
regulated financial institutions, which standardizes the financial system. This in turn causes 
market participants take more similar portfolio decisions, which increases pro-cyclicality. 
Thirdly, indicators capturing systemic risk lag financial markets, rather than lead them, 
providing the necessary warnings a little too late. This implies that the implementation of 
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counter-cyclical policies occurs with a time lag, which could exacerbate financial market 
conditions, rather than resolve them. 33 
Rupello and Suarez (2012) developed a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending 
whereby banks expect that 1) there will be shocks to their earnings; and 2) variations of 
capital requirements over the business cycle could weaken their lending capacity and hold 
capital buffers. They show that Basel II was more pro-cyclical (in its rules) than Basel I but 
safeguards the health of the banking sector even more so than Basel I. Garbers and Liu 
(2018) employed a small open economy real business cycle model with domestic and 
foreign borrowing, incorporating capital requirements and LTV ratios. When a positive 
foreign interest rate shock is introduced, risk premium rises and the availability of foreign 
fund falls. Both macroprudential tools were found to lessen the impact of such a shock, 
more so from the LTV ratio. They found that the optimal macroprudential policy was 
counter-cyclical. That is, LTV ratios increase after the shock and the capital adequacy 
drops.   
4 Data and Model Specification   
4.1. Data 
For macroprudential policies, our focus has been the RRs, LTV ratios, provisioning, and 
depending on usage and availability, minimum capital adequacy ratios, capital 
requirements, sector-specific (mostly housing-related) risk weights, and taxes on financial 
institutions. We obtain this data primarily from central bank websites, financial stability 
reports, Bloomberg, Datastream, Haver Analytics, in addition to existing databases, 
particularly Shim et al. (2013). We build a monthly time series based on the dates of 
announcements that were made and complement these series with data that reflect 
macroeconomic activity, namely industrial production (IP)/manufacturing, as well as 
unemployment. For prices, we use both the consumer price index and housing price index. 
For credit, we employ overall domestic credit indicators, household credit, credit to the non-
 
33 Danielsson et al. (2016) highlighted the example of Japan in 2007, when authorities restricted bank lending to property 
developers at a time when foreign lenders were also exiting the real estate market, which led to significant credit crunch.  
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financial sector, as well as housing credit. 34 Data on credit, prices, and macroeconomic 
activity were obtained either from Haver Analytics or Datastream.  
4.2.Methodology 
We follow Glocker and Towbin (2012) and El Said (2013) to examine the impact of 
unexpected changes in macroprudential policy tools on selected macroeconomic 
aggregates, and estimate the following Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) 
specification  
    (1) 
Where is a five-dimensional vector of endogenous variables with monthly logarithms of 
variables that capture economic activity, prices, credit, monetary and macroprudential 
policies.  Our main indicators for macroeconomic activity are the unemployment rate and 
industrial production (IP).35 For prices, we mainly use the overall consumer price index, 
and housing-specific CPI, while for credit we use total credit, household credit, as well as 
mortgage credit depending on data availability. 36  
Following El Said (2013), required reserves are used as a measure of macroprudential 
policy in our benchmark model, and then repeat our estimations with the different 
macroprudential policies employed; LTV ratios, liquidity ratios, minimum and total 
regulatory capital, capital requirements/regulatory capital, risk weights, taxes, and 
provisioning.  
Unless otherwise stated, all variables - except for the monetary and macroprudential polices 
-are log transformed, and the analysis is conducted for 15 EMs. The choice of countries has 
been governed by  data availability based on the IMF (2013), Glocker and Towbin (2012, 
2015), Vegh, Federico and Vuletin (2012), and run our analysis over the period 2000-2012 
 
34 We employ these two variables inter -changeability to test the robustness of our results.  
35 Using the unemployment rate as a proxy for economic activity is standard in the SVAR literature and monetary policy 
and was also used in Glocker and Towbin (2012) to measure the impact of required reserves on different macroeconomic 
aggregates.   
36 Note that we have conducted unit root tests to establish the stationarity of the data – previous versions employed first 
differences with similar results obtained - but following Perotti, 2002, de Castro and de Cos, 2006; Heppke-Falk et. al, 
2006, and Ravnik and Zilic (2010), variables in levels are employed as is typical in the literature given that our main 
interest is the dynamic effects of both the macroeconomic and macroprudential shocks, instead of parameter estimation 
(See Ravnik and Zilic, 2010, Guay, and Pelgrin, 2007, and Heppke-Falk et. al, 2006 for more information). 




for most countries.37 This specification includes a constant, and is re-estimated using a 
constant and a deterministic trend38. Lags were determined by the Akaike and Schwartz 
Information Criteria, and for most of our estimations, ranged between 1-2 lags.  
We employ bootstrapping as it lays the ground for a strong basis for forecast errors, has an 
added value as a predictive tool (McCullough, 1994) and is “superior” to Monte Carlo 
simulation method (Fachin and Bravetti, 1996). We thus bootstrap the confidence intervals 
of the impulse response functions (IRFs) at the 68% confidence level with 2000 iterations.  
Before proceeding with the Identification strategy, we highlight the fact that the empirical 
literature on the monetary policy transmission mechanism is classified into two strands (El 
Said, 2013). One branch identifies monetary policy shocks as innovations to a monetary 
aggregate, or M2 or the monetary base.39 . The other classifies monetary policy shocks as 
innovations to the baseline interest rate.40 Similar Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke 
and Blinder (1992), and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1994 and 1999), we employ 
the latter specification, with more details in the identification strategy below.  
4.2.1. Identification Strategy   







𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 , 𝑢𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙) is thus the vector of reduced form 
innovations (residuals)41. We impose the following identification assumptions on our A and 
B matrices to identify the macroprudential and monetary policy shocks:  
AU=BE  (2) 
 
 
37 Monthly data restrictions for our macroeconomic indicators in some cases force us to start beyond this date.  
38 Also following El Said (2013).  
39 See Barro (1977), Reichenstein (1987), Cochrane (1994). 
40 Such as the SELIC, repo rate, and overnight interest rates as in the cases of Brazil, India, and Turkey respectively (El 
Said, 2013) 
41 Econ represents economic activity, cpi represents the different measures of price indicators, credit presents the different 











































 (3)  
The classic literature 42  assumes a recursive assumption, and we thus identify a 
macroprudential shock and an interest rate shock.43  Sims (1980) suggested the use of the 
Choleski identification scheme, in such a way that the model is just identified with 15 
restrictions,  matrix A as a lower triangular matrix, while matrix B diagonal. Following El 
Said (2013), we do not impose any restrictions on the elements of matrix B as restrictions 
on lagged endogenous variables are difficult to substantiate theoretically. Hence, it is a 
diagonal matrix, and its elements are identified within the SVAR estimation.44 
Aiyar, Calomaris and Wieladek (2012) highlighted that a substantial literature in monetary 
economics employed this identification scheme, as long as the “slow moving variables” – 
our macroeconomic variables - are ordered before the two policy variables. Following El 
Said (2013), macroprudential indicators are ordered last in our baseline regressions, and 
interest rates are ordered fourth. 45   Thus, our benchmark model assumes that our 
macroeconomic aggregates do not contemporaneously react to changes in monetary or 
macroprudential policies (El Said, 2013), which is the standard application in the VAR 
literature on monetary policy (Leeper, Sims, and Zha, (1996), Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Watson (1997), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz 
(2005), and Federico and Vuletin (2012)). We therefore presume that innovations in 
macroprudential and monetary policies do not have any contemporaneous effect on our 





42 See Mallick and Soussa (2011) 
43 See Gottschalk (2001) for further information on identification. 
44 See Amisano, and Giannini (1997). 

































































This section only reports the results that displayed significance among our regressions 
among the countries this chapter investigates.  We first present the cyclicality of 
macroprudential and monetary policies in response to shocks, and then we follow this by 
examining the effectiveness of these policies in terms of their impact on economic activity, 
prices, and credit.  
Despite the equivocal nature of the results, we generally find that output, prices and credit 
respond in the anticipated (downward) direction in response to a shock (tightening) in 
macroprudential policy in most countries under study, especially among countries that 
endured house price bubbles, overheating episodes, or capital flow volatility.46  
The price puzzle holds in a lot of countries whereby monetary tightening is associated with 
higher prices. Results pointed to the fact that the implementation of macroprudential 
policies was both countercyclical and pro-cyclical, sometimes in the same country, 
depending on the tool being employed, and the type of shock that elicits the macroprudential 
response. In other words, the effectiveness of these tools in controlling either credit growth, 
inflation, or economic activity, did not particularly follow a particular cyclicalality pattern. 
That is, the effectiveness of macroprudential policies did not necessarily stem from their 
counter-cyclicality, and sometimes their pro-cyclical implementation was more effective in 
reducing credit or inflation.  
Similar to the results of El Said (2013), changes in required reserve ratios were found to be 
more effective in targeting macroeconomic activity and credit growth, whereas LTV ratios 
were more suited towards curbing housing-CPI, and housing-specific credit.  This is similar 
to the findings of Vuletin, Federic and Vegh (2012), Glocker and Towbin (2012 and 2015), 
and others, but we employ bigger datasets across a broader range of EMs.   
Overall, our results point to the equivocal manner through which macroprudential policies 
operate, despite their effectiveness. The tables below display our cross-country results for 
simplification purposes, and then we highlight selected country-specific findings to portray 
the functioning of macroprudential policies. Despite the significance of the results 
 
46 The volatility of capital flows is beyond the scope of this chapter. See Chapter Three on the link between capital flows 
- namely portfolio flows - and macroprudential policies.  
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displayed, we must emphasize the equivocal nature of our results, which has been the 
subject of criticism in the literature for some time. Another source of criticism worth 
highlighting is that not much is yet known about the real effect of macroprudential policies 
in terms of supplying credit, and credit and/or banks' risk-taking behavior. (Gomez, 2016) 
5.1.Required Reserve Ratios: Cyclicality and Effectiveness 
RRRs are the most frequently used macroprudential tool within EMs, and our results point 
to their significant effect on either reducing industrial/economic activity, prices, and 
inflation.  Vegh and Vuletin (2014) held that EMs used RRR over the business cycle more 
actively relative to AEs to manage capital flows47. The impact of macroprudential policies 
on credit is mixed, and the countercyclical behavior of RRRs does not necessarily that 
macroprudential policies are effective in achieving its desired objectives, particularly in 
response to credit growth or inflation.  In some countries, tighter macroprudential policies 
contribute to rising unemployment, but with a lag. RRRs tend to be countercyclical 
particularly in response to a macroeconomic shock proxied by a shock to unemployment or 
industrial activity/manufacturing particularly with Asia, and Emerging Europe, Middle East 
and Africa (EMEA).  
5.1.1. Cyclicality of Required Reserve Ratios 
Table (2) displays the response of RRRs to an unemployment shock (an increase in 
unemployment), and in three out of the six countries displayed, the RRR gets to be loosened 
immediately (i.e. acting countercyclically). Except for Colombia, all RRRs are loosened 
either on impact or in the first quarter after an unemployment shock. Monetary policy was 
countercyclical in all countries on impact, except for Egypt. 48  
Table (2): Cyclicality of RRRs in Response to an Unemployment Shock 
Unemployment 
Shock RRR Response 
Monetary Policy 
Response 
  0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil * * * * * * * *
 
47 Refer to Chapter Three on macroprudential policies and capital flows.  




Colombia  * * * * * * *
Czech Republic * * * * * * * *
Egypt * * * * * * * *
Turkey * * * * * * * *
Russia * * * * * * * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. An upward arrow indicates an increase (tightening) in the macroprudential tool of interest in all cases except for 
LTV ratios when an upward arrow indicators macroprudential loosening. * indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
Table (3) represents the responsiveness of RRRs (and monetary policy) to an IP (or 
manufacturing) shock. This is a positive shock that boosts economic activity, and in five 
out of the eight EMs on display, RRRs acted countercyclically, and the RRRs were 
tightened on impact in response to the shock in IP. The duration of tightening varies from 
one country to another, but on average the tightening occurs on impact, and lasts for one 
quarter. Monetary policy - in seven out of the eight countries on display - was 
countercyclical, with policy rates tightened on impact.   
Table (3): Cyclicality of RRRs in Response to an IP Shock 
IP/ Manufacturing 
Shock RRR Response  
Monetary Policy 
Response 
  0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil *    * * * *
China * * * * * * * *
Colombia * * * * * * * *
Czech Republic * * * * * * * *
India * * * *  *  
Poland * * * * * * * *
South Korea     * * * *
Turkey * * * * * *  
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. An upward arrow indicates an increase (tightening) in the macroprudential tool of interest in all cases except for 





Table (4) highlights selected results whereby RRRs respond to a shock in CPI inflation, or 
housing price inflation, and in seven out of ten countries, RRRs also respond in a 
countercyclical pattern on impact, more so than the six instances of monetary policy 
tightening on impact.  
Table (4): Cyclicality of RRRs in Response to a Price Shock 
 
Inflation/Housing 




0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil * * * * * * * *
China * * * * * * * *
Colombia * * * * * *  
Egypt *    * * * 
Czech Republic * * * * * * * *
India * * * * * * * *
Poland * * * * * * * *
South Korea * * * * * * * *
Turkey     * * * *
Russia * * * * * * * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. An upward arrow indicates an increase (tightening) in the macroprudential tool of interest in all cases except for 
LTV ratios when an upward arrow indicators macroprudential loosening. * indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
 
Table (5) displays the response of RRRs to a credit shock, whereby five out of the nine 
countries on display witnessed a tightening in their RRRs, more so than the three instances 
of monetary tightening with the impact of the shock remaining significant until twenty 
months after the shock. It is important to note that we are representing a sample of our more 
significant results, and as can be seen, RRRs respond more countercyclically relative to 
monetary policies in selected EMs. This suggests that despite the less frequent changes in 
RRRs, they have displayed a dynamic response to macroeconomic shocks. This is similar 
to the findings of the IMF (2012c) whereby counter-cyclical monetary policy was used, 
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while macroprudential tools were used to restrict any potential accumulation of systemic 
risk related with rapid credit growth.  
Table (5): Cyclicality of RRRs in Response to a Credit/Lending Shock  
 
 
Credit/ Lending  
Shock  RRR Response 
Monetary Policy 
Response 
  0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil * * *  * * * *
China * * * * * * * *
Colombia * * * * * * * *
Czech Republic * * * * * * * *
Egypt        
India * * *     
Poland * * * * * * * *
South Korea * * * * * * * *
Russia * * * * * * * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. An upward arrow indicates an increase (tightening) in the macroprudential tool of interest in all cases except for 
LTV ratios when an upward arrow indicators macroprudential loosening. * indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
5.1.2. Effectiveness of RRRs 
Tables (6)-(9) display the results of shocks to RRRs and policy rates, and the response of 
IP, unemployment, prices and credit to these shocks.  Table (6) displays the result of IP 
which only declines in Poland and the Czech Republic on impact as a result of an RRR 
shock. Similar to the IMF (2013), monetary policy was more effective in curbing industrial 
activity and credit growth relative to RRRs, with the effect persistent up to 10 months after 
an interest rate increase. In some cases - such as India - IP does drop after one quarter from 
the introduction of the RRR, but overall, monetary policy has a stronger impact on IP and 
credit relative to RRRs.  The price puzzle persists in many of the EMs under analysis, and 






Table (6): Impact of Monetary and Macroprudential Shocks on IP 
Policy Shock   
RRR 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
IP Response 
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil       * 
China     * * * *
Colombia    *    
Czech Republic * * * * * * * *
India * * * *
   
Poland * * * * * * * *
South Korea     * * * *
Russia  * * * * * *

Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. An upward arrow indicates an increase (tightening) in the macroeconomic shock of interest (increase in 
unemployment or IP, or prices or credit).* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence band. 
 
Table (7) shows the response of unemployment to a rise in interest rates and the RRR. 
Generally, unemployment was found to respond less to policy changes – most of the results 
were insignificant for unemployment - and among the significant results, unemployment 
rises on impact as a result of RRRs tightening in Brazil and Egypt. Unemployment is 
normally a lagging variable, which would explain its rise 5-10 months after the initial 
tightening, either monetary or macroprudential.  
Table (7): Impact of Monetary and Macroprudential Shocks on Unemployment 
Policy Shock   
RRR 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Unemployment 
Response 0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil * * * * * * * *
Colombia        
Czech Republic  * * * * * * *
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Egypt * * * *    
Russia * * * * * * * *
Turkey  * *  * * * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. An upward arrow indicates an increase (tightening) in the macroeconomic shock of interest (increase in 
unemployment or IP, or prices or credit).* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence band. 
 
Table (8) displays the results of a macroprudential and monetary shock on inflation. Only in 
the cases of Colombia, Poland and Russia were RRRs effective on impact in reducing 
inflation, and the price puzzle appears to hold despite monetary tightening. That is, monetary 
tightening is associated with price increases rather than price decreases. 49 
 
 
49 In some cases, the inclusion of commodity prices - such as Brent oil prices - helped improve the results, but in general, 
the price puzzle holds. This argument held for Colombia, but it did not work for the United Arab Emirates, both 
hydrocarbons exporters.  
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Table (8): Impact of Monetary and Macroprudential Shocks on Inflation 
Policy Shock   
RRR 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Inflation Response  0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil * * * * *   
China     * * * *
Colombia * * * * *  * *
Czech Republic * * * * * * * *
Egypt        
India     * * * *
Poland * * * * * * * *
Russia * * * * * *  
South Korea        
Turkey     * * * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. An upward arrow indicates an increase (tightening) in the macroeconomic shock of interest (increase in 
unemployment or IP, or prices or credit).* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence band. 
 
Table (9) displays the results of the response of credit to shocks to RRRs and the central bank 
policy rates, and the results are mixed. Only in Russia did credit drop on impact, with most 
other countries displaying an insignificant impact on impact as a result of an RRR shock. 
Only four out of ten countries see a decline in credit on impact as a result of an increase in 
monetary policy, and the impact lags by at least a quarter. China’s credit declines in the 
second quarter after RRR, as well as monetary tightening, and the results are in line with Ma, 
Xiandong and Xi (2011) about the ability of RRR to curb credit growth, even if the impact 
is short-lived. 
Table (9): Impact of Monetary and Macroprudential Shocks on Credit 
Macroprudential 
Shock   RRR 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Credit Response  0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil * * * * * * * *
China * * * * * * * *
Colombia     * * * *
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Czech Republic   * * * * * *
Egypt        
India * * * *    
Poland    * * * * *
Russia * * * *    
South Korea     * * * *
Turkey     * * * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. An upward arrow indicates an increase (tightening) in the macroeconomic shock of interest (increase in 
unemployment or IP, or prices or credit).* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence band. 
Overall, our results show that the countercyclical behavior of RRRs does not necessarily 
imply effective macroprudential policies in achieving its desired objectives, particularly 
with respond to credit growth or inflation.  
5.2.LTV Ratios 
For caps on LTV ratios, a shock to this macroprudential variable implies a loosening, so we 
carefully interpret the results of this section.  We find that LTV ratios have behaved counter-
cyclically in response to unemployment and IP shocks.  
5.2.1. Cyclicality of LTV ratios 
We have five countries that implement caps on LTV ratios in our sample, and in four of 
them LTV ratios behaved countercyclically when it comes to an unemployment/IP shock 
as could be seen in Table (10).  That is, an adverse shock to unemployment was met by a 
loosening (increase) in LTV ratios in Poland on impact, but then they were tightened 
(decreased) as of the fifth month. Interest rates were also loosened in response to an interest 
rate shock in Poland. An IP shock was met by tightening the LTV ratios in China, South 
Korea, and Turkey on impact, but the result was only significant in South Korea and 
Turkey, two countries that experienced episodes of overheating (and housing price 
appreciation). Poland loosened its LTV ratios on impact but tightened within the first 
quarter based on the impulse response functions.  Only in Korea were interest rates 
tightened on impact in line with LTV ratios, and in Turkey, they were tightened within the 
first quarter. Poland, as well, loosened its interest rates on impact as a result of an (adverse) 
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unemployment shock, so overall, the combination of LTV ratios and interest rates tend to 
respond countercyclically in the countries in our sample.
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Table (10): Cyclicality of LTV Ratios/Policy Rates After an Economic Activity Shock 
Unemployment 
Shock LTV 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Poland * * * * * * * *
IP/ Manufacturing 
Shock LTV 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
China    * * * * *
Poland * * * * * * * *
South Korea * * * * * * * *
Turkey * * *  * * * *
 
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. For LTV ratios, an upward arrow indicates a loosening of this tool in operation, so results to be interpreted in the 
opposite direction as a result of loosening this macroprudential tool.* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
 
Interestingly, Table (11) shows that LTV ratios acted procyclically in response to an 
inflation/house price shock. In this context, LTV ratios were loosened on impact as house 
prices increased, only to be tightened during the second quarter in the case of China, Poland, 
and Turkey. Interest rates, however, were tightened on impact in China and Poland (and 
Turkey, even though the tightening in Turkey was not significant).  What is more interesting 
is the results in Table (11), which shows that China and Turkey tightened their LTV ratios 
on impact after a credit shock. Thus, LTV ratios in China and Turkey have acted 
countercyclically in the face of a credit shock, but procyclically during an inflation shock, 








Table (11): Cyclicality of LTV Ratios/Policy Rates After an Inflation Shock 
Inflation/Housing 
Price Shock LTV 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
China * *   * * * *
Poland * * * * * * * *
South Korea        
Turkey * * * *   * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. For LTV ratios, an upward arrow indicates a loosening of this tool in operation, so results to be interpreted in the 
opposite direction as a result of loosening this macroprudential tool.* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
 
Table (12) portrays more pro-cyclicality of LTV ratios in response to a credit shock in the 
case of Korea on impact, and a counter-cyclical behavior in Turkey, South Korea, and in 
Poland. 50 Our results point to the differing pattern of cyclicality of the same tool under 
different shocks, and that LTV ratios were countercyclical in the case of a shock to 
macroeconomic activity and credit, more than shocks to CPI. This is in line with the 
findings of Lim et Al. (2011) who held that caps on LTV have been implemented depending 
on loan size, as well as possibly the location and value of the property. 
Table (12): Cyclicality of LTV Ratios/Policy Rates After a Credit Shock 
Credit/ Lending  
Shock LTV 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
China * * * * * * * *
Poland / * * * * * * * *
South Korea * * * * * * * *
Turkey * * * * * * * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. For LTV ratios, an upward arrow indicates a loosening of this tool in operation, so results to be interpreted in the 
 
50 For Poland, in the regression including unemployment, LTV ratios were tightened/counter-cyclical on impact, but the 
result was not significant. When unemployment is replaced by IP, LTV ratios were tightened on impact, and the result 
was significant.  
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opposite direction as a result of loosening this macroprudential tool.* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
5.2.2. Effectiveness of LTV Ratios  
Higher LTV ratios imply a loosening of LTV ratios, encouraging more lending for 
housing/real estate purposes, so we interpret our shock as a loosening shock that encourages 
borrowing for house purchases. Table (13) shows that, on impact, loosening LTV ratios is 
associated with a fall in both IP and manufacturing, as well as a fall in unemployment. 
Monetary tightening also reduces IP in Turkey and South Korea and increases 
unemployment in Poland. Table (14) shows that prices drop in the case of Turkey when the 
LTV ratio is loosened, which is an anomaly in this case, but prices increase in South Korea 
as a result of the same LTV loosening. The rise in prices in China and Poland as a result of 
the LTV shock was not significant on impact.    Table (14) also shows that the price puzzle 
still holds. It is important to note that we showed earlier that LTV ratios acted pro-cyclically 
in response to an inflation/house price shock, which could explain their ineffectiveness in 
Table (14). They were, however, implemented counter-cyclically in the case of an industrial 
shock. A simple conclusion we can make is that the counter-cyclicality of macroprudential 
policies could dampen their adverse effects on credit and inflation when they are loosened 
as the central bank/financial regulator acts in a dynamic pattern to any vulnerabilities that 
may arise. Only in the case of Korea, as shown in Table (14) was loosening the LTV ratio 
associated with higher prices. The price puzzle still holds.  
Table (13): Response of Production/Unemployment to LTV and Policy Rate Shocks 
Policy Shock   
LTV 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
IP Response 
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
China * * *     
South Korea * * * * * * * *
Turkey * * * * * * * *
Policy Shock   
LTV 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Unemployment 
Response 0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Poland * * * * * * * *
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Table (14): Response of Inflation to LTV and Monetary Policy Shocks 
Policy Shock   
LTV 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Inflation Response  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
China     * * * 
Poland     * * * *
South Korea * *   * * * *
Turkey * * * * * * * *
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. For LTV ratios, an upward arrow indicates a loosening of this tool in operation, so results to be interpreted in the 
opposite direction as a result of loosening this macroprudential tool.* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
Table (15) displays the response of credit to loosening the LTV ratio, and monetary policy 
shocks. Interesting, and similar to the pattern in inflation, loosening LTV ratios led to lower 
credit, and the results were significant for Turkey and Poland until the third quarter after 
the initial shock. A monetary tightening was able to reduce credit in China and Turkey, but 
credit rose in South Korea. So, while the results are equivocal, countercyclical LTV ratios 
helped contain credit from growing even if LTV ratios were loosened.  
Table (15): Response of Credit to LTV and Monetary Policy Shocks 
Macroprudential 
Shock   
LTV 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Credit Response  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
China     * * * *
Poland * * * *    *
South Korea     * * * *







Provisioning, as a macroprudential tool, is employed to ensure that banks keep a pool of 
money on the side in case of a rise in non-performing loans, bad or impaired, especially 
during episodes of distress. A lot of countries, such as the United Arab Emirates, during the 
global financial crisis raised their provisioning ratios, which discouraged lending, leading 
to a lot of criticism about the role of provisionings in aggravating slowdowns as a result of 
limited credit extensions as they were implemented procyclically. Basel III has thus 
advocated the use of time varying/dynamic provisioning, and our results yields interesting 
observations.  
5.3.1. Cyclicality of Provisioning 
In response to an unemployment shock, provisionings were loosened in two out of four 
countries, and tightened in two others. Thus, they were counter-cyclical in Serbia, and 
Brazil, and pro-cyclical in Poland and Colombia as shown in Table (16). 
Table (16): Cyclicality of Provisionings in Response to an Unemployment Shock 
Unemployment 
Shock Provisioning 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  





 * * * *
Colombia * * * * *   
Poland * * * * * * * *
Serbia * * * * * *  
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. For LTV ratios, an upward arrow indicates a loosening of this tool in operation, so results to be interpreted in the 
opposite direction as a result of loosening this macroprudential tool.* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
Table (17) displays the cyclicality of provisionings as a result of an industrial shock 
whereby out of 7 countries, provisionings were countercyclical, in this case tightened on 
impact, in India and South Korea, and tightened within the first quarter in Columbia and 
the UAE. For the UAE, provisioning was procyclical on impact, but tightened shortly 
afterwards, and in the case of Columbia, it was not significant. Turkey was the only country 
whose provisionings displayed a persistently pro-cyclical behavior, loosened in the first and 
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second quarter, and the effect dissipates afterwards. Monetary policy displayed a counter-
cyclical behavior in most of these countries, tightening on impact in response of a shock in 
IP.  











Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. For LTV ratios, an upward arrow indicates a loosening of this tool in operation, so results to be interpreted in the 
opposite direction as a result of loosening this macroprudential tool.* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% confidence 
band. 
Table (18) shows that in response to a price shock, provisionings were pro-cyclical, and 
loosened in Brazil, Serbia, and the UAE, and were countercyclical in Colombia, Turkey 
and South Korea, and tightened in all countries except for South Korea. Results confirm the 
superiority of interest rates in the face of inflation, and that provisionings may not 




Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil   *  * * * *
Colombia  * * * * * * *
India * * * *    
Serbia     * * * *





 * * * *
UAE * * * *    
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Table (18): Cyclicality of Provisionings in Response to a Price Shock 
Inflation/Housing 
Price Shock Provisioning 
Monetary Policy: 
CB Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil * * * * * * * *
Colombia * * * * * * * *
India     * * * *
Poland   

    
Serbia * * * * * * * *
South Korea * * * * * * * *
Turkey * * * * * * * *
UAE * * * *    
Notes: These tables present our findings from the impulse response functions evaluated on impact, after five, ten, and 20 months after 
the shock of interest. For LTV ratios, an upward arrow indicates a loosening of this tool in operation, so results to be interpreted in 
the opposite direction as a result of loosening this macroprudential tool.* indicates the significance of the results at the 68% 
confidence band. 
Table (19) shows that provisionings are counter-cyclical in the case of Colombia, Serbia, 
and Turkey, but procyclical in India, Poland, the latter becoming countercyclical in the 
second quarter. These results support the function of macroprudential policies in 
responding to rapid credit extensions, despite their pro-cyclical response for other 
macroeconomic variables, as well as for other countries.   
Table (19): Cyclicality of Provisioning in Response to a Credit Shock 
Credit/ Lending  Shock 
Provisioning 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil  * * * * * * *
Colombia *   *  * * *
India * * * * * * * *
Poland * * *






Serbia * * * * * * * *
South Korea * * * * * * * *
Turkey *    * * * *
UAE        
5.3.2. Effectiveness of Provisionings 
In terms of effectiveness of provisionings, Table (20) shows that tighter provisionings only 
reduced IP in the case of Turkey, which displays a pro-cyclical behavior in response to 
changes in industrial activity, and a counter-cyclical behavior otherwise. In the case of an 
unemployment shock, only in Poland did provisioning help lower unemployment. We 
previously saw that provisionings were pro-cyclical in the face of a 
macroeconomic/IP/unemployment shock, so their pro-cyclical nature in this case helped 
curb unemployment as shown in Table (21). Table (22) shows no particular pattern for the 
impact of provisionings on inflation, whereby a provisioning shock only lowers inflation 
in Brazil, whereas monetary policy shocks helped lower inflation in some EMs, with the 
price puzzle still holding. Table (23) shows that provisionings are effective in selected 
countries in reducing credit, while it is insignificant for the rest of them.  
Table (20): Effectiveness of Provisionings in Response to an Industrial Shock 
Policy Shock 
Provisioning 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
IP Response 
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil       * *
Colombia  * * *    *
India * * * *    
South Korea * *   * * * *
Turkey * * * * * * * *





Table (21): Effectiveness of Provisionings in Response to an Unemployment Shock 
Policy Shock 
Provisioning 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Unemployment 
Response 0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Serbia * * * * * * * 
Colombia  * * * * * * *
Poland * * * * * * * *
Serbia * * * * * * * *
 
Table (22): Effectiveness of Provisionings in Response to an Inflation Shock 
Policy Shock 
Provisioning 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Inflation Response 
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil * * * * * * * *
Colombia  * * *    *
India   * * * * * *
Poland * * * * * * * *
Serbia * * * *   


South Korea        
Turkey    * * * * *
UAE     * * * *
Table (23): Effectiveness of Provisionings in Response to a Credit Shock 
Policy Shock 
Provisioning 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Credit Response 0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil    * * * * *
Serbia * *  *    
Colombia  * * * * * * *
India  * * *    
Poland        






5.4.Other Macroprudential Policies  
Annex II displays additional results from selected macroprudential policies including 
regulatory capital/capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, whereby these policies were 
counter-cyclical in response to IP and unemployment shocks and were both procyclical 
and counter-cyclical in response to credit shocks, and shocks to consumer prices. In terms 
of their impact, similar to previous policies, their counter-cyclicality did not entail their 
ability to reduce IP; they had mixed effects on IP and unemployment,51 but lowered credit 
and consumer prices.  
5.5.Selected EM Case Studies 52 
This section outlines selected IRFs for two countries, one that displayed countercyclicality 
and effectiveness in lowering house-prices and credit, and another whereby the effects were 
not as straightforward. We highlight impulse response functions from Columbia, as an 
example of proper implementation of macroprudential policies, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), an example of a country highly dependent on macroprudential policies 
but its implementation is not as sophisticated as that of Colombia. Annex III highlights 
three other EMs, Turkey, Egypt, and South Korea as additional examples. Annex IV 
outlines the macroeconomic backdrop in which macroprudential policies operated for our 
12 EMs.  
i. Colombia 
Colombia is an example of a country that employed a number of macroprudential policies 
to reduce systemic risk, and as the previous section showed, it applied them counter-
 
51 However, these policies are not designed with the aim of targeting IP in the first place, so the mixed results are 
warranted.  
52 All other IRFs are available upon request. I acknowledge using the code of the Bank of England’s Ambrogio Cesa-
Bianchi- available online- for running the SVARs, generating my IRFs, and updating the code as was deemed necessary. 
IRFs presented- similar to the tables- display the bootstrapped results at the 68% confidence band.  
South Korea     * * * *
Turkey  * * * * * * *
UAE     * * * 
53 
 
cyclically. During 2006-2009, Columbia experienced an episode of over-heating 53 
characterized by a real GDP growth rate of 7%, an annual growth rate of its loan portfolio 
of around 28%- only to be followed by an increase in non-performing loans- increasing 
housing prices, and significant capital inflows (Gomez, 2016).  In addition to monetary 
tightening, tighter reserve requirements were implemented as well as higher provisioning 
were in place in addition to other - non-quantifiable - macroprudential tools such as limits 
on the exposure of financial institutions to derivatives operations, restrictions on profit 
distribution, and controls on foreign debt exposure of residents to control credit expansion. 
The combination of these policies helped bring down credit growth by the end of 2007 
(Gomez et al., 2016), and our results are consistent with the notion that monetary policy 
alone has been insufficient to dampen credit growth and control overheating. 
For Colombia, we have four alternative measures of macroprudential policies; provisions, 
housing-specific provisions, the average RRR, and the RRR for demand deposits.  Figure 
(2) shows the results of tightening the RRR on different macroeconomic aggregates, - 
industrial activity, prices, and credit extended by commercial banks.  Our results point to 
lower industrial activity, lower prices, and lower credit as a result of a macroprudential 
shock. The only insignificant result is that of industrial activity. Similar results are obtained 
as a result of monetary tightening, but the use of RRRs had a more significant effect on 
curbing inflation as a result of a macroprudential shock rather than a monetary shock.  
Figure (2): Impact of RRR and Monetary Policy Shocks 
 
 
53 Similar to the one it experienced in the 1990s, culminating with a financial crisis, prompting the authorities to use LTV 
and DTI ratios, limits on net total FX positions, and creating its Financial System Surveillance Committee to act as the 




  In terms of the cyclicality of the RRRs, we can see in Figure (3) that RRRs have been 
tightened on impact in the case of an IP and credit shocks, but loosened after a price shock, 
with the policy response being short-lived. Monetary policy on the other hand was 
countercyclical in response to the three shocks, and the tighter policy rates persisted after 
an IP and a credit shock, more so than an inflation shock.54 
Figure (3): Cyclicality of RRRs and Monetary Policies  
 
 
Figure (4) highlights the results of the same model of figure (3) with a provisioning shock 
instead of a RRR shock. A provisioning shock was effective in reducing manufacturing 
activity, inflation, and lending, even more so than monetary policy shocks, which only had 
an immediate and short-lived impact on lending, and IP, with no significant impact on 
inflation until the 10th month (3rd quarter) after the initial monetary tightening. 
Figure (4): Impact of Provisioning and Monetary Shocks 
 





In terms of cyclicality, Figure (5) points to the counter-cyclicality of provisionings even 
more so than that of monetary policy, particularly in response to a credit shock. Similar 
results are observed when IP is replaced by unemployment, in Figure (6), holding all else 
constant. 
Figure (5): Cyclicality of Provisioning and Monetary Policy 
 
 
Figure (6), interestingly, shows a reduction in unemployment on impact, which picks up 
within the first quarter after both monetary and macroprudential shocks. Unemployment is 
a lagging indicator, so a delayed response is warranted. CPI inflation decreases more in 
response to a tightening in provisioning rather than the policy rate.55 
 
55 Recall that the introduction of commodity prices- Brent in the case of Colombia- helped eliminate the price puzzle as 
discussed earlier.  
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Figure (6): Impact of Provisioning and Monetary Policy Shock  
 
 
Figure (7) shows that provisionings have been counter-cyclical, tightened, after a shock 
to inflation, and credit on impact, but procyclical in the case of an unemployment shock 
whereby provisionings are tightened in response to higher unemployment.56 
Figure (7): Cyclicality of Provisioning and Policy Rates  
  
 
ii. United Arab Emirates 
The UAE is an open economy with a fixed exchange rate to the US Dollar. Being an oil 
exporter, the oil price drop around the time of the global financial crisis had significant 
impact on the economy, with spillover effects significantly felt in the property market.  But 
 
56 While we do not show the results, housing-specific provisioning also appeared to be procyclical, loosening as a result 
of a manufacturing shock, CPI and credit shock, but the result was only significant in case of the CPI shock. One 
explanation is that provisioning is not designed to respond to CPI adjustments, and the loosening has been in response to 
something else not accounted for. We thus interpret the results with caution, as per Gomez et al. (2016).   
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with near zero Fed rates, the UAE had limited scope to use its interest rate tool to stabilize 
the macroeconomic environment, leaving the onus to lie on macroprudential policies to 
maintain financial stability. The Central Bank instead relied heavily on the use of 
provisionings to curb credit growth.  Tightening provisions was implemented in a 
procyclical manner,57  which slowed down the process of economic recovery, and we 
present the results for both provisioning and capital adequacy ratios. 
Figure (8) displays the results of the effectiveness of a provisioning and macroprudential 
shock, and provisioning has been effective in reducing consumer prices only. Interest rates, 
on the other hand, have been more effective in reducing both IP, while the impact on credit 
is insignificant as a result of both a provisioning and monetary policy shock.  
Figure (8): Impact of a Provisioning and Monetary Shock 
 
 
In terms of cyclicality, Figure (9) shows that provisioning was countercyclical on impact 
as a result of a shock to consumer prices, and credit, but the effect is short-lived and wears 
 
57 Based on the timing of announcements of higher provisioning over the period 2008-2010. However, data restrictions 
only allowed us to perform these regressions between 2010-2013. Data restrictions on the macro variables available on 
a monthly basis, not just the macroprudential policies. Refer to the Annex for additional case studies. Further case studies 
for other EMs available upon request alongside impulse response functions.  
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off within the first or second quarter. Monetary policy was pro-cyclical as a result of both 
lending and price shocks whereby both policies were loosened.  
Figure (9): Cyclicality of Provisioning and Policy Rates  
  
 
Figure (10) displays the impulse response functions after raising the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio which, interestingly helps lower inflation, and IP, with an insignificant 
impact on lending, and an insignificant impact of monetary policy58 in place.  
Figure (10): Impact of a Capital Adequacy Ratio and Monetary Shock 
       
 
58 Or the presence of a price puzzle, again.  
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Figure (11): Cyclicality of Capital Requirements and Policy Rates  
   
 
6.  Robustness Checks 
This chapter has undergone a significant amount of robustness checks using alternative 
variables, and alternative orderings of existing variables.59 Among the variables included 
in alternative estimations have been the VIX, a measure of U.S. stock market uncertainty 
to capture the impact on financial stability in EMs, total factor productivity, non-
performing loans, nominal and real effective exchange rates, and the results have been 
mixed, as has been the case with our baseline regressions. We also ran our regressions 
using alternative measures of credit; total credit, private sector credit, household credit, 
mortgage credit, and non-financial sector credit. When it comes to ordering, we opted for 
re-ordering macroprudential policies either first, or fourth, ahead of interest rates, as driven 
by the literature. This is similar to Vegh, Federico and Vuletin (2012) who ordered required 
reserve changes first, followed by the other macroeconomic aggregates.  Required reserves 
 
59 Robustness checks and multiplier effects are available upon request.  
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were ordered first as they found that macroprudential policy changes were not essentially 
guided by cyclical variations in output.60  In only a few cases did we get more significance, 
so we stick to the baseline SVAR presented. We also re-ran all regressions using CPI 
inflation (difference of the natural logarithms of CPI), as well as credit growth, and in some 
cases, macroprudential policies would be more significant in curbing credit growth and 
inflation, especially in the countries experiencing overheating, or housing price 
appreciation, but results continue to point out to the mixed nature of the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies. Similar results were obtained when our regressions were run in 
first differences- taking account of non-stationarity – instead of in levels as governed by 
the existing literature. 
 
60 Using high frequency data, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) also ordered the policy 
variable first. Given that we used monthly data, such ordering also works for us.  Similarly, Sims (1980) ordered the 
monetary policy variable first and assumed that it was not contemporaneously affected by innovations from other 
variables (El Said, 2013). 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter analyzed the effectiveness and cyclicality of macroprudential policies across 
15 EMs over the period 2000-2012.  Using SVARs, our results point to the equivocal nature 
of the operation of macroprudential policies and their cyclicality, and how their operation 
is very much country-specific, at the discretion of policy makers, depending on the initial 
macroeconomic conditions, and fundamentals of the country in question. While it is 
difficult to draw solid conclusions in terms of the effectiveness of macroprudential policies, 
our results point to the counter-cyclicality of RRRs and LTV ratios in selected EMs.  The 
countercyclical behavior of RRRs, however, does not necessarily imply their effectiveness, 
with pro-cyclical RRRs managing in some cases managing to reduce credit or inflation. 
LTV ratios were usually used countercyclically in response to a shock to economic activity 
and credit but were pro-cyclical on in response to price shocks. When LTV ratios were 
implemented counter-cyclically, their negative impact on various macroeconomic 
aggregates was limited, given the responsiveness of authorities in a dynamic pattern in 
response to any vulnerabilities that may arise. Their countercyclical nature helped contain 
credit from growing even if LTV ratios were loosened. 
Testing empirically for the effectiveness of macroprudential policies is an area that has 
scope for future research. Longer time series, alternative identification strategies- 
excluding monetary policy, using sign and/or long run restrictions- and using panel VARs 
are potentially future areas that would pave the way for additional research. Using existing 
databases- such as those of Cerutti et al. (2015), Shim et al. (2013), as well as that of Akinci 
and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) within a proxy SVAR context would be important to test for 
the effectiveness and cyclicality of macroprudential policies across a broader range of 
macroprudential policies. Our regressions singled out macroprudential policies, whereas 
there could be more than one tool in operation, making it difficult to attribute all the results 
to a single macroprudential tool, so taking the regressions above one step further would 
involve the interaction of multiple macroprudential tools together to test for their overall 




Annex I: Data and Sources 





Industrial Production/Unemployment Rate Datastream 
CPI/Housing-Specific CPI Datastream 
Total Lending/Lending to the Private 




SELIC Rate Datastream 
Total Provisioning Datastream 
Required Reserve Ratio Datasteam 










Unemployment Rate/Industrial Activity Datastream  
CPI/Housing-Specific CPI Datastream  
Credit: Loans to reidents, Household loans 
Datastream /Haver 
Analytics Analytics 
Policy Rate (Lombard Rate) 
Datastream /Haver 
Analytics Analytics 






CPI/CPI Housing Haver Analytics 
Lending/Credit to the private sector 
Haver Analytics/Central 
Bank of Egypt 
Industrial Production/Manufacturing Datastream 
Unemployment Rate Haver Analytics 
Required Reserve Ratio (Macropru1) 
Central Bank of Egypt 
Press Releases/Local News 
Announcements 
Local Currency Liquidity Ratio 
(Macropru6) Central Bank of Egypt 
Foreign Currency Liquidity Ratio 





  Total Provisionings and Percentage of loans 
Central Bank of Serbia and 
Datastream 
Household lending Datastream 
CPI Datastream 










Index/Unemployment Rate Datastream 
CPI/Housing-Specific CPI Datastream 
Policy Rate Datastream 
Household lending/Mortgage Lending/Total 
Lending, Private Sector Lending Datastream, IMF, and BIS 
Provisioning  Datastream 
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LTV Ratios (3-year; 3-10 years; Over 10 
years and under 600 mn won; Over 10 years 
and above 600 mn won) 
Central Bank of Korea, and 





Unemployment Rate Rate Datastream 
Industrial Production Datastream 
Consumer Price Index/ Housing CPI Datastream 
Domestic Credit to Residents (EOP,NSA, 
Mil.AED) Datastream 
Loans by Commerical Banks Datastream 
Provisionings  
Central Bank of the UAE, 
Local News 
Announcements 
Housing Specific Provisionins (Macropru3) 
Central Bank of the UAE, 
and Shim et al. (2013)  
Minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio 








Unemployment Rate/IP/Manufacturing  Datastream 
Consumer Price Index/ Housing CPI Datastream 
Credit by Commercial Banks/Credit By 
Commerical Institutions/Gross Corporate 
Loans/Mortgage Loans /Consumer Credit  
Datastream/Haver Analytics 
Analytics 
Policy Rate Datastream 
Required Reserve Ratios 
Central Bank of Colombia, 
Haver Analytics Analytics, 
Shim et al. (2013) 
Provisioning/Mortgage Provisioning 









CPI/Housing-Specific CPI Datastream 
Domestic Credit  
Datastream/Haver Analytics 
Analytics  
Policy Rates (Repo and Reverse Repo) 
Haver Analytics 
Analytics/Datastream 






Industrial Production/Unemployment Rate Datastream 
Consumer Price Index/ Housing CPI Datastream 
Dometic Claims on Households, Personal 
Loans, Private Loans, Corporate and 
Personal Loans; credit to non-financial 
sector  Datastream/Haver Analytics 
Policy Rate Datastream 










Industrial Production/Manufacturing Datastream 
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CPI/Housing-Specific CPI Datastream 
Credit: Household Loans; loans to non-
financial corporations, household loas Datastream/Haver Analytics 
Polic Rate Datastream/Haver Analytics 
Required Reserve Ratio 








Industrial Production /Unemployment Rate  Datastream 
CPI/Housing-Specific CPI Datastream 
Lending by Commercial Banks, Housing-
Related Lending, Private Sector Lending Datastream 
Policy Rates (Average and End of Period) Datastream 
LTV Ratios (And survey information on 
LTV ratios) 
Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey 
(CBRT), Datastream 
Provisionings Change  Datastream 





Industrial Production/Unemployment Rate Datastream 
CPI/Housing-Specific CPI Datastream 
Domestic Credit/Household 
Lending/Lending by Largest 4 banks Datastream 
Policy Rate Datastream 
LTV Ratio 
News Sources, Shim et al. 
(2013) 
RRRs (Big Banks and Small Banks), RRR 
for banks with lower capital adequacy ratio, 

















61 CPI inflation, industrial production, and manufacturing are presented as indices before their log transformations. 
Unemployment, policy rates, provisionings (unless otherwise stated), liquidity, capital adequacy are all presented as 

















Ratios on House 
Saving Accounts
 Mean 71.6 103.6 8.0 56.7 41.2 5.9 50818.9 16.8 249516.0 44.8 19.7
 Maximum 145.4 138.8 13.1 103.1 877.1 7.2 130705.0 19.0 599057.6 60.0 20.0
 Minimum 0.0 63.4 3.4 31.8 1.0 5.1 321.0 12.9 71716.2 42.0 15.0
 Std. Dev. 43.7 17.0 2.6 15.4 105.6 0.6 34696.3 1.4 146985.4 3.5 1.2
 
Observations







































Mean 12.5 13.5 11.8 4.7 45.0 15.0 84.0 84.6 49.4 5.7 4.1 4987.0 57789.8 3292.1 48359.8 5827.4
Maximum 19.5 21.5 18.0 5.0 65.0 21.0 102.9 102.4 100.1 7.5 4.3 25100.0 160006.7 16235.2 116609.3 27162.3
Minimum 6.0 6.0 6.0 3.0 42.0 7.0 69.8 66.4 13.7 4.4 4.0 -320.6 14722.9 751.0 11336.2 1520.1
Standard 
Deviation
4.8 5.7 4.2 0.7 3.6 4.6 11.1 12.0 26.2 0.7 0.1 3967.5 39783.0 3048.2 31614.0 6346.1








































 Mean 91.3 93.7 84.0 84.0 12.2 74063.9 35251.8 12939.0 35364.1 2736137.0 6.4 11.9 5.8 1902.2 532.6 6.4
 Maximum 114.7 119.1 97.9 97.9 17.9 147936.0 78518.0 30286.0 78827.0 14344636.0 12.0 27.0 11.4 5087.1 1171.2 12.0
 Minimum 63.2 69.1 64.2 64.2 7.8 26672.0 6903.0 6943.0 6963.0 31118.1 3.0 8.3 5.3 270.9 258.1 3.0















 Mean 4.5 4.4 4.2 1.9 21.0 3.8 37.0 48.7
 Maximum 4.6 4.6 4.6 2.2 21.5 5.3 58.0 70.0
 Minimum 4.3 4.1 3.8 1.5 20.3 2.0 0.0 40.0
 Std. Dev. 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.0 14.4 11.9
 
Observations
174.0 155.0 155.0 174.0 155.0 155.0 180.0 155.0



























 Mean 99.5 98.1 118.1 10.8 178736.7 400.6 87048.7 12.1 51.3 45.0 13.1
 Maximum 145.9 118.4 133.4 13.4 227819.0 547.1 145263.0 13.4 61.2 62.9 14.1
 Minimum 63.5 81.4 95.9 8.4 146322.0 280.2 39258.0 10.6 39.7 27.2 10.0
 Std. Dev. 25.8 11.1 7.8 1.7 22306.8 75.9 28819.1 0.7 5.5 11.4 1.6
 
Observations




























 Mean 151.8 92.6 82.7 73.4 33855.6 5083291.2 7.0 5.8 74.8 1.0 5.6
 Maximum 194.2 119.7 120.3 117.1 62750.7 9170360.0 9.0 7.5 83.5 2.0 9.0
 Minimum 99.1 56.2 55.0 45.9 11395.4 2014850.0 4.8 3.3 62.5 0.3 4.0
 Std. Dev. 23.2 15.9 20.7 24.6 15660.4 2186737.0 1.2 1.2 5.1 0.5 1.4





















 Mean 106.7 105.0 67.5 63.0 278535.7 79976.3 31289.4 6.3 3.8
 Maximum 125.9 155.4 92.1 89.7 578092.6 111723.0 54609.0 19.0 5.0
 Minimum 84.1 -3.5 42.7 36.9 55171.6 61065.0 17901.0 2.0 3.0
 Std. Dev. 12.6 46.3 15.5 16.5 188642.7 11131.4 9802.7 4.5 0.6








































FX loans to 
banks
 Mean 262.1 101.5 96.0 100.8 7.1 11.6 5.3 22,078.8 15575012.0 4433960.0 353369.9 1219341.0
 Maximum 405.9 117.3 122.6 118.3 9.6 18.4 6.2 38,319.5 28091060.0 9719936.0 556933.0 3767656.0
 Minimum 129.2 99.9 68.9 71.1 5.0 8.0 3.4 6,179.8 6179836.0 1578632.0 237158.0 61773.0
 Std. Dev. 83.7 2.7 12.2 8.5 1.2 2.3 0.6 9563.719 5951538.0 2183223.0 78170.5 1066781.0
 
Observations
145.0 145.0 145.0 145.0 145.0 145.0 145.0 138.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 145.0




 Mean 2.9 2.2 5.4 5.2 8.7
 Maximum 2.9 2.3 5.5 5.4 12.5
 Minimum 2.9 2.0 5.1 4.9 4.0
 Std. Dev. 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.7
 
Observations






























Credit to the 
private 
sector 
















 Mean 4 4 4 4 4 6 3 646288.3548 704378.9318 1391731409 1247531.44 818787.524 46 47 69 63 50
 Maximum 5 5 5 5 5 7 4 747044.2 1161014 2238776486 1945675 1114758.6 70 70 70 70 70
 Minimum 4 4 4 4 2 5 3 536726.4 215664 590823677 501093 515856.6 0 0 60 60 0
 Std. Dev. 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 64975.55788 286645.4057 506335553 464027.218 193103.476 16 18 3 4 18
 Observations 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 73 176 176 176 120 164 176 176 176 176


















 Maximum 213.7 257.1 14.2 80.5 79.2 77716400.0 678000000.0 983558.9 22.0 15.0 63.7 120.1
 Minimum 110.3 110.1 7.0 47.9 46.5 2117787.0 72830319.0 215179.2 1.5 5.0 0.0 -37.7
 Std. Dev. 30.4 43.2 1.6 8.5 8.5 22369797.0 176000000.0 230903.6 5.8 2.3 14.8 17.7
 Observations 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0 101.0























 Mean 115.4 111.3 105.4 3.4 2.5 33170.5 204180.7 14.0 1.0 1.8 15.9 11.6
 Maximum 119.0 116.6 123.5 4.8 5.2 97570.0 237356.0 14.0 1.0 7.5 19.2 12.0
 Minimum 107.8 107.4 82.4 2.3 1.2 5210.0 194326.0 14.0 1.0 -2.2 12.2 10.0
 Std. Dev. 2.3 3.0 8.8 0.7 1.3 27289.3 9598.1 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.1 0.7
 
Observations
72.0 72.0 157.0 157.0 156.0 123.0 58.0 157.0 157.0 45.0 46.0 58.0
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Annex III: Additional Macroprudential Policies 
Table (1): Policy Cyclicality in Response to an Unemployment Shock 
Unemployment 
Shock Other Macropru 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil (Regulatory 
Capital) 




* * * *    
Table (2): Policy Cyclicality in Response to an IP Shock 
IP/ Manufacturing 
Shock Other Macropru 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil (Regulatory 
Capital) 
* * * * * * * *
Egypt (Local Currency 
Liquidity Ratio) 
       
India (Risk Weights; 
housing Sector) 
    * * * *
UAE: Capital 
Requirements 
       
Table (3): Policy Cyclicality in Response to a Consumer Price Shock 
Inflation/Housing 
Price Shock Other Macropru 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil (Regulatory 
Capital ) 
* * * * * * * *
Egypt (Local Currency 
Liquidity Ratio) 




    * * * 
India (Risk Weights; 
housing Sector) 
* * * * * * * *
UAE: Capital 
Requirements 






Table (4): Policy Cyclicality in Response to a Credit Shock 
Credit/ Lending  Shock 
Other Macropru 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate  
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil (Regulatory 
Capital ) 
* * * * * * * *
Egypt (Local Currency 
Liquidity Ratio) 




 * * *  * * *
India (Risk Weights; 
housing Sector) 
    * * * *
UAE: Capital 
Requirements 
       
 
Table (5): Impact of Macroprudential and Monetary Policies on IP 
Table (6): Impact of Macroprudential and Monetary Policies on Unemployment 
Policy Shock 
Other Macropru 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Unemployment 




* * * *







Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
IP Response 
0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil (Regulatory 
Capital ) 
* * *    * *
Egypt (Local Currency 
Liquidity Ratio) 
* * * * * * * *




    
UAE  * *     
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Table (7): Impact of Macroprudential and Monetary Policies on Consumer Prices 
Policy Shock 
Other Macropru 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Inflation Response 0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil (Regulatory 
Capital ) 
    * * * *
Egypt (Local Currency 
Liquidity Ratio) 




  * *   


India (Risk Weights; 
housing Sector) 
* * * * * * * *
UAE: Capital 
Requirements 
 * * * * * * *
Table (8): Impact of Macroprudential and Monetary Policies on Credit 
Policy Shock 
Other Macropru 
Monetary Policy: CB 
Policy Rate 
Credit Response 0 5 10 20 0 5 10 20 
Brazil (Regulatory 
Capital ) 
 * * * * * * *
Egypt (Local Currency 
Liquidity Ratio) 




* *     


India (Risk Weights; 
housing Sector) 
       
UAE: Capital 
Requirements 
       
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Annex IV: Additional Case Studies 
i. South Korea 
South Korea is another country that has implemented macroprudential policies at least 
since 2002, but financial stability was only formally included in the Bank of Korea’s 
mandate in 2011 (Kim, 2014). Korea introduced several LTV ratios depending on the type 
of loans62 for house related purchases, and we employed them all separately into our 
SVARs in addition to their average and we test the various LTV ratios separately, alongside 
their average. We report the results of three-year LTV ratios, which has been the most 
significant macroprudential tool; longer (up to ten years), or shorter did not yield 
significant macroeconomic effects, which could also hint towards the optimal number of 
years housing loans should be provided to avoid property bubbles or significant credit 
expansion in the case of South Korea.  
Figure (1) displays the results of an LTV (loosening) shock in addition to a monetary shock 
in South Korea. In this figure, we report the average LTV and we see that a loosening of 
the LTV ratio lowers industrial activity on impact as well as credit, and the latter only 
significant after the first quarter. Lower credit is in line with the comments of Korea’s 
former Central Bank governor who held that LTV ratios 63  helped curb increases in 
mortgage loans (Kim, 2014). We find no significant impact on housing CPI (or CPI as a 
whole). Monetary tightening appears to only have a significant impact on IP, with an 






62 South Korea has an LTV ratio for 3-year loans or under, an LTV ratio for loans between 3 and 10 years, an LTV ratio 
for loans over 10 years for property over 600 million won, and an LTV ratio for loans over 10 years for property prices 
under 600 million won 
63 And DTI ratios 
64 When housing-specific CPI is replaced by overall CPI, the same result is maintained. As a reminder, we follow the 
literature and use the log of CPI and nominal credit. When we take the log difference of CPI, the price puzzle- in some 
countries including South Korea, but not all of them- is resolved.  
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Figure (1): Impact of Monetary and LTV Shocks in South Korea 
 
 
Figure (2) confirms that the LTV ratio has been countercyclical in South Korea, tightened 
on impact after an IP, CPI housing, and lending shock, and significant within the first 
quarter as a result of a CPI housing, and credit shock, more so than industrial activity. This 
is a valid result as LTV ratios are not designed to respond to output/manufacturing shocks. 
Monetary policy on the other hand was counter-cyclical and significant as a result of a 
shock in housing prices and IP, and pro-cyclical as a result of a credit shock.  65 
Figure (2): Cyclicality Monetary and LTV Shocks in South Korea 
    
 
65 Beyond the results of the average LTV ratio above, results from the 3-year LTV ratio also point to the counter-
cyclicality of the LTV ratio, this time even for IP, a result that is significant on impact, and similar results obtained as a 




For South Korea’s RRR, Figure (3) shows the ineffectiveness of RRRs  relative to 
monetary policy across the board, whereas monetary tightening is effective in bring down 
IP. In terms of cyclicality, RRRs were counter-cyclical as a result of a lending and IP shock, 
and pro-cyclical in response to CPI, re-emphasizing the inappropriatedness of RRRs to 
deal with price shocks.   
Figure (3): Effectiveness of RRRs and Interest Rates in South Korea 
 
 





For provisioning, provisions on normal loans and on impaired loans were estimated. While 
provisionings respond in a countercyclical manner- similar to RRRs- the results were not 
significant in terms of the effectiveness of macroprudential policies, and IP even increases 
as a result of higher provisionings (on normal loans).  











Turkey is another country that has significant experience in using macroprudential policies 
as well as employing unconventional monetary policy.66  After its 2001 financial crisis67 
and the instigation of fiscal, monetary and prudential reforms, Turkey underwent an 
episode of rapid credit growth and capital inflows.  Interestingly, the rapid credit growth 
that occurred coincided with regulatory tightening as tighter restrictions on bank dividend 
distributions, bank entry and branch openings,68  higher capital adequacy and liquidity 
coverage ratios were imposed, in addition to provisions and risk weights (Kara, 2016).  
Figure (7) displays the results when provisions are the macroprudential tool under 
examination, and whereby an immediate drop in manufacturing occurs, which recovers in 
the second month. The impact of a provisioning shock on manufacturing gradually 
dissipates, unlike monetary policy, whereby the decline in manufacturing is more persistent 
as a result of a monetary shock relative to a macroprudential shock.  Housing CPI inflation 
increases on impact, as a result of a macroprudential shock, and then slows down in the 
second month, but the result is insignificant almost until the 20th month.  The price puzzle 
holds in the case of the monetary shock, while lending to the private sector – as expected 
– declines on impact when provisions increase but is more significant as a result of a 
monetary policy shock.69 
Figure (7) Impact of a Provisioning and Monetary Policy Shock in Turkey 
 
 
66 Through tan asymmetric interest rate corridor and a reserve options mechanism, in addition to the policy rate (Uysal, 
2017).  
67 A combination of a banking, fiscal, and a balance of payments crisis, with very similar dynamics to those brewing 
behind its distress in 2018.   
68  The notion that bank regulations restricts branch openings is very relevant to Chapter 4 on the impact of 
macroprudential policies on financial inclusion, with bank branches being one of the measures that capture access to 
finance. In this sense, Turkey is an interesting case; Kara (2016) held that bank branches and new bank entry declined as 
a result of these stricter regulations, but also the stricter regulations were coupled with rapid credit growth.  




Thus, monetary policy in Turkey appears to have a more persistent - and significant - 
impact on credit relative to provisioning, where lending to the private sector recovers less 
than a quarter after the provisioning shock. In Turkey’s case, we run the SVARs using both 
monthly averages and end of period monetary policy rates and both have almost the same 
impact on macroeconomic aggregates when interacted with provisions. We report the 
monthly average results, particularly because Turkey has a history of unconventional 
monetary policy activity where it was changing rates almost daily after the global financial 
crisis - around 2010.  Figure (8) displays the short-lived counter-cyclical nature of 
provisioning (as well as housing specific provisioning) whereby they are tightened on 
impact in response to a shock in CPI housing and lending (to the private sector) and 
loosened on impact in the case of an IP shock. Monetary policy was more counter-cyclical 
relative to provisioning in response to an IP and credit shock, tightening on impact until 10 
months after the initial shock. Interestingly, monetary policy is tightened only on impact 
in response to a CPI housing shock.  





Figure (9) shows the results when RRRs are the macroprudential tool of interest. The 
results are not significant, often taking the wrong direction for unemployment and CPI, 
with low significance of the impact of raising required reserves on credit. When 
unemployment is replaced by IP,70 higher RRR led to higher IP, another anomaly but the 
result was not significant.   A monetary shock was most effective in reducing lending in 
the Turkish economy, while the price puzzle holds. Unemployment, as a lagging indicator 
is once again in decline once monetary tightening occurs but increases by the second 
quarter.  
Figure (9): Impact of a Required Reserve Shock and a Monetary Shock in Turkey 
 
 
In terms of cyclicality, Figure (10) shows that RRRs and interest rates displayed counter-
cyclicality in response to an unemployment shock whereby both policies are loosened as a 
 
70 Impulse response function available upon request. 
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result of an increase in unemployment, and both policies remained loosened for at least one 
quarter after an initial shock. Both policies are also tightened in response to a credit shock, 
albeit with a lag for the RRR, and monetary policy is more counter-cyclical in the case of 
a price shock.  




iii. Egypt  
 
Egypt is an EM that has experienced a banking crisis in the late 1990s, and hence has 
employed macroprudential policies since then to safeguard the health of its financial sector. 
Among the macroprudential tools that Egypt employs are RRRs, risk weights, and liquidity 
ratios (both domestic and foreign).  Figures (11 -16) display the results of the effectiveness 
and cyclicality of local and foreign liquidity ratios as well RRRs. 
Figure (11) displays the results of the effectiveness shocks to the foreign liquidity ratio and 
the policy rate. On impact, unemployment increases, while lending and CPI housing 
decline, and the effects last between one to two quarters. The policy rate has been less 
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effective even in controlling inflation.71 The impact of a monetary policy suggests that the 
interest rate channel (interest rate on lending or discount rate) continued to be a weak tool 
to affect the different macroeconomic aggregates.  This result is in line with Billmeier and 
Al-Mashat (2005) who highlight that Egypt’s interest rate channel is under-developed 
when it comes to transmitting monetary shocks to economic aggregates.72 
Figure (11): Effectiveness of Foreign Currency Liquidity Ratio 
 
 
In terms of cyclicality, Figure (12) points to the counter-cyclicality of the liquidity ratio 
after an unemployment shock,73 whereby the liquidity ratio is loosened as unemployment 
rises. The liquidity ratio does not seem to have a significant impact on CPI and appears to 
act pro-cyclically and loosened in the face of a rise in lending. Monetary policy however, 
despite its insignificance above, showed counter-cyclicality, tightened as a result of higher 





71 Central Bank of Egypt has a history of responding to price pressures with a delay, and  
72 Only in 2017, though, after Egypt’s reform program with the IMF did the interest rate channel help curb inflationary 
pressures, but the transmission mechanism continues to be weak.  
73 As well as an IP shock, but with less significance. 
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Figure (12): Cyclicality of Foreign Currency Liquidity Ratio 
  
 
In terms of the local (or domestic) liquidity ratio, Figures (13)- (14) show that the local 
liquidity ratio is effective in lowering both credit and industrial production on impact, with 
no impact on inflation, while monetary policy affecting IP the most and on impact. In 
contrast to the foreign liquidity ratio in the face of a lending shock, results point to the 
counter-cyclicality of the local liquidity ratio, whereby it is tightened on impact as a result 
of a lending shock. It is, however, loosened on impact- and the result is significant as a 
result of a price shock. No significant impact is observed from its response to a shock in 
industrial production. Interest rates were also counter-cyclical in response to a price shock.  





Figure (14): Cyclicality of Foreign Currency Liquidity Ratio 
 
In terms of the effectiveness of the RRR, Egypt does not resort to frequent changes in its 
RRR, which would explain its ineffectiveness based on Figure (15), although whenever 
RRRs change, Figure (16) points to the counter-cyclicality of such changes; a rise in 






74 Even recently, RRRs have been loosened in light of the slowdown Egypt faced since 2011 and tightened late 2017 on 
the back of improved economic activity.  
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Figure (15) Required Reserve Ratio in Egypt 
 






A Primer on Macroeconomic Conditions and Use of Macroprudential Policies in 
Selected EMs.75 
 
As mentioned previously, the choice of countries was governed by data availability, in 
countries known for their longer history in implementing macroprudential policies. In this 
section, we provide a primer on the macroeconomic backdrop in which macroprudential 
policies have been employed. 
Brazil   
 Limiting systemic risk has been a priority by Brazilian authorities (BIS, 2017), and over 
the period 2005-2007, the Brazilian economy observed signs of overheating, as GDP 
growth picked, up, alongside industrial production, and construction activity (see Figure 
(1)). The pick-up was driven by an increase in capital inflows (Lim et Al., 2011), and at 
the same time, credit growth was on the rise (see Figure 1)  The observed overheating led 
the authorities to introduce a number of macroprudential policies including countercyclical 
measures (especially dynamic provisioning) and reducing foreign currency risk by 
decreasing limits on currency mistmatch in an attempt to mitigate vulnerabilities. (Lim et 
Al., 2011). 
Brazil also actively employed LTV ratios, reserve requirements, caps on foreign currency 
lending, limits on net open positions/currency mismatches, and countercyclical capital 
requirements (IMF, 2013c).   Figure (1) shows that there was another episode of 
overheating/growth pick up in 2009/2010, which was associated with rapid credit growth 
– especially vehicle loans – and a rise in speculative inflows (Lim et. Al., 2011). The rapid 
credit growth in vehicle loans was coupled with a rise in loan maturities and LTVs, as well 
as lower interest rate spreads (BIS, 2017). Thus, concerns about this rapid growth of credit 
led the central bank to increase the regulatory capital requirements especially on consumer 
credit and on minimum payment limits on credit cards to prevent any rapid build-up of 
vulnerabilities. This helped lower household credit growth by half by late 2011/2012 (IMF, 
2013c).   
 
75 Unless otherwise stated, all data for this Annex comes either from Datastream or Haver Analytics 
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During the late 1990s, Columbia experienced a mortgage crisis on the back of significant 
leverage from mortgage borrowing (Lim, et. Al, 2011).   This led to the introduction of 
limits on exposure of households to debt, and measures that reduced leverage from 
mortgage borrowers, including LTV and DTI ratios, as well as limits on the net open 
foreign currency positions of financial institutions. The introduction of these 
macroprudential tools helped lower household/private sector credit in the late 1990s 
(Figure 2), and banks were already overly invested in local currency government bonds 
instead (BIS, 2017).  
By the early 200s, GDP growth picked up, and manufacturing activity improved, and the 
reforms implemented were coupled with lower inflation (see Figure (2)).  By 2007, GDP 
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growth was close to 7%, while inflation picked up.  As such, worries about overheating 
surfaced. While the onset of the global financial crisis helped limit overheating, authorities 
introduced selected macroprudential policies in an attempt to curb rapid growth and lower 
procyclicality (Lim et Al, 2011). The measures implemented included reserve 
requirements, limits on maturity mismatches, dynamic provisioning, and restriction on 
profit distribution.   
By 2006, the pickup in GDP was accompanied by stronger public finances, and lower 
inflation, which fueled another round of rapid credit expansion to consumers [see Figure 
(2)], with a 45% real growth in consumer loans in H2 2006 (BIS, 2017). The transmission 
channel of monetary policy weakened, new loan quality was declining, the current account 
deficit was widening (BIS, 2017) leaving limited room for maneuver. Thus, reserve 
requirements were increased to control the rapid growth of credit growth, and by mid-2007, 
the central bank announced marginal reserve requirements on domestic bank deposits, and 
an unremunerated reserve requirement on all foreign debt (and on portfolio inflows) to help 
prevent any potential currency mismatches (IMF, 2013c).  This helped bring down credit 
growth by mid-2008 as shown in Figure (2), and signs of overheating were dissipating.   In 
2011 consumer credit picked-up again, fueling regulatory concerns about the rise in 
household leverage. and financial regulators were worried about the increase in household 
leverage, which was met with a rise in consumer loan provisioning. Other measures used 
in Columbia include LTV ratios, DTI ratios, caps on credit growth, limits on net open 
positions/currency mismatch, and limits on maturity mismatch, and restrictions on profit 










Figure (2): Colombia Economic Activity, Credit and Inflation  
  
Source: Bank of International Settlements (2017) 
 
China 
The global financial crisis led to a slowdown in the Chinese economy – see Figure (3) – 
which led to the implemented of a significant stimulus package in 2008. This helped growth 
pick up, but was also coupled with rapid credit expansion, and house prices increased by 
the end of 2009, and authorities introduced several macroprudential measures to limit credit 
growth and house price inflation (Lim et Al., 2011). By 2011, the central bank introduced 
dynamic provisioning (BIS, 2017), and has also used LTV, as well as DTI ratios, ceilings 
on credit or credit growth, reserve requirements, counter cyclical capital requirements 
(IMF, 2013) 
 
Figure (3): China Economic Activity, Credit and Inflation  
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Czech Republic 
A combination of loose monetary policy in the 1990s, overheating, and weaker asset 
quality raised systemic risk in the Czech Republic, culminating with a recession in 1997-
1999. Banking sector restructuring and privatizations paved the way for a stronger 
regulatory framework by the central bank (Frait et Al., 2011).  Since then, the Czech 
National Bank (CNB) has been gradually developing its macroprudential policy 
framework, and macroprudential policies have been employed to complement 
microprudential policies to reduce systemic risk (IMF, 2012b). The policy tools employed 
include countercyclical capital buffers, capital conservation buffer, systemic risk buffer 
(CNB, 2019). When setting the rate of the countercyclical capital buffer, the CNB monitors 
credit growth, and the broad financial cycle, and one of the more recent episodes of 
employing macroprudential policies was in December 2017 when the CNB increased the 
counter-cyclical capital buffer on the bank of a rise in the vulnerabilities in the banking 
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sector. Particular attention is also paid to the leverage ratio by CNB authorities (CNB, 
2019).  






Similar to the Czech Republic, Egypt’s banking sector was hard hit in the late 1990s, to be 
followed by a broader banking sector reform which involved bank mergers/privatizations 
and more prudent regulation (Jreisat and Hassan, 2016), which helped maintain financial 
stability, and helped the banking sector to weather the adverse effects of the global financial 
crisis, as well as the 2016 currency crisis. Among the most commonly employed 
macroprudential tools are the reserve requirements, liquidity tools to help mitigate liquidity 
risks, limits on forex currency positions and mismatches, while both long and short 
positions in any particular countries can be in the range of 1-10% of the capital base 
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(Prasad, 2016). Other tools employed by the Central Bank of Egypt include limits on real 
estate exposure, leverage ratio, and provisioning, and as can be shown from Figure (5), 
household credit growth remained contained.76  






India’s financial system continues to be bank based, and macroprudential policies have 
been implemented since the early 2000s when banks built a 5% investment fluctuation 
reserves (of their total portfolio), employed risk weights, LTV ratios, reserve requirements, 
and provisioning requirements to limit the overheating of capital markets, as well as the 
 
76 The rise in inflation observed in 2017/2018 was due to the floating of the exchange rate, and the ensuing depreciation 
of the currency, and did not reflect any episode of overheating. The Central Bank of Egypt maintains prudent control to 
avoid excessive borrowing and has been more engaged in government lending/purchasing local currency government 
bonds than lending the private sector.  
89 
 
overheating observed in the housing and commercial real estate sector (BIS, 2017 and IMF 
2011). Specifically, between 2004-2008, robust economic growth coupled with 
urbanization fuelled a real estate boom and a rapid rise in credit, including household loans 
for housing and consumer credit.  (IMF, 2011) 
Counter cyclical provisioning and differentiated risk weights for these sectors were 
introduced in 2004, and by 2007, LTV caps on housing loans were introduced (they were 
also used in 2012 in the midst of an expansion of lending by non-bank financial corporates). 
Other measures implemented include a country cyclical capital buffer, and capital 
requirements for systematically important financial institutions. (BIS, 2017) 
 
Figure (6): India Economic Activity, Credit and Inflation  
 
 






Macroprudential policies in Poland focus on the banking sector, and by 2015, authorities 
introduced a broad framework for macroprudential regulation that encompasses 
identification, assessment, and monitoring of systemic risk (IMF, 2019). The 2006- 2008 
credit boom77 led to concerns about weaker credit underwriting standards (Lim et Al., 
2011). Relatedly, a rise in foreign currency lending to un-hedged borrowers was observed 
and led to expectations of a potential currency appreciation.  
The ensuing rise in systemic risk led authorities to introduce a number of measures aimed 
at limiting credit and foreign currency risks particularly those associated with mortgage 
lending to households, in addition to broader measures aimed at supporting liquidity and 
capital buffers to increase their resilience.  Among the tools employed are the LTV and 
DTI ratios, reserve requirements and restrictions on profit distribution (Lim et Al. (2011), 
and IMF, 2013). At the same time, banks have been required to maintain strong capital 
positions, employed conservative risk weights to control leverage, while credit institutions 
were required to abide by high liquidity ratios, and employ strict dividend policies. This 
combination of tools enabled the polish banking system to have a high resilience to shocks 
(BIS, 2017), and helped curb credit growth including that to households. Housing prices 
were also on the rise between 2006-2006-2008, but their rate of growth eased after 2009.  
Figure (7): Poland Economic Activity, Credit and Inflation 
 
 
77 See Figure (7) for data on the rise of credit to households 
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Russia 
The Central Bank of Russia (CBR)employed macroprudential tools in three instances 
around 2007/2008, 2013/2014, and in 2016. First, the period prior to the global financial 
crisis was characterized by rising capital inflows, rising inflationary pressures, a 
dependence of banks on foreign lending (foreign borrowing was 20% of total bank’s 
liabilities) and foreign financing.  The CBR responded by raising the required reserve ratio 
for credit institutions in 2007/2008 (BIS, 2017). 
The onset of the global financial crisis led to a significant contraction of the Russian 
economy especially over the period 2008-2010. During this time, credit growth and GDP 
weakened, capital outflows increased, asset quality was deteriorating, and the CBR 
responded by introducing macroprudential tools in an attempt to address liquidity 
constraints, manage capital flows, and reduced currency risk (Lim et Al., 2011) 
By 2011, rapid credit growth especially in the unsecured credit market was observed, the 
growth of unsecured consumer loans was almost three times as much as the growth of loans 
to the non-financial sector, inflation was on the rise, the cost of unsecured consumer loans 
was increased, and household deposits to banks focused on corporate and mortgage 
lending78 was decreasing.   This led the CBR to double the provisioning for unsecured 
loans and raise the risk weights for consumer loans in 2013 (BIS, 2017). In 2016, the 
dollarization observed in the banking  
The third instance in which the CBR used macroprudential policies was around 2016. By 
that time, the banking sector was highly dollarized, and the CBR reacted by raising the risk 
weights for foreign currency claims on households, the risk weights for foreign currency 
 
78 Which would help finance their activities (BIS, 2017) 
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loans to corporate entities with inadequate FX earnings to service debt obligations, and on 
investments in FX-denominated securities. To limit the growth of FX denominated 
obligations of credit institutions, the CBR also increased the mandatory reserve 
requirements at the time (BIS, 2017).  Other tools that the CBR has under its 
macroprudential umbrella include DTI ratios, limits on net open positions/currency 
mismatch and dynamic provisioning (IMF, 2013).  




In Serbia, macroprudential policies were employed following a period of rapid credit 
growth between 2004-2011. The excessive credit growth observed was coupled with rising 
foreign debt liability eurorization, and bank lending in foreign currency led to a rise in 
systemic risk.  To limit the high credit growth and currency risk, the central bank employed 
DTI caps, caps on foreign currency lending, limits on net open currency positions/currency 
mismatch, reserve requirements, counter-cyclical capital requirement, restrictions on profit 
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distribution, higher risk weights as a way to curb FX lending, and employed an exposure 
limit for retail lending relative to tier 1 capital.  (Lim et Al., 2011) 
 






The early 2000s were characterized by a rapid rise in mortgage loans in line with a focus 
of the banking sector on household lending rather than corporate lending in the aftermath 
of the 1997 crisis. As such, demand for housing increased, and property prices spiralled 
(Banque Du France, 2014). This increased the vulnerability of the Korean financial system 
to housing price booms (Lim et Al., 2011) as shown in Figure (10) in the early 2000s. By 
September 2002, authorities introduced LTV ratio caps based on loan maturity, house 
prices, and location (Banque Du France, 2014), which helped bring prices down as can be 
seen below. However, by 2005/2006 house prices resumed their appreciation ahead of the 
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global financial crisis, which prompted authorities to prioritize the use of LTV caps to limit 
the house price appreciation, support the construction sector, and contain household debt 
(Lim et Al., 2011).  
Between 2009- 2011, Korea’s banking sector also so a rise in short-term external debt, and 
regulators wanted to reduce both this debt as well as capital flow volatility, lower maturity 
mismatches, and limit excessive foreign currency lending from translating into systemic 
risk. During this decade, a combination of LTV and DTI ratios, reserve requirements, tax 
incentives, and other housing specific measures, restrictions on investments in foreign 
currency denominated bonds, tighter foreign currency liquidity standards, as well as 
lending ceilings to address the vulnerabilities observed (Lim et. Al., 2011), and as can be 
seen from the charts below, both credit growth and prices (especially housing-specific 
credit growth and prices) cooled down as a result of the measures implemented.  
 






Prudential policies were first actively used during after the 2001 crisis,79 whereby the 
Turkish banking and regulatory authority was introduced, which helped reignite 
confidence in the Turkish economy (alongside with the other reforms introduced) (BIS, 
2016). However, he global financial crisis translated into an FX liquidity squeeze in 
Turkey, which led the banking sector to respond by reducing FX loans, Eurobond holding, 
restrictions on profit distribution to strengthen the banking sector’s balance sheets (Lim, et 
Al., 2011). As can be observed from Figure (11), GDP, industrial production, and 
manufacturing contracted in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, unemployment was 
on the rise, while credit growth was falling as a result to preserve the health of the banking 
sector. By 2010 though, Turkey introduced caps on LTV ratios for real estate loans (Lim 
et Al., 2011) as consumer loans were broadly rising, as well as housing specific loans in 
specific (see Figure (11).  
Already by 2010 Turkey has been actively engaged in using reserve requirement as a 
macroprudential tool to dampen the credit cycle, and raise the maturity of liabilities (BIS, 
2017). Among the measures employed reserve options mechanism80, in an attempt to 
counteract the negative impact of excessive volatility of capital flows on financial stability 
(BIS, 2017). Turkey has also used LTV ratios, caps on foreign currency lending, limits on 
net open positions/currency mismatch, and restrictions on profit distribution (IMF, 2013) 
as part of its macroprudential toolkit to limit systemic risk.  
 
79  Banking, fiscal, and balance of payment crises (BIS, 2016). 
80 This enables the banking sector to voluntarily hold a specific amount of its mandatory local currency reserve 
requirements in foreign currency (BIS, 2017). 
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As a country that pegs its currency to the US dollar, UAE’s monetary policy tends to follow 
the Federal Reserve, with limited scope for it to address financial stability concerns, leaving 
more scope for macroprudential policies to be used to address financial stability issues. 
The oil price boom of 2003-2008 helped fuel credit growth81, which translated into housing 
price appreciation. , Given the dependence of the UAE on hydrocarbons, real estate lending 
comprised ~20% of  banks’ balance sheets,  raising the systemic risk concerns in the 
banking sector (Arvai et Al., 2014). The global financial crisis, and the subsequent fall in 
oil prices exposed the vulnerabilities of the UAE’s real estate and banking sector, which 
translated into a slowdown/credit squeeze that adversely affected the real estate and 
banking sectors.  As such, the UAE employed macroprudential policies during this time, , 
 
81 Which led to rising bank leverage in the UAE (Arvai, et. Al, 2014) 
97 
 
most notably by (procyclically) raising provisionings, which slowed down lending growth 
considerably (see Figure (12)).  Other macroprudential policies in the UAE’s toolkit 















Chapter 3 82 




This chapter revisits sovereign credit ratings, contagion, and capital flows to emerging 
markets (EMs). Specifically, we analyze how changes in sovereign ratings influence 
different types of capital flows to 24 EMs.83 We focus on two types of capital flows: FDI 
flows, and portfolio flows, as they comprise the lion’s share of capital flows to EMs. We 
also analyze cross-country – or contagion- effects of sovereign ratings by testing whether 
changes in the sovereign ratings in any of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) can explain changes in the different kinds of capital flows in other 
EMs. Using the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM estimator 
over the period 1990-2014 (for FDI flows) and 1990-2017 (for portfolio flows), this chapter 
shows that sovereign ratings is a crucial factor for EMs’ access to international capital 
markets. Even more strongly, a sovereign ratings upgrade (downgrade) in one of the 
BRICS countries leads to more (less) capital inflows to the other EMs in the sample. In 
addition, the results suggest that interdependence – or contagion – may continue to be a 
threat to capital flowing into EMs, especially during crisis times, during which a ratings 
change plays a bigger role in affecting capital flows relative to tranquil times. Given the 
recent rise of capital flow management tools – both macroprudential policies and capital 
controls – to reduce systemic risk and to cope with the volatility of capital flows, we test 
for the interaction between these tools and sovereign ratings. In this sense, sovereign 
ratings are a proxy for sovereign risk,84 while macroprudential policies are a proxy for 
financial stability (or even systemic risk) and we test for their joint impact on capital flows. 
While either tool alone yields mixed results, the interaction of these tools with sovereign 
ratings does impact capital inflows to EMs. This could have important policy implications 
for the timing of macroprudential policy implementation
 
82 Written with Noha Emara. An earlier – and much shorter – version of this paper was published in the World Journal 
of Applied Economics (2015) as part of a conference proceeding. Further details are available in the References. 
83 Regressions on FDI are run for 24 countries. Due to data restrictions, regressions on portfolio flows are run for 23 
countries, excluding Venezuela from portfolio flows estimations.  




Since the early 1990s, emerging markets (EMs) have experienced periods of extraordinary 
surges in capital flows – both FDI and portfolio flows. Specifically, FDI flows to EMs 
jumped from an annual average of US$40 billion in the early 1990s to an average of 
US$300 billion per year in the mid-2000s (IIF, 2015).  By 2012 over 20% of total FDI was 
concentrated among the four largest EMs; Brazil, Russia, India, and China,85 a more than 
three-fold increase relative to just 6% in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2013).86 What is more, portfolio 
flows jumped from an average of about US$6 billion annually in the period 1982-88, to 
almost US$34 billion in 1992, with Latin American countries receiving the bulk of this 
increase (World Bank 1993), and by 2017, capital flows into EMs reached almost US$1 
trillion (IIF, 2017). Despite the recurrent EM crises in the 1990s, capital flows to EMs 
sustained their increases ahead the of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, and the effects 
of the “Great Retrenchment” that followed were only temporary for EMs relative to AEs.   
The rise in capital flows to EMs over the last two decades has been attributed to several 
factors, including low investment prospects in AEs, specially ever since the onset of the 
global financial crisis, low interest rates, and more recently unconventional monetary 
policies in AEs. This made investments in EMs more attractive,87 as did the stronger 
economic performance of EMs relative to AEs.88   The role played by credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) in EM lending was another reason behind the rise in capital inflows to EMs. CRAs 
provide information about a country’s creditworthiness in terms of its economic stance and 
its probability of default, which allows investors to differentiate between countries when 
determining their investment decisions.  
The information collected on a sovereign government’s willingness and ability to pay its 
debt in full, and in a timely manner, is known as its sovereign rating.89 Sovereign ratings 
are, thus, most important for EMs whose access to international capital markets varies 
 
85 Four out of the five BRICS countries.  
86 One of the most significant episodes of FDI inflows to BRICS occurred over the period 2003-2008 when FDI inflows 
grew from US$77 billion to US$281 billion. China and Russia accounted for the largest share (UNCTAD, 2013).  
87 See for example Fernandez-Arias (1996), Montiel and Reinhart (1999). 
88 For EMs, capital flow is of huge importance, given its implications for growth, lowering output volatility, financing 
investments, and promoting financial development, during tranquil times (Ostry et al., 2010 and Igan, 2016).  
89 The timeliness of repayments in particular is of huge importance in determining a country’s rating, as it acts as a signal 
for both the willingness and ability to repay. 
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greatly.90 Information asymmetries inherrent in EMs91 previously dissuaded international 
investors from investing in unrated countries. However, with the realization that foreign 
investment was likely to increase once EMs were rated, the number of rated countries 
increased from 12 in 1980 to around 100 in 2002 (Carlson and Hale, 2005). Ratings have 
thus contributed to the rise in sovereign governments’ access to international capital 
markets and enhanced their ability to raise funds at lower cost.  
However, CRAs came under severe - and recurrent- scrutiny following the repeated 
financial crises – and defaults- in EMs in the 1990s,92 and then again during the 2007-2009 
global financial crisis. The failure of CRAs to predict these crises and their downgrading 
of sovereign ratings after the fact- especially during crisis times- raised questions about the 
possibility that CRAs may have deepened these crises, which resulted in enormous capital 
outflows from EMs, and to “sudden stops” in severe circumstances (Calvo, 1998). Thus, 
the role of sovereign ratings in stimulating EMs’ access to international capital markets 
implies that capital flows tend to respond to rating changes. This response could also be 
contagious, spreading across countries, especially during crisis periods. Since the BRICS, 
as the biggest bloc of EMs, absorb a significant bulk of capital inflows, such cross-country 
effects could be particularly likely if a rating change occurs in of one of the BRICS 
countries.  
It is important to note that very few studies attempted to analyze the relationship between 
sovereign ratings, capital flows, and contagion. Similarly, only a handful of studies have 
investigated whether changes in sovereign ratings affect the types of capital flows 
differently. Given that capital flows vary in nature, such differences seem likely. For 
instance, FDI is more stable that portfolio flows, and takes a longer time to enter or leave 
an economy. Portfolio flows, on the other hand, are more volatile, normally referred to as 
the “hottest” type of capital flows (IMF, 2011).93 Hence, breaking up the different types of 
 
90 A number of studies highlighted the most important determinants of sovereign ratings (See for example Cantor and 
Packer, 1996, and Juttner and McCarthy, 1998), and they include income per capita, external debt, economic 
development, and default history. 
91 See Reinhart (2002) 
92 Such as the Tequila crisis (1994/95), the Asian flu (1997/1998), and the Russian virus in 1998. For more information, 
see Calvo (1998). 
93 We have excluded bank flows for this analysis because of the dominance of FDI and portfolio flows in EMs, but they 
are less volatile than portfolio flows in tranquil times. During crisis times, however, their volatility increases significantly 
(IMF, 2011).  
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capital flows permits the investigation of how capital flows respond to changes in sovereign 
ratings in different ways. Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993) as well as Taylor and 
Sarno (1997) were among the pioneering studies in this area. Moreover, previous research 
did not investigate whether changes in ratings affect capital flows uniformly across 
countries, as compared to their effect in the “ground-zero” country, that is, the country that 
was first downgraded. Studies have also only recently started to examine the role of 
macroprudential policies – or more broadly capital flows management tools – in dealing 
with the volatile components of capital flows. 94  Macroprudential policies deal with 
systemic risk, in the quest to achieve financial stability, while sovereign ratings reflect 
sovereign risk, and to our knowledge, no previous research examined the interaction 
between sovereign and systemic risks in the context of capital flows.95    
Thus, this chapter revisits sovereign credit ratings, capital flows to EMs, and contagion, 
with a focus on FDI and portfolio flows, as they comprise the bulk of capital flows to 
EMs. 96  Specifically, this study will address the following questions: how do ratings 
changes influence different types of capital flows to EMs? Can a sovereign rating change 
in one country explain changes in FDI and portfolio flows in another country? Throughout 
this chapter, we examine foreign currency sovereign ratings, as this represents a proxy of 
the ability of countries to access international markets. We also study the effect of ratings 
changes among the BRICS countries, and how they influence capital flows to other EMs 
or lead to their co-movement. We focus on the BRICS as they are the biggest among EMs 
in size. We also examine whether distance matters between the country whose ratings has 
changed and changes in capital flows to other countries, by dividing the EM sphere into 
three regions; Asia; Latin America; and Central and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and 
Africa (CEEMEA).   We further investigate how changes in macroprudential policies and 
capital controls affect capital flows. Our results suggest that sovereign ratings are an 
important factor for both FDI and portfolio flows to EMs. Furthermore, a rating change in 
 
94 For more information on the policy mix authorities in EMs employed to deal with the volatility of capital flows, and 
the ensuing financial stability issues, see Ahmed and Zlate (2014).  
95 The link between sovereign risk and systemic risk has been investigated by Manzo and Picca (2014) among others 
holding that systemic risk does have a sovereign component, and that shocks to sovereign risk affects the probability of 
banking default. This directly affects systemic risk considerations, and hence macroprudential policies play a role.  
96 We don’t include bank lending, as EMs rely less on bank lending, which comprised around 16% of gross inflows 
around the time of the global financial crisis, and under 10% of outflows (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011).  Most of the 
capital flowing into EMs take the form of FDI or portfolio investments.  
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one of the BRICS countries has a significant impact on both types of capital flows, 
suggesting a contagious – or interdependence – effect across countries. Asian countries, in 
particular, appear to experience the highest impact of a cross-country ratings change. 
Results also show that the presence of a financial crisis, whether country-specific or 
otherwise, increases the impact of a sovereign rating change on capital flows. Specifically, 
a one-notch decrease in a sovereign rating during crisis times reduces capital inflows twice 
as it would in tranquil times.  
The introduction of capital flow management tools yields interesting, but mixed results. As 
expected, capital controls decrease the flow of FDI into EMs, but they appear to increase 
portfolio flows.97 Macroprudential policies also increase portfolio flows, but when both 
macroprudential policies and sovereign ratings interact – or change simultaneously- 
portfolio flows decline. The results of this chapter have important policy implications in 
the operation of sovereign ratings, and the interaction between sovereign and systemic risks 
in EMs.  
Thus, the rest of this paper is divided as follows: Section 2 briefly highlights trends in 
capital flows in EMs over the last two decades. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 4 outlines the data used for this chapter, and Section 5 the methodology. Section 6 
documents our results. Section 7 documents our robustness checks, and section 8 
concludes.  
2. Trends of Capital Flows to EMs: A Primer 
This section briefly outlines the trends that have characterized capital flows to EMs since 
the 1990s.98 A detailed analysis of these trends is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a 
sense of the magnitude and significance of capital flows to EMs provides an important 
background. EMs experienced three surges of significant capital inflows, the first of which 
was over the period 1990-1997,99 culminating with the Asian crisis, capital outflows, and 
the infamous sudden stops episodes (see Calvo, 1998). Over 50% of total inflows during 
 
97 For reasons to be clarified later, this paper only examines the impact of macroprudential policies in relation to portfolio 
flows. 
98 We focus in this section on gross capital flows to EMs. Pagliari and Hannan (2017) held that both gross inflows and 
gross outflows determine net flows in AEs, but that gross inflows primarily determine them for EMs, so our analysis of 
the trends focuses on the gross aspect of capital flows. Figure (3) shows that both the gross and net capital flows display 
similar trends in EMs.  
99 Particularly around 1995/1996. 
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this episode went to Asia, and around 40% of it was FDI flows (IMF, 2011).  Figures (1) 
and (2) highlight these waves by type, as well as by region, with Asia and Latin America 
dominating the receipt of capital flows.   
Figure (1): Gross Capital Flows- All EMs (% of GDP)       Figure (2): Gross Capital Flows by Region 
 
Source: IMF (2011)                                                                            Source: IMF (2011) 
Given the instabilities that ensued with the onset of the Asian crisis, EMs underwent 
significant structural reforms in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, thereby improving 
their fundamentals, and becoming more integrated with the global economy through trade 
and financial linkages. This paved the way for the second wave of capital flows by 2002.100 
This wave ended with the onset of the global financial crisis, and during this wave, FDI 
constituted around 80% of total flows, up from around 40-60% of aggregate capital flows 
to EMs in the mid-1990s (Erduman and Kaya, 2014 and Koepke 2015). Other inflows, in 
the form of bank lending, increased, particularly to Emerging Europe, during this wave, 
(IMF, 2011), as shown in Figures (1) and (3). Gross capital flows peaked at 11% of GDP 
in the EMs in 2007, from under 5% in 2005 (ECB, 2016), and under 2% of GDP in 1990 
(IMF, 2011). Even during the global financial crisis, FDI remained resilient while most of 
the outflows were portfolio flows, and other investments (Erduman and Kaya, 2014).101   
 
 
100Which peaked around 2006. 





Figure (3): Gross (and Net) Capital Inflows to EMs (USD bn and % of GDP) 
 
Source: IMF (2011) 
After the global financial crisis, capital flows declined significantly, and a third wave of 
capital inflows into EMs began in 2009 but ended in 2011with the deepening of the 
Eurozone debt crisis (Pagliari and Hannan, 2017). This wave was driven by the low 
growth- and interest-rate environments in AEs, increased risk appetite among investors, 
and better growth prospects in EMs.  The bulk of this wave was in the form of portfolio 
flows – both debt and equity flows, especially debt – when the increased interest rate 
differential, between AEs and EMs, led more money to flow into EMs (Erduman and Kaya, 
2014). Despite the rise in capital flows during this wave, total gross capital flows to EMs 
were still below their pre-crisis levels (ECB, 2016).  Another notable trend since the crisis 
has been the rise in the proportion of capital flows into EMs, particularly around 2009, but 
that proportion declined again by 2013, driven more by global factors rather than country-
specific factors. Capital flows have also been more volatile since 2009, particularly during 
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the 2013 taper tantrum,102 when the share of inflows to EMs except for China declined 
(ECB, 2016).  Figure (4) highlights the fact that China sustained the rise in capital flows, 
but other EMs did not. Overall, the global retrenchment in capital flows after the global 
financial crisis was more evident in AEs than in EMs (Bussiere, et al., 2016).  
                                 Figure (4): AE and EMs Gross Capital Inflows
Source: ECB (2016) 
Reflecting our interest in the BRICS countries, we illustrate two important elements of 
capital flows to them in Figures (5) and (6). These figures highlight the significant rise in 
FDI inflows to the BRICS countries, the quadrupling of their share in global FDI since 
2000, and the fact that India, China, and Russia captured the lion’s share of both FDI and 
portfolio flows. China alone received over 50% net capital flows to the BRICS countries 
over the period 2005-2010, as well as the highest share of net equity flows (Pollock, 2011). 
The regional concentration of capital flows among the Asian economies has significant 







102 Sudden capital outflows from EMs followed the Federal Reserve’s announcement that the bond purchases program 
might taper off by the end of 2014, shedding light on the susceptibility of EMs to Fed policy expectations (Koepke, 2014 





        
    
Source: UNCTAD (2013)   Source: ECB (2016) 
  
3. Literature Review 
This section will survey the classical literature that addresses, separately, the impact of 
sovereign ratings, and the main determinants of capital flows, both FDI and portfolio flows. 
A review of the literature that combines and addresses sovereign ratings, capital flows, and 
financial contagion will follow. As will be apparent, the former is vast, but the latter, 
especially studies that differentiate between capital flows by type is much smaller. We also 
supplement this section with a survey of the literature that addresses capital flows, and 
macroprudential policies, within the context of capital flows management (CFM) tools.  
3.1.Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings 
The literature on sovereign ratings and their role in financial markets appeared mainly after 
the 1994 Mexican crisis. Studies either address the determinants of sovereign credit ratings 
or their impact.103 Seminal work by Cantor and Packer (1996) showed that CRAs supply 
more information about speculative grade 104  sovereigns than is present in public 
information. Relatedly, Reinhart (2002) and Kraussl (2003) asserted that sovereign credit 
ratings are crucial for EMs because EMs’ accessibility to international capital markets is 
 
103 The literature on the determinants of sovereign ratings is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
104 Cantor and Packer (1996) define speculative grade as “non-investment-grade”; they are countries that have a higher 
risk of default, with lower probability of repaying their debt in full and in a timely manner. Investors normally have a 
preference for higher rated countries, those preferably rated investment grade.   
Figure (5): FDI Inflows in BRICS, 
and their Share in Global FDI 
 
Figure (6): Capital Flows to BRICs 
Countries (sum of gross flows as a % 




unstable and varies widely over time. They attribute this instability and variation to 
asymmetric information in financial markets.105 Thus sovereign ratings lower asymmetric 
information as most international investors favor purchasing rated assets rather than 
unrated ones (Kraussl (2003b)).  
The literature on the impact of sovereign ratings tends to focus on aspects related to equity 
market index returns,106 individual stock returns,107 or bond yields,108 with a few country-
specific studies focusing on FDI.109 More recently, more work has been examining the 
impact of sovereign ratings on exchange rate volatility.110 Using event studies, Cantor and 
Packer’s (1996) work, and that of Sy (2001),111 found that sovereign ratings changes112  
resulted in significant changes in bond yields in the other direction, as anticipated;  as 
ratings improve, bond yields get smaller. Using panel regressions and event studies, 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), and Brooks et al. (2004) found that sovereign ratings 
downgrades adversely affected stock markets, leading to cross-country contagion. 113 
Martell (2005) analyzed the impact of sovereign ratings changes on a cross-section of 
domestically traded stocks, and held that stock markets normally react to sovereign ratings 
downgrades only, and mostly to rating announcements by S&P, rather than Moody’s.  
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), on the other hand, found that sovereign ratings upgrades 
led to instantaneous drops114 in sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads over the 
period 2001-2008.115 They also found that positive rating announcements had spillover 
effects on other emerging CDS markets, and that the credit rating of the non-event country 
determined how much.116   
The literature on asset interdependence and stock liquidity has increased recently. 
Christopher et al. (2012) used a sample of 19 EMs over the period 1994-2007 to study the 
 
105 In this context, Reinhart (2002) highlights the importance of sovereign ratings in foreseeing episodes of sovereign 
distress. 
106 Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), Brooks et al. (2004(, and Martell (2005) 
107 Martell (2005) and Correa et al. (2013) 
108 Cantor and Packer (1996), Larraín et al. (1997), and Gande and Parsley (2005). 
109 Popa (2012), Bayar and Kilic (2014), and Mugobo and Mutize (2016). 
110 See Baum et. Al. (2016) for example.  
111 Using a simple regression for the change in spreads and ratings 
112 Such changes occur as a result of a change in sovereign risk. 
113 Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) thus conclude that CRAs contribute to EM financial instability. 
114 The authors found negative rating announcements had no impact on sovereign CDS markets. 
115 CDS spreads could be viewed another proxy for sovereign risk, and Ballester and Gonzalez-Ureaga (2017) hold that 
hypothetically, both CDS spreads and announcements by CRAs should mirror similar information content, and thus, 
CDS spreads, should react to a sovereign ratings announcement. .  
116 A negative rating announcement could be associated with spill-over effects; however, in this case, the credit rating of 
the event country – the one that witnessed a ratings downgrade – would determine how much.  
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impact of sovereign credit ratings changes on stock and bond market co-movements with 
their respective regional markets. They find that stock and bond market co-movements in 
a particular region react heterogeneously to sovereign ratings changes.117 Specifically, 
sovereign ratings 118  are positively correlated to regional stock market co-movements, 
implying spillover effects, whereby a rating upgrade is beneficial for neighboring 
countries, in addition to the ground-zero country. Downgrades, however, lead to a change 
in investor sentiment, relocating funds from the downgraded market to surrounding 
countries.119   
3.2.Determinants of Capital Flows 
The classical literature on the determinants of capital flows divides the determinants into 
push (external)120 factors and pull (country-specific) factors, with research focused either 
on episodes of extreme capital flow movements or capturing the longer run determinants 
of capital flows (Hannan, 2017). Lately a number of studies have differentiated between 
gross and net capital flows, showing that their varying nature121 warrants different behavior 
during shocks (Forbes and Warnock, 2012, Broner et al., 2013, Ghosh et al., 2014, and 
Koepke, 2015).122  
We focus our analysis on capital flows by component – FDI vs. portfolio flows – at a time 
when researchers are increasingly examining capital flows by different classifications.123 
Push factors normally include growth and interest rates in AEs and global risk aversion,124 
while pull factors normally comprise domestic aspects such as economic performance or 
market size.  Koepke (2015) highlights that pull factors are more cyclical,125 and short term 
in nature, tending to differ across the varying phases of the business cycle. Other push and 
 
117 Using a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model (GARCH) and an error-correction 
model. 
118 As well as ratings outlooks. 
119 Other findings include the fact that 1) sovereign ratings and outlooks were inversely related to co-movements in 
regional bond markets, implying the presence of contagion effects during episodes of rating downgrades (also referred 
to as negative rating spillover effects); 2) the negative effect tends to occur more in countries with higher than (regional) 
average ratings; and 3) asset correlations were significantly related to ratings in the long term, rather than the short term.  
120 Exogenous for EMs, triggered by certain developments in advanced economies.  
121 Given the potentially differing behavior between domestic and foreign investors (Broner et al. (2013).  
122 This line has been important especially for those focusing their work on analyzing extreme capital flow movements.  
123 Other than by component, the literature has recently classified capital flows by 1) residency of investor (comparing 
EM resident, non-resident capital flows, and net capital flows; 2) type of investor (retail vs. institutional investors); 3) 
data frequency (annual, quarterly, monthly, weekly, daily); 3) official vs. private sector; 4) currency; 5) maturity; and 6) 
geography (Koepke, 2015).  
124 Global risk aversion particularly affects portfolio flows (see Koepke, 2015). 
125Often short- term, varying depending on the business cycle phase, and includes variables such as interest rates, and 
real GDP.  
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pull factors that are more structural126and long term in nature include factors such as 
portfolio diversification (push), the rise of institutional investors (push), quality of 
institutions (pull), and the role of government in an economy (pull; Koepke, 2015). This 
section will first highlight some of the “usual suspects” in the push and pull factors of 
capital flows literature in general, namely the cyclical variables, followed by the push and 
pull factors for both FDI and portfolio flows, based on studies focused on one or the other 
type of capital flows.  
Using principal component analysis, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) were among 
the pioneers in concluding that external – or push – factors such as U.S. interest rates and 
real estate returns, were important determinants of capital inflows to Latin America. 
Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1995) held that that international interest rates were an 
important determinant of the size of capital inflows to EMs. Fernandez-Arias (1996) found 
that the rate of return in AEs is another crucial push factor.127  Calvo and Reinhart (1996) 
and Chuhan et al. (1998), also found that the GDP growth rate of the developed countries 
is a major push factor.   
To examine pull factors, Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (1995) constructed a 
creditworthiness index and concluded that creditworthiness was a major determinant of the 
direction of capital flows.128 Other pull factors include inflation rates (Ahn et al. 1998), as 
a proxy for macroeconomic stability (or risk) in this context; exchange rate stability 
(Lopez-Mejia 1999); and GDP growth rate (Hernandez, Mellado, and Valdes 2001). 
Relatedly, Hernandez, Mellado, and Valdes (2001) held that the main determinant of 
capital flows is the country’s fundamentals. In their study spanning the period 1970- 2000, 
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005) found that institutional quality is another 
important determinant of capital flows. 
The push and pull factors earlier research identified have continued to be significantly 
valuable in analyzing trends of capital flows since the onset of the 2007 global financial 
 
126 Structural factors include institutional quality, governance, and regulatory aspects.  
127 Monthly data on co-movements between official reserves and real exchange rates were used as a proxy for capital 
inflows.  
128Fernandez-Arias and Montiel’s creditworthiness index was based on comparing the present value of a country’s 
capacity to repay foreign liabilities to the accumulated stock of foreign liabilities. The repayment capacity was based on 
a country's capability to produce a trade surplus. They used the comparison to determine if extra liabilities can be 




crisis. Research has attributed the significant retrenchment in foreign capital flows that 
came with the global financial crisis largely to a huge “push shock” in global risk aversion 
that prompted global investors to unwind their EM positions (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 
2011). This has been more applicable to portfolio flows than to other types of capital flows, 
because FDI has been less vulnerable since 2007-2009.   
After the global financial crisis, researchers refocused on the impact of expansionary129 
monetary policies in AEs, which Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) had originally 
discussed. The focus of this literature has been on portfolio flows, the capital flow 
component that witnessed a significant improvement after 2009, during the third wave of 
capital flows surging into EMs. Koepke (2014) as well as Ahmed and Zlate (2013) find 
that unconventional U.S. monetary policy did not alter the volume of capital flows, and 
instead shifted the composition of capital inflows towards portfolio inflows. Using cross-
sectional regressions to capture episodes of financial stress in EMs, Ahmed, Coulibaly, and 
Zlate (2015) find that the 2013 “taper-tantrum” episode had a lower impact on the financial 
markets of EMs with stronger economic fundamentals. While they found limited evidence 
of investor differentiation among EMs prior to 2013, differing economic fundamentals 
around 2008 helped explain the heterogeneous responses of EMs’ financial markets to the 
global financial crisis. The authors held that the role of pull factors, or fundamentals, 
increased during the Eurozone crisis in 2011 as well as in the 2013 taper tantrum.   
On the other hand, using seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs), Forbes and Warnock 
(2012) pinpointed bouts of excessive movements in capital flows, and found that global 
factors, especially global risk, were significantly related to episodes of extreme capital flow 
movements. Pull factors, on the other hand, were found to be less important, in addition to 
the limited relationship between capital controls and the probability of significant changes 
in capital flows.  
To investigate the recurring episodes of surges of capital inflows in EMs, Cerutti et al. 
(2015b) employed a latent factor model to study the determinants and sensitivity of gross 
capital inflows in 34 EMs over the period 2001-2013. Given the recurring episodes of 
surges of capital inflows in EMs, they focused on push factors, and examined FDI, portfolio 
 




inflows, and other inflows. The pull factors in the model were type of exchange rate regime, 
institutional quality, real GDP growth trade, and trade openness; the push factors were the 
real effective exchange rate (REER), average GDP growth rate in the United States, Euro 
Area, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the VIX as a measure of global risk aversion (or 
risk appetite), changes in expectations of the U.S. policy rate, and the slope of the yield 
curve.130 Among their main findings is that slowdowns in advanced economies led to 
increases in capital flows into EMs, while increases in the VIX lowered capital flows into 
EMs, as global uncertainty rises. A rise in the U.S. REER also lowered capital flows to 
EMs as the depreciation of their currencies renders borrowers riskier, with lower solvency, 
in USD terms. The results showed that push factors mattered more relative to pull factors, 
both among portfolio debt and equity flows, with Ghosh et al. (2012), Chung et al. (2014), 
Bruno and Shin (2014), as well as Forbes and Warnock (2012) above reaching similar 
findings.  
Most recently, Hannan (2017) used country fixed effects on a sample of 34 EMs over the 
period Q3 2009-Q4 2015 to study the determinants of both net and gross capital flows.131 
He found that growth differentials, interest differentials, global risk aversion, financial 
development, reserves, and institutional quality primarily drive capital flows.132 Yet, the 
results differed across the type of capital, whether FDI or portfolio flows, or, whether they 
were gross or net capital flows. Hannan acknowledges that he studied a period after the 
global financial crisis, which may not be representative of the determinants of capital flows 
in the long term and acknowledges that the low growth prospects of EMs, as well as a 
deteriorating global risk sentiment caused the slowdown in capital flows to EMs after the 
global financial crisis.   
 
 
3.2.1. Determinants of FDI 
 
130 The yield curve represents the difference between the 10-year and 3-months U.S. T-bill rates. Other variables that 
potentially had an impact on bond and equity flows, and were tested, included the 10-year U.S. government bond yield, 
as proxy for return on investing in cross-border bonds relative to U.S. bonds; the lagged return of the Emerging Markets 
Bond Index; and the lagged return of the MSCI EM index, both as proxies for returns in EM bond and equity markets.  
Variables that were specific to banking inflows were also included, including the TED Spread – the difference between 
short term interbank lending and government T-bill rates – but they are beyond the scope of this study.  
131 Hannan controlled for serial correlation and cross-section dependence using Driscoll-Kraay standard errors for the 
estimated coefficients, and examined FDI, portfolio flows (both debt and equity), and other investment flows. 
132 Other determinants of capital flows that Hannan considered were commodity prices, global liquidity growth (measured 
by the G-7 M2 growth), U.S. yield gap, U.S. corporate spreads, trade openness, income per capital, and capital openness.  
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A significant number of papers have focused on the determinants of FDI,133 with 
findings broadly in line with research on determinants of capital flows. For example, long-
term factors governing the real economy, such a market size134 (Dunning, 1993; Garibalidi 
et al., 2002), mostly affect FDI – rather than short-term domestic (or international) 
fluctuations. Within a push-pull factor framework, domestic output growth has been largely 
undisputed as one of the leading pull factors that attract FDI (Koepke, 2015; Gastanaga et 
al., 1998; De Vita and Kyaw 2008).135  Addison and Heshmati (2003) also found that trade 
openness and democracy positively affect FDI, while the level of perceived risk and debt 
negatively affects it.   
Other pull factors that exert a significant effect on FDI include government consumption 
as a share of GDP,136  or more broadly fiscal deficits (Albuquerque et al. 2005; Garibalidi 
et al., 2002), inflation (Walsh and Yu, 2010; Garibalidi et al., 2002),137 and a weak currency 
(Blonigen, 1997). Furthermore, Abbott et al. (2012) found that flexible exchange rates 
tends to increase FDI. Institutional quality, governance, and low corruption also had a 
positive impact on FDI inflows (Gastanaga et al. 1998; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006). 
Similarly, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) found that economic reforms played a limited 
role in driving FDI inflows in Latin America, with trade and financial liberalization being 
notable exceptions. 138  However, Daude and Fratzscher (2008) found that information 
frictions and institutional quality had less effect than portfolio inflows on FDI inflows,139 
suggesting that institutional quality could have a mixed effect. Limiting the risk of 
expropriation was another important FDI determinant for Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006). 
As for push factors, Koepke (2015) highlighted the limited role that push factors played 
for FDI. Yet selected work attempted to examine the impact of changes in global risk 
aversion on FDI inflows during the global financial crisis,140 and the results were mixed. 
 
133 We are concerned with macro/country-level/exogenous determinants in this chapter. For more information on firm-
specific FDI determinants, see Blonigen (2005).  
134 Market size is proxied by GDP growth or GDP per capita.  
135 Gupta and Ratha (2000) is an exception; they find that GDP growth had no significant impact on FDI flows. 
136 GDP is a proxy for the size of the government in the economy. 
137 Lower inflation mattered more for AEs than EMs. 
138 Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) studied the period 1980-1996. They found that tax reforms, privatizations, international 
capital liberalization, and regime type were not significant determinants of FDI.  
139 Daude and Fratzscher’s measure of portfolio inflows included both debt and equity.  
140 Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011) shed light on the fact that risk aversion shocks tends to affect capital flows through 
three main channels; 1) risk re-assessment, which leads to capital flight from weaker economies; and 2) declining 
investment and 3) lower global trade.  
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For example, Rey (2015) found a positive relationship between the VIX and FDI inflows 
into EMs, while Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2011)141 found a negative relationship, holding 
that the impact of global risk aversion on FDI is smaller than other components of capital 
flows. On the other hand, Albuqerque (2005) found no relationship between global risk 
aversion and FDI inflows.  
Further research examined output growth in advanced economies as a potential push factor, 
but a lot of the findings were inconclusive. De Vita and Kyaw (2008) obtained mixed 
results,142 depending on the model employed, while DasGupta and Ratha (2000) did not 
find any significant impact. Albuquerque et al. (2005 and 2002) found both a negative and 
positive143 relationship, respectively, between global growth and FDI into EMs. They also 
found that, asset return indicators had no impact on FDI inflows. This was an expected 
result given the long-term (and slow-moving) nature of FDI inflows.   
Some research was focused solely among the determinants of FDI in the BRICS countries, 
including the work of Vijayakumar et al. (2010). Using panel regressions with fixed effects 
and data over the period 1975-2007, they examined market size, labor cost, infrastructure, 
currency value, and gross capital formation as potential determinants of FDI inflows in the 
BRICS countries.144 They found that inflation and industrial production – proxies for 
stability and growth potential – as well as trade openness were not significant determinants 
of FDI.  
3.2.2. Determinants of Portfolio Flows 
Researchers generally agree that push factors largely drive portfolio flows, while pull 
factors matter more for FDI (Guichard, 2017).145 Most analysis concurs that global risk 
aversion and interest rates in AEs mattered the most for portfolio flows to EMs, with a 
significant negative relationship between these variables and portfolio flows, both debt and 
equity. Eichengreen and Gupta (2016) reach a similar finding, stating that global risk 
 
141 Milesi-Ferretti and Tille examined capital flow retrenchment. 
142  The SVAR context led a positive relationship. In different specifications, however, they found a negative but 
insignificant relationship.  
143 The positive relationship pertained to vertical FDI flows (investments related to an integrated international supply 
chain that meets external demand) (Koepke, 2015).This is a valid argument whereas horizontal FDI is more influenced 
by pull factors. 
144 Vijayakumar et al. proxied market size by GDP and GDP per capita and currency value either by the real effective 
exchange rate or the nominal effective exchange rate. 
145 This also applies to bank flows, but bank flows are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
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aversion was more important in the last decade, while U.S. monetary policy mattered more 
in the 1990s, so the importance of push factors changes over time for portfolio flows. 
Growth and interest rate differentials were also important drivers of portfolio flows (IMF, 
2016). 
Fratzscher (2011) examined the determinants of net portfolio flows in 50 economies over 
the period 2005-2010 and found that major crisis events and changes to global risk and 
liquidity had a significant impact on capital flows, in periods of both crises and recovery. 
The heterogeneity in which countries were affected reflects variations in macroeconomic 
fundamentals, institutional quality, and country risk.146   More importantly, push factors 
were the main drivers during times of crises, while pull factors mattered more during 
tranquil times. 
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) modelled net private capital inflows to selected EMs in Asia and 
Latin America using quarterly panel data over the period 2002-Q2 2013.   Using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and fixed effects, they found that growth and interest rate differentials 
between EMs and AEs and global risk appetite are the most crucial determinants of net 
private capital inflows. They also find that capital controls lowered portfolio (net) inflows. 
Unconventional U.S. monetary policy147  also affected portfolio flows into EMs, showing 
a larger (positive) impact on gross portfolio flows than on net flows.  
Using a time varying regression model on monthly data for 23 countries over the period 
2005-2013, Erduman and Kaya (2014) found that the interest rate differential and inflation 
rate were the most significant pull factors of portfolio bond flows. They found that global 
liquidity, measured by the sum of total assets of the Fed Reserve (Fed) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB,) was the most important push factor, especially when unconventional 
monetary policies were first introduced. They acknowledged, however, that its importance 
has been decreasing over time. Global risk appetite, measured by monthly differences of 
the VIX index, was also found to have a significant, albeit small, impact on bond flows.  
 
146 However, Fratzscher (2011) did not measure country risk by sovereign ratings.  




Sarno et al. (2016) used a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model148 to study the relative 
contribution of common (push) and country-specific (pull) factors to the variance of bond 
and equity flows from the United States to 55 other countries. More than 80% of this 
variance was due to push factors from the United States, including interest rates, stock 
market performance, liquidity, and the U.S. output gap. The pull factors that mattered were 
interest rates, the output gap, and capital account openness.  
Using fixed effects, Byrne and Fiess (2016) examined the nature and determinants of 
capital flows over the period 1993-2009, focusing on bond and equity flows.149  Long-run 
bond yields in advanced economies, as well as commodity prices, were found to be among 
the important push factors, while financial openness and institutions were the main pull 
factors.150 
3.3.Financial Contagion 
A vast literature addresses contagion as the international spreading/transmission of shocks; 
it shows that such contagion is mainly a result of herding behavior of financial agents or 
similar fundamentals/interdependence between countries (Calvo and Reinhart, 1996, 
Dornbusch et al., 2000, and Lee et al., 2013). Eichengreen et al. (1995 and 1996) examined 
quarterly macro and political data on 20 OECD countries, and found that trade links are 
the principal transmission channel through which financial crises spread across 
countries.151 Glick and Rose (1998) used panel data of 161 countries for five currency 
crises152 and reached the same conclusion, while macroeconomic factors did not help 
explain the cross-country occurrence of speculative attacks.  Another channel is the 
“uncertainty channel of contagion” (Kannan and Kohler-Geib, 2009), whereby uncertainty 
increases in light of anticipated versus unanticipated events.153 Forbes (2012) held that the 
more dependent countries are on trade, with leveraged banking systems, the more they are 
susceptible to financial contagion. Having increased capital inflows, does not, however, 
 
148 The model isolates push and pull factors that determine movements in international portfolio flows. 
149 Byrne and Fiess (2016) also looked at bank flows, but that is beyond the scope of this review. 
150 Byrne and Fiess Fiess (2016) found a small correlation between the VIX and equity flows, unlike other studies that 
find the VIX is the main push factor.  
151 Eichengreen et al.’s findings identify macroeconomic similarities, or fundamentals, as the second channel. 
152 The currency crises occurred in 1971, 1973, 1992, 1994-1995, and 1997. 
153 A recent example of such an unanticipated event is the May 2018 EM sell-off. Investors anticipated a strengthening 
U.S. dollar and Fed tightening, but the capital outflows from EMs exposed the vulnerabilities of the weaker EMs (most 
notably Turkey and Argentina), which caused institutional investors to pull money out of other EMs either to 1) make up 
for losses in the weaker EMs; or 2) for fear of similar vulnerabilities arising elsewhere.  
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make them more prone to contagion. Using a sample of 49 EMs and developing countries 
over the period 1980-2009, Lee et al. (2013) found that the volatility of capital flows has a 
significant contagion effect that varies by type of capital flows and that the volatility of net 
inflows tends to be more susceptible to intra-regional contagion relative to gross inflows.  
Ahmed et al. (2017) assessed the significance of economic fundamentals in the 
transmission of international shocks to financial markets in selected EMs over seven 
episodes of EM financial stress.154  They found that countries with better fundamentals 
witnessed less weakening in their financial markets during the 2013 taper-tantrum, while 
those EMs that weakened had experienced greater private capital inflows and larger 
exchange rate appreciation. Prior to this episode, there was limited evidence of investor 
differentiation among EMs. 
3.4.Capital Controls and Macroprudential Policies to Manage Capital Flows 
EMs tend to employ monetary and fiscal policies, exchange rate policy, capital controls, 
and macroprudential measures to manage capital flows (Ghosh et al., 2017),155 especially 
when if capital inflows contribute to systemic risk 156  (IMF, 2012). 157  In this sense, 
macroprudential policies can help limit the build-up of systemic risk158 that arises directly 
and indirectly, respectively, through increased cross-border lending/capital inflows and 
asset valuation (IMF, 2016). This is particularly the case during episodes of surges in 
capital inflows, particularly portfolio flows, which require macroprudential tightening 
(Ghosh et al., 2017).159   
On the other hand, the rationale behind the use of capital controls stems from the 
perspective of the “impossible trinity,” 160 or trilemma, of having an open capital account, 
a fixed exchange rate, and an independent monetary policy simultaneously. Capital 
 
154 Ahmed et al. addressed the period from the 1990suntil the 2013 taper tantrum.  
155 EMs employ monetary and fiscal policies to deal with the inflationary and overheating effects of capital inflows. They 
use exchange rate policies to contain appreciation pressures. Prudential measures can be applied to curb excessive credit 
growth and related financial-stability risks.  
156 For more information on the channels through which capital flows increase systemic risk, see IMF (2017).  
157 When surges in capital flows lead to asset price volatility, asset bubbles, currency appreciations, and problems in the 
transmission of monetary policy, these problems can result in accumulating balance sheet vulnerabilities, and thus, there 
is a need for the use of tools that deal with episodes of surges in capital inflows (IMF, 2012).  
158 Or financial-stability risks, more broadly (Ghosh et al., 2017) 
159 The intuition behind this is that portfolio flows, as well as cross-border bank flows, are usually associated with credit 
booms and risks to financial-stability, necessitating the need for tightening macroprudential policies, relative to periods 
where FDI inflows increase (Ghosh et al., 2017) which does not contribute to systemic risk. 
160 See Mundell (1963). 
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controls facilitate loosening of the impossible trinity constraint, particularly when 
managing the exchange rate is the main goal. In this sense, capital controls on inflows 1) 
help lower exchange rate appreciation pressures, especially during non-crisis times 
(Blundell-Wignall and Roulet, 2014), especially if they limit the volume of inflows161; 2) 
help lower vulnerability to crises stemming from extreme or risky foreign borrowing (Ostry 
et al., 2010); and 3) help address any potential balance sheet vulnerabilities, the most 
relevant of which are currency and maturity mismatches (Ghosh et al., 2017).162 As a result, 
the IMF support for capital controls increased since the crisis (Gallagher and Tian, 2017). 
With the rise in interest of macroprudential policies, recent research questioned whether it 
is more effective to use macroprudential policies than capital controls to manage capital 
flows, especially their volatile components, given their potential adverse effects on a 
country’s banking system.163  Researchers refer to macroprudential policies and capital 
controls as capital flow management (CFM)  tools  (Forbes et al., 2013), and they are 
implemented them to limit capital flows.164 This section briefly reviews the literature that 
has examined the impact of both capital controls and macroprudential policies on capital 
flows.  
Most of the literature on the use of capital flow management tools found little or no impact 
on the volume of capital flows, but rather found an effect on their composition (Ostry et 
al., 2010; Magud et al., 2011; and Beirne and Friedrich, 2016). Specifically, the literature 
on capital controls found that they have a mixed effect on capital flows, 165  and included 
country-specific analysis as well as cross-country analysis. Country-specific studies found 
that capital controls had a limited impact on the total volume of inflows166 (see Ariyoshi et 
 
161 The literature that follows shows that the impact of capital controls on exchange rate appreciation pressures is mixed. 
162 Ghosh et. al. also hold that capital controls are employed in episodes where EMs face multiple and increasing risks 
that could adversely affect macroeconomic and financial stability.  
163 Thisis particularly important when foreign currency funding is crucial (Blundell-Wignall and Roulet, 2014), which is 
the case in a lot of EMs, and has the potential to shed light on EMs’ vulnerability to liquidity problems particularly during 
episodes of stress or bank runs. Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2014) highlighted that among the most prominent 
macroprudential tools in this context have been caps on foreign currency borrowing, foreign exchange (FX) swaps, 
restricting foreign exchange (FX) transactions to only those related to investment and trade activities, and introducing 
taxes/levies on cross-border flows.  
164 Excluding prudential tools that target specific institutions (Forbes et al., 2013), with a particular focus on currency 
based prudential measures (Ghosh et al., 2017) on the macroprudential front. 
165 Ostry et al. (2010) held that this reflects 1) the limited controls EMs use; 2) the implementation of controls as part of 
a wider package of tools that target capital flows, which makes it harder to identify the impact of capital controls; 3) the 
complexity of capturing their intensity.  
166 Country-specific studies are beyond the scope of this chapter. For more information, see Ariyoshi et al. (2000), Ostry 
et al. (2010), and Habermeier et al. (2011).  
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al., 2000), and a more significant impact on the composition of inflows (Habermeier et al., 
2011).  Cross-country studies found that in countries that experienced surges in capital 
inflows, capital controls helped limit those surges, but the result varied by the types of 
controls. Such studies include Cardarelli et al. (2009), which examined episodes of surges 
of capital inflow surges inflows to 52 countries over the period 1987-2007. They found 
that tighter controls on capital inflows lowered net private inflows, including net FDI 
inflows. They concluded that capital controls tend to have temporary effects as market 
participants usually found a way around them.167 
Binci et al. (2010) examined capital controls in a panel of 74 countries over the period 
1995-2005 and found that the effect of capital controls varied by the type of controls 
imposed, asset category, direction of flows, and by a country’s income level. Specifically, 
debt and equity controls had a limited impact effect on capital inflows, but significantly 
lowered outflows. They also found that capital controls are more effective in AEs than in 
EMs because they have better institutional quality. 
Selected studies similarly centered on the role of capital controls as a pull factor and their 
impact on FDI. Asiedu and Lien (2004) shows that the effect of capital controls168 on FDI 
differed by region and varied over time (from the 1970s onwards). Since the 1990s, the 
three types of capital controls were found to exert a considerable effect on FDI, with East 
Asian and Latin American countries showing a greater adverse effect than those in the 
Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Elo (2007) found that higher capital controls lowered 
the length of FDI investments at certain levels of country risk. This is quite important for 
the current study as it relates to how FDI responds to capital controls during changing 
country risk, as proxied by sovereign ratings. 169   Dell’Erba and Reinhardt (2015) 
concentrated on financial sector FDI and concluded that capital controls increased the 
probability of FDI inflows.  
The limited literature on whether macroprudential policies effect capital flows does not 
find a clear impact, partly because these policies do not directly affect the volume or 
 
167 See Baba and Kokenyne (2011) for a similar result on the temporary effects of capital controls, and that their 
effectiveness tends to depend on the intensity of their implementation, the extent of capital market development, and 
stickiness of capital flows.  
168 Asiedu and Lien used three types of capital controls; restrictions on the capital account, repatriation of export proceeds, 
and the presence of several exchange rates as measures of capital controls. 
169 In fact, one of their measures for country risk has been Moody’s sovereign ratings. 
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composition of capital flows, but rather affect the balance sheet risks associated with 
capital inflows (Forbes et al., 2013 and IMF, 2016).  Most of the focus of the literature on 
macroprudential policies and their relationship with capital flows focused on cross-border 
bank flows.  Using a panel of 46 countries over the period 2004-2012, Aysan, et al. 
(2014) studied the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in Turkey in acting as a buffer 
against the volatility of capital flows, but with a focus on bank flows.170  They found that 
macroprudential policies make capital flows less volatile to global conditions. Turkey in 
particular was less sensitive to global factors than other EMs; the researchers concluded 
that macroprudential policies were as effective as capital controls in containing cross-
border capital controls.  
Using data on portfolio debt and equity, FDI, and other investments, McQuade and Schmitz 
(2016) study the drivers of capital flows before and after the global financial crisis, by 
comparing the level of capital flows in 2005-2006 and in 2013-2014. They found that 
tighter macroprudential policies, measured by the aggregate macroprudential index from 
Cerutti et al. (2015a), led to lower total inflows, with a negative and statistically significant 
impact on other investment inflows (mainly banking), as well as a negative coefficient in 
relation to FDI. They conclude that macroprudential policies could be an obstacle to capital 
flows.  
Beirne and Friedrich (2016) used fixed effects to study the impact of macroprudential 
policies on capital flows on a panel of 75 countries over the period 1999-2012. The 
effectiveness of macroprudential policies was largely dependent on the structure of the 
domestic banking system. 171  Thus, under specific financial sector conditions, 
macroprudential policies are effective in reducing capital inflows, mainly banking flows.  
However they did not find that macroprudential policies have a significant impact on 
portfolio equity flows or FDI flows, irrespective of the structure of the banking sector.  
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (2017) examined the role of macroprudential 
policies as a potential determinant of gross capital inflows to Asia in the period 2009- 2016. 
 
170 Aysan, et al. call for future research focused on portfolio inflows. While the volatility of capital flows is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, we touch upon it because of its relevance of this research to the current study. For more information 
on the volatility of capital flows, see Mendoza and Terrones (2008) and Bruno and Shin (2013a and b). 
171 That is, the structure of the banking sector, as determined by regulatory quality, and credit to deposit ratios. improves 
the effectiveness of macroprudential policies. A higher cost-to-income ratio, on the other hand, lowers the effectiveness 
of macroprudential policies.  
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Using panel regressions,172 appeared to have a dampening impact on short term capital 
movements into Asia; tighter macroprudential policies lowered portfolio inflows by 0.31% 
and lowered other investment inflows by 0.51% of GDP.  
Some papers also looked at both capital controls and macroprudential policies together 
within the context of CFM policies. Using a propensity-score matching methodology to 
examine data on weekly changes in capital controls and macroprudential policies over the 
period 2009-2011,  Forbes et al. (2013 and 2015) found that most of the CFM tools tested 
did not significantly affect capital flows, but that they affected financial fragility.173 They 
found that capital controls had a significant impact on lowering equity flows, but an 
insignificant effect on bond flows.174 In this sense, they viewed both capital controls and 
macroprudential policies as tools to reduce financial stability, particularly bank leverage, 
inflation expectations, and private credit.  
Ghosh et al. (2014) used data on bilateral cross-border bank flows over the period 1995-
2012 into 76 countries to test for the impact of both capital controls and macroprudential 
policies on both capital inflows by recipient countries and outflows by source countries.175  
They find that the use of both capital controls and prudential policies lowers the volume of 
bank flows. Specifically, results from OLS regressions showed that increasing restrictions 
on capital outflows, as well as their disaggregated measures on bond, equity, FDI, and 
financial credit, led to lower cross-border bank outflows. As for the impact on inflows, they 
found a more varied outcome in their results without a statistically significant impact on 
inflows. They concluded that capital controls on inflows tend to have an asymmetric 
impact. More importantly, prudential policies employed, especially FX-related measures, 
were associated with lower cross border bank flows by 70-80%. They obtained similar 
results in jointly testing both controls on inflows and outflows and concluded that the 
volume of cross-border bank flows responds to restrictions on both inflows and outflows.  
 
172 Additional significant pull and push factors included GDP growth differentialswhile financial and policy variables 
(interest rate differential and exchange rate movements) had more impact on short-term flows than on long-term flows.  
173 Particularly bank leverage, credit growth, asset bubbles, foreign currency exposure, or short-term liabilities. 
174 Ghosh et al.’s findings apply even if capital controls target bond flows.   
175 Ghosh et al. employ capital controls on bonds, equity, and FDI, in addition to restrictions on lending to non-residents, 
and locally in FX and restrictions on purchasing FX denominated securities that are domestically issued. They captured 
prudential policies using a dummy variable as a proxy of the presence or absence of the tool in question.  
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Pasricha et al. (2015) employed panel VARs to test for the impact of changes in capital 
controls and currency-based macroprudential policies for 17 EMs over the period 2001-
2011. Overall, the authors did not find significant evidence that capital controls are 
effective. They found that tightening measures of net inflows significantly lowered gross 
inflows, as well as gross outflows, while the impact on net inflows is not significant, 
especially prior to the global financial crisis. After the global financial crisis, neither gross 
inflows nor gross outflows fell because of the tightening measures introduced in all 17 
EMs.176 
Bruno et al. (2017) examined the impact of both bond market and banking sector 
macroprudential and CFM policies on quarterly data of 12 Asia-Pacific countries over the 
period 2004-2013.177  They found that these policies led to a slowing in both banking and 
bond inflows, particularly macroprudential policies prior to 2007 and CFM policies prior 
to 2009.178 Spillover effects of CFM policies showed a link between banking CFM policies 
and higher international debt securities prior to 2007, and bond CFM policies were linked 
to increased cross-border lending after 2009.  Countries with more rigorous capital controls 
in place witnessed lower banking inflows and lower international bond issuances, while 
countries with loser capital controls only had effective policies in episodes of weak growth 
of bond and banking inflows. 
Ghosh et al. (2017) examined the response of EMs’ response to capital inflows in 50 EMs 
over the period 2005-2013 using OLS179 and probit models. They found that EMs use a 
combination of monetary tightening, FX market interventions, capital controls, and 
macroprudential tightening to avoid the unwanted consequences of capital flows. Given 
the rising literature on macroprudential policies and its relationship with capital flows, 
McQuade and Schmitz (2016) held that macroprudential policies could be viewed as 
 
176 Spill-over and contagion effects of capital controls from the BRICS to other EMs were examined in this paper, but 
contagion effects from changes in capital controls are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
177 The CFM policies Bruno et al. examined are bank and bond inflow tools. They also examined various capital control 
measures as tools of capital flow management tools. Macroprudential tools examined were based on existing databases 
such as Shim et al. (2013), and Lim et al. (2011). They also employ panel regressions with no country fixed effects, 
which refer to as pooled OLS regressions, while constraining global factors so that they have identical coefficients in 
terms of their effect on the dependent variables.  
178 After 2009, bond-related CFM policies did not lower bond inflows.  
179 Ghosh et al. account for potential serial correlation by clustering the standard errors. 
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important determinants of international capital flows, given how accommodative monetary 
policy has been since the onset of the global financial crisis. 
3.5.The Interaction Between Sovereign Ratings, Capital Flows, and Contagion  
The literature that combines sovereign ratings, capital flows, and financial contagion has 
been much smaller than the above strands.180 The first such work, has been that of Chuhan, 
Claessens, and Mamingi (1993), who employed panel data for the period 1988-1992 on 
U.S. capital flows to nine Latin American countries and nine Asian countries. The authors 
discovered that bond flows were faster to react to a country’s credit rating change relative 
to equity flows.  Calvo and Reinhart (1996) examined contagion in Asia and Latin America 
prior to and post the December 1994 Mexican crisis. They found proof of “large neighbor 
effects” on capital flows to and from Latin America from 1970 to 1993, and that co-
movement across equities and bonds in Latin America increased with the onset of the 
Mexican crisis.  
Taylor and Sarno (1997) extended Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi’s (1993) analysis to 
examine the determinants of U.S. capital flows to nine Latin American and nine Asian 
countries from 1988 to 1992. They found that long term equity and bond flows are evenly 
sensitive to the push and pull factors employed, and that a country’s domestic credit rating 
assisted in explaining the pattern of U.S. portfolio flows to the countries under study. 
Larrain et al. (1997) employ Granger causality tests, and event studies, in an unbalanced 
panel of 26 countries – both EMs and advanced – over the period 1987-1996. They 
conclude that CRAs’ industry likely reduces excessive private capital inflows to EMs 
experiencing negative rating announcements. Positive announcements, however, did not 
have a significant effect on sovereign risk assessments.  
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002b) concluded that, in addition, to significantly affecting 
bond and stock markets, changes in ratings resulted in contagion, or spillover, effects.  
Kraussl (2003) found that changes in sovereign ratings of the ground-zero country 
significantly affected financial markets of other emerging markets.  
 
180 Also, to our knowledge, no research ties sovereign ratings, as a proxy for sovereign risk, with systemic risk, whether 
from a capital flows perspective or a macroprudential perspective.   
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Albuquerque (2003), on the other hand, regressed the share of FDI in gross capital flows 
on the ratings assigned. He found an inverse relationship between them and concluded that 
changes in ratings may explain changes in FDI flows. More recently, Kim and Wu (2008) 
tested the impact of sovereign ratings on financial development and capital flows in 51 
EMs over the period 1995-2003.  They find that sovereign credit ratings encourage 
financial intermediary development and therefore attract capital flows. FDI-specific 
findings suggest that an improvement in sovereign ratings increases FDI into EMs. 
Gande and Parsley (2004) studied the impact of sovereign ratings changes in 85 countries 
on equity mutual funds over the period 1996-2002 and found asymmetric responses among 
capital flows. Ratings downgrades were associated with outflows from the downgraded 
country, while a ratings upgrade was not necessarily associated with significant equity 
inflows. The degree of corruption mattered in terms of affecting the response of equity 
flows; countries with lower levels of corruption witnessed lower outflows during 
downgrades.  
Finally, Bekaert et al. (2011) studied the transmission of crises across equity portfolios in 
55 countries, finding evidence of contagion from the U.S. markets and the global financial 
sector, but the effects were small. More significant contagion from domestic equity markets 
to individual domestic equity portfolios were found, and held that country-specific factors, 
particularly the current account balance and fiscal balance, are most important in shaping 
contagion risks. Sovereign ratings were another factor that had a significant impact on the 
performance of equity markets during crisis times.  
 
4. Data  
Our analysis addresses both FDI and portfolio flows. For FDI, we employ annual data, 
while, in light of their volatile nature, we employ quarterly data for portfolio flows.181 The 
dataset is constructed as a panel of country observations and includes 24 EMs over the 
period 1990-2014 for FDI and 23 EMs over the period 1990-2017. Data restrictions made 
 
181 For annual results for portfolio flow regressions in line with FDI, refer to Emara and El Said (2015).  
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it necessary to drop Venezuela from the latter set.182. The list of countries included in the 
sample is reported in Table (1) in Annex I. 
The two dependent variables in the model are net FDI and Gross Portfolio Inflows, both 
taken as a share of GDP to account for country size. Given the lack of volatility in FDI, 
and their longer-term stable nature, running our regressions in net terms was warranted in 
light of the classical literature on capital flows. For portfolio flows, however, their volatile 
nature implies that inflows and outflows could be determined by differing factors,183 and 
in such cases, Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) held that inflows and outflows need to be 
studied differently. This is why our dependent variable for portfolio inflows is in gross 
terms.  For FDI, our set of independent variables consists of the current account balance 
(as a percent of GDP), the real interest rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) sovereign ratings, an index for capital controls, the weighted average of 
the G-7184 real GDP growth rate, and the weighted average of the G-7 real interest rate.  For 
portfolio flows, our independent variables also include the real GDP growth rate, S&P 
sovereign ratings, inflation rate, and the current account balance as a percent of GDP as 
pull factors. We also include the fiscal balance as a percent of GDP as an additional pull 
factor since a larger fiscal deficit necessitates financing, both domestic and external, and 
bond flows is the common venue for such financing.  
Since push factors matter more for portfolio flows, we also include the VIX index – a 
measure of U.S. stock market uncertainty- to capture global uncertainty,185 the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury yield, the change in the U.S. REER), and the growth rate in the total assets of the 
Fed, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan to capture global liquidity. We also include the U.S. 
GDP growth rate186 and interest rate differential.187 Our choice of the push and pull factors 
reflects the literature outlined above, and we focus on S&P sovereign ratings because they 
 
182 FDI results have been submitted for publication as a separate paper from portfolio flows, and we present the results 
as such 
183 Portfolio outflows in some EMs could occasionally be driven by global factors- such as the 2013 Taper Tantrum, or 
the 2018 EM sell-off. Thus, a country’s fundamentals, or pull factors, may not have changed and still portfolio outflows 
would occur.  
184 France, Canada, Italy, Germany, U.S., U.K. and Japan. 
185 In this case, a rise in global uncertainty tends to stifle investments due to possible irreversibility (Byrne and Fiess, 
2016). 
186 U.S. growth rate was highlighted as the most relevant for portfolio flows. Our robustness checks included the G-7 
growth rates, interest rates of the U.S. vs. G-4 and G-7, growth differential, as well as different measures of global 
liquidity.  
187 In line with the literature for portfolio flows, more so than just either the EM interest rate or the AE/US interest rate.  
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are the ones most commonly described as leading the markets.  Li (2004) and Gande and 
Parsley (2005) were among the studies that maintained S&P as the principal rating agency, 
and it reflects the ratings other agencies in the market assigned. Table (2) and (3) in Annex 
(I) provide a detailed list of the variables used, definition, unit of measurement, and data 
sources. Annex (11) describes the process through which we converted ratings into 
numbers based on a linear transformation scale and created a time series for sovereign 
ratings changes from 1990 until 2017.188 
Figure (7) Sovereign Ratings and Capital Flow Trends  
 
Source: Haver Analytics and S&P 
Figure (7) displays scatterplots showing the relationship between sovereign credit ratings 
and both FDI and portfolio inflows as a share of GDP for the last five years of our sample. 
As expected, FDI inflows as a share of GDP, the slow-moving variable, are positively 
related to sovereign ratings, highlighting the responsiveness of FDI inflows to sovereign 
ratings. Portfolio inflows, on the other hand, are more fast moving, and the data does not 
display a particular trend on their relationship with sovereign ratings during the average of 
the last five years of our sample.   
5. Model Specification and Methodology 
The methodology is divided into five parts. First, we examine the impact of a ratings 
change on both FDI and portfolio flows. Second, we investigate whether or not this impact 
displays a contagion effect, particularly from the BRICS countries in our sample to other 
 
188 The ratings data is available upon request where we created a monthly series based on date-specific ratings changes, 
and then we computed quarterly and annual data based on the created series.  
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EMs. Third, the contagious effects of each of the five BRICS countries on three regions, 
Asia,189 CEEMEA,190 and Latin America,191 are analyzed to understand whether distance 
matters in terms of the impact of a sovereign rating change. Fourth, we analyze the effect 
of the changes in sovereign ratings capital flows in the presence of two types of crises: the 
2007 global financial crisis and country-specific crises 192 . Finally, we analyze the 
interaction between sovereign ratings, and CFM policies to determine their joint impact on 
gross portfolio inflows.193 
First, for the impact of changes in sovereign debt ratings on the flow of FDI and portfolio 
(as a percent of GDP)194, we employ a dynamic panel regression model as follows,  
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = α +  ρ𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 +  βXi,t−1 + δZi,t−1  + λRi,t−1 + εi,t               (1) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t = 1990,…T 
 
where FDIit denotes the ratio of net inflows from foreign investors to GDP, of country i at 
time t, FDIit-1 is the AR(1) endogenous variable,
195  The list of exogenous variables is 
divided into two groups; pull and push factors.  Xit-1 is the vector of pull factors, Zit-1 is the 
vector of push factors, Rit-1 is the sovereign debt rating, and εit is the error term of the 
regression. We include the first lag of sovereign ratings, the push and pull factors in our 
regressions, instead of their current values, since FDI flows take time to respond to 
macroeconomic developments. As stated above, equation (1) is estimated using annual 
data. 
Once again, the vector of pull factors includes the current account balance as a share of 
GDP, the real interest rate, inflation rate, real GDP growth rate, current account as a share 
 
189The nine Asian countries in our sample are China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Thailand. 
190The eight CEEMEA  region countries in our sample are Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Russia, 
South Africa, and Turkey. 
191 The seven Latin American countries in our sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela. 
192 We survey various new sources and crisis database to establish the years in which EM crises were 
observed.  
193 We only run this estimation for portfolio flows, again, given their volatile nature, and the use of macroprudential 
policies to deal with systemic risk issues that emanate from the volatility of portfolio flows.  
194 We list it as a percent of GDP to control for country size.  
195 One-year lag of FDI. 
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of GDP, an index for capital controls,196 and S&P ratings.197 The vector of push factors 
contains two variables: the weighted average of the G-7 real GDP growth rate and the 
weighted average of the G-7 real interest rate.  
Equation (2) replicates equation (1) for portfolio flows, using the current quarter’s ratings 
and push and pulls factors, as portfolio flows can respond instantaneously to 
macroeconomic and financial developments. 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α +  ρ𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  βXi,t + δZi,t  + λRi,t + εi,t               (2) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t= 1990,…T 
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 denotes the ratio of gross portfolio flows to GDP
198 of country i, at time t. 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 
is the autoregressive term of order one; Xit and Zit are vectors of pull and push factors, 
respectively; Rit represents the sovereign rating change of country i at time t; and εit is the 
error term of the regression. The push factors encompass the U.S. GDP growth rate, 
volatility index (VIX), interest rate policy differential,199 U.S. real effective exchange rate, 
growth rate in the ECB, Fed, and Bank of Japan’s total assets, and the U.S. treasury yields. 
The vector of pull factors will include the real GDP growth rate, inflation rate, current 
account balance as a share of GDP, fiscal balance as a share of GDP, and the S&P sovereign 
debt ratings. The hypothesis that will be tested here is that sovereign ratings changes 
significantly affect the two types of capital flows. That is, a ratings upgrade (downgrade) 
for country i will affect different types of capital flow in country i. Equation (2) is estimated 
using quarterly data. 
Following Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort (1996), Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) 
and Arellano and Bond (1991), we estimate equations (1) and (2) using the dynamic panel 
system200 GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and 
Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000).  Using OLS and Least Square Dummy Variable 
estimators would result in biased estimators and in inconsistent estimators (Hsiao, 2003), 
 
196 For FDI, the index for capital controls is included in the baseline regression. Results without capital controls for FDI 
can be found in Emara and El Said (2015). We employ the capital controls index from Fernandez et al. (2015). 
197 We include credit outlooks because, prior to an actual upgrade or downgrade, sovereign states are usually put on what 
is known as a positive or negative “credit watch” that can have an effect on the flow of capital. However, a country 
placed on a credit watch may not have its rating adjusted.  
198 Once again, to control for country size,  
199 Between the U.S. and EMs in the panel. 
200 We use the dynamic panel system to overcome the bias problems of the difference GMM methodology. 
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respectively. More specifically, the presence of a lagged endogenous variable suggests that 
correlation will exist between the latter and the error term, resulting in biased estimators. 
Thus, to avoid the endogeneity problem that might arise from causality – from capital 
inflows to one or more of the determinants and vice versa – leading to a possible correlation 
between the set of regressors and the residual term of the regression, we use the Arellano-
Bond estimation methodology.  201 
The System GMM works by combining the standard set of moment conditions in first-
difference, and lagged levels as instruments, with an additional set of moments conditions 
derived from the equation in levels. Following Arellano and Bond (1991) we remove the 
unobserved fixed (country-specific) effects, by taking the first difference of Equations (1) 
and (2) as follows: 
(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1)
= α +  ρ(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−2) +  β(Xi,t−1 − Xi,t−2) + δ(Zi,t−1 − δZi,t−2)  
+ λ(Ri,t−1 − Ri,t−2) + (εi,t − εi,t−1 )                                                           (3) 
 
(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1)
= α +  ρ(𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−2) +  β(Xi,t − Xi,t−1) + δ(Zi,t − δZi,t−1)  
+ λ(Ri,t − Ri,t−1) + (εi,t − εi,t−1 )                                                              (4) 
In addition, one of the important assumptions of the Difference GMM is the assumption of 
no correlation between the dependent variable and the error term and the set of the 
independent variables and the error term. This assumption provides the following two extra 
moments conditions about the correlation between the dependent variable and the error 
term, as well as the set of independent variables and the error term (Emara, 2012),  
𝐸[△ 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0, 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇 
                    𝐸[△𝑀𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0, 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇                                        (5) 
 
201 Furthermore, the time-invariant country characteristics may be correlated with the set of regressors. The GMM, 




where is the set of all the explanatory variables of Equation (1) except the push factors, 
Zi,t. The same applies for portfolio flows, and once again, is the set of all the 
explanatory variables of Equation (2) except the push factors, Zi,t.  
 
𝐸[△ 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0, 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇 
           𝐸[△𝑀𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0, 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇                                (6) 
 
As for testing contagion effects among capital flows, we follow Hernandez, Mellado, and 
Valdes (2001), and focus on the likelihood of the presence of “pure” contagion.  This 
entails a considerable co-movement in capital flows when controlling for changes in the 
determinants of capital flows. Thus, employing a dynamic panel regression model, we form 
Equations (7) and (8)202 to test the hypothesis that changes in sovereign ratings in the 
BRICS countries significantly cause changes in capital flows in the other EMs in the 
sample,  
    𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜌𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1  + 𝜎∑𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1
5
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (7) 
where the dependent variable, vectors of push and pull factors, are the same as before from 
Equation (1) except for the ratings. In Equation (7), we replace the rating variable with the 
weighted average of the five BRICS countries’ ratings controlled for country size203 and 
denoted by the variable ∑ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡
5
𝑗=1  . This variable is used to estimate the extent to which a 
sovereign ratings downgrade (upgrade) in the BRICS countries affects FDI to flow out of 
(into) other EMs in the sample.  
𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜌𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖,𝑡  + 𝜎𝑅_𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (8) 
 
In Equation (8), we use R_PCA204, which is computed as the principal component of the 
ratings of the five BRICS countries. The dependent variable is the same as that in Equation 
 
202 Also estimated by System GMM. 
203 We control for country size by multiplying the value of country j’s regional discrete variable by its GDP, relative to 
the sum GDP of the countries in the region. 
204 Instead of the weighted average of the BRICS countries, like we did with FDI. The weighted average of the BRICS 





(2), as well as the vectors of push and pull factors.  Equations (7) and (8) will also be 
estimated for each of the five BRICS countries, one at a time, by replacing both 
the ∑ 𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1
5
𝑗=1  and the 𝑅_𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡with the rating of each of the BRICS countries. The idea 
is to test the hypothesis that the changes in the rating of each BRICS countries significantly 
affects both FDI and portfolio flows in the rest of EMs in the sample, in addition to the 
BRICS bloc as a whole.   
We then investigate this contagion effect further by considering the distance from the 
BRICS country experiencing a rating change on the three regions in the sample. We thus 
estimate Equations (7) and (8) for each of the five BRICS countries in relation to the Asian, 
CEEMEA, and Latin American regions, respectively, to test the extent to which rating 
changes affect the capital flows across the three regions. 
We then analyze the impact of the changes in ratings on the capital flows in the presence 
of two types of crises; the 2007-2009 global financial crisis205 and country specific crises 
by adding a dummy variable Di,t to the model, as shown in Equations (9) and (10) below, 
to account for the two types of crises in turn. For instance, to account for the global 
financial crisis the dummy variable is 1 for the years Q1 2007 to Q4 2012 and zero 
otherwise. To account for country’s specific crisis,206 the dummy variable takes 1 for 
country i at time t of the crisis and zero otherwise.   
               𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = α +  ρ𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 +  βXi,t−1 + δZi,t−1  + λRi,t−1 + θDi,t−1 
                                                                +ϑ(Di,t−1 ∗ Ri,t−1) + εi,t                                           (9) 
 
               𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α +  ρ𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  βXi,t + δZi,t  + λRi,t + θDi,t 
                                                                +ϑ(Di,t ∗ Ri,t) + εi,t                                           (10) 
 
The total effect of a crisis, whether global financial crisis or country’s crisis, is estimated 
by adding the coefficient 𝜆 to the coefficient 𝜗 to capture how the impact of sovereign 
 
205 As well as the eurozone debt crisis between 2010-2012. 
206 Dates of country-specific crisis were obtained from Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) database on dates of banking and 
currency crises, as well as various news sources for the particular quarterly dates in which country-specific crises started 
and ended.  
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ratings changes during crisis times differs in terms of its impact on capital flows relative to 
tranquil times. The statistical significance is determined by their variances and covariances.  
As a last test for the impact of the capital flow management tools, we add to Equation (2) 
various macroprudential indicators from Cerutti et al. (2016), and Shim et al. (2013) to test 
for the impact of using macroprudential policies on portfolio flows and whether tightening 
and loosening macroprudential policies will affect portfolio flows. We also calculate the 
total effect of using macroprudential policies alongside ratings changes in the same manner 
as we did above with the total effects of ratings during crisis times. 
               𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = α +  ρ𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑡−1 +  βXi,t + δZi,t  + λRi,t + θMacroprui,j,t 
                                                 +ϑ(Macroprui,j,t ∗ Ri,t) + εi,t                                           (11) 
For macroprudential policies, we focus our analysis on portfolio flows, because they are 
more volatile and, unlike FDI, could contribute to systemic risk, and financial instability.  
FDI’s stability eliminates the need to use macroprudential policies to stabilize it, and there 
is also therefore no reason to expect to find a link between FDI and systemic risk.207 
 
6. Estimation Results 
Once again, the model is estimated under nine specifications  using the Arellano-Bond 
System GMM, where both types of portfolio flows are regressed on the set of independent 
variables. 208  Once again, the System GMM methodology is best at dealing with 
simultaneous causality issues that run between FDI and its explanatory variables and lead 
to correlations between the latter variables and the error term, as well as the correlation 
between the country’s fixed effects and the set of explanatory variables.  
The set of instruments passed the relevant tests where the first stage F-statistics has 
exceeded ten (0.1) and thus are valid.209 The hypothesis that the set of instruments are 
 
207 Unless FDI, for instance, is concentrated in the housing sector, contributing to boom-bust cycles in house prices, 
which is beyond the scope of this analysis.  
208 For the original set of results upon which this work was built, see Emara and El Said (2015). The FDI and portfolio 
results in Emara and El Said (2015) was a shorter version of the results presented here, and we simply built on expanding 
the models we previously introduced.  
209 To estimate the model using Dynamic Panel System GMM, we include a valid set of instruments in the model. The 
set of instruments we use for the differenced equation consists of the second lag of FDI of the 25 time periods (and 27 
for portfolio flows) in the time series. Also, the standard instruments of the differenced equation consist of push and pull 
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endogenous is rejected for all regressions as computed by the Hansen test and its p-value. 
We first present our results for FDI, followed by the results for portfolio flows.  
6.1.FDI 
Table (1) shows the results of estimating nine specifications for the FDI regression, based 
on Equation (1) above. Our results build further on Emara and El Said (2015)210  by 
including a capital controls index among our set of explanatory variables while testing for 
the impact of sovereign ratings changes on FDI.  Column (1) shows the results of the FDI 
regression on its own lag where the sign and statistical significance is as expected: positive 
and significant at the 1% level. In Column (2), when the lagged GDP growth rate is added 
to the regression, the coefficient of the lagged FDI remains positive and statistically 
significant. The results of this column show that the coefficient of GDP growth is also 
significant, and the magnitude of this coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in 
the lagged GDP growth rate corresponds to about 0.23 percent (of GDP) increase in FDI. 
Once again, this confirms the literature that held that domestic output growth is one of the 
leading determinants of FDI flows, as shown by Gastanaga et al. (1998), Hernandez et al. 
(2001), and Koepke (2015). Table (1a) in Annex II displays the results from El Said and 
Emara (2015) without the capital controls index where we can see that the coefficient of 
GDP growth is almost double (0.49) that of Table (1) in the presence of capital controls.   
In Column 3 (Table 1), the lagged sovereign ratings variable is added to the regression, 
where the result of lagged rating shows a statistically significant positive coefficient 
implying that one notch rating upgrade corresponds to about 0.11 percent (of GDP) 
increase in FDI. The coefficients on lagged FDI and GDP growth remained statistically 
significant after the addition of ratings, as our main variable of interest. 211  To our 
knowledge, few studies have focused mainly on the link between FDI and sovereign 
ratings, but our results are in line with those of Kim and Wu (2008), who found that an 
improvement in sovereign ratings increases FDI into EMs.   
 
factors included in the regressions. The hypothesis that the set of instruments are endogenous is rejected for all regressions 
as computed by the Sargan test and its p-value as show by the end of all the tables. . 
210 Selected results from Emara and El Said (2015) will be highlighted.   
211 The coefficient of the lagged rating in Table (1b), the model that excluded the capital controls index, is slightly above 





Table 1: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
          
FDI it-1 0.698*** 0.697*** 0.606*** 0.601*** 0.608*** 0.606*** 0.579*** 0.597*** 0.597*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0396) (0.0243) (0.0232) (0.0250) (0.0313) (0.0457) (0.0594) (0.0590) 
Real GDP Growth it-1  0.230** 0.202** 0.252** 0.276*** 0.267** 0.312*** 0.214*** 0.207*** 
  (0.0919) (0.0825) (0.102) (0.103) (0.107) (0.120) (0.0789) (0.0698) 
Rating it-1   0.110*** 0.118*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.225*** 0.221*** 0.223*** 
   (0.0349) (0.0348) (0.0332) (0.0288) (0.0534) (0.0511) (0.0562) 
Inflation it-1    -0.000780** -0.0347* -0.0350* 0.00963 0.00688 0.0104 
    (0.000390) (0.0196) (0.0184) (0.0234) (0.0273) (0.0337) 
Real Interest Rate it-1     0.00174 0.00273 0.00732 -0.0209 -0.0192 
     (0.0176) (0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0397) (0.0411) 
Current Account it-1      0.0260 -0.00770 0.0115 0.0111 
      (0.0633) (0.0610) (0.0477) (0.0472) 
Capital Controls Index it-1       -0.0408*** -0.0446*** -0.0438*** 
       (0.0149) (0.0167) (0.0164) 
G-7 Real GDP Growth it        0.458 0.477* 
        (0.298) (0.290) 
G-7 Real Interest it         -0.0389 
         (0.119) 
          
Observations 556 556 507 448 404 404 359 359 359 
Number of country 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test          
Order 1 p-value 0.0423 0.0331 0.0235 0.0296 0.0307 0.0301 0.0231 0.0217 0.0216 
Order 2 p-value 0.2086 0.2159 0.2225 0.2216 0.2244 0.2214 0.2301 0.2200 0.2187 
 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors.
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Column 4 shows the regression with where the lagged inflation is added to the regression, 
whereby inflation is included as a proxy for macroeconomic stability (Walsh and Wu, 
2010). The coefficient of the lagged inflation rate shows an expected negative and 
statistically significant impact on FDI, where a 1 percent increase in inflation leads to 0.001 
percent drop in FDI. While this is a small coefficient, this result is suggestive of a link 
between inflation and FDI inflows are linked, while when other studies found no significant 
link, even at the 10% level (see Arbatli, 2011 for example). 212 The results also show that 
the coefficients of the lagged FDI, lagged GDP growth, and lagged rating do not change in 
terms of the signs and statistical significance in Column (4). Columns (5) and (6) of Table 
(1) shows that adding the lagged real interest rate and lagged current account balance as a 
percent of GDP do not have a statistical significant impact on FDI, highlighting the fact 
that market size matters more in our sample, even though we expect a positive relationship 
between real interest rates and FDI (Addison and Heshmati, 2003).213  214  The insignificant 
result of the current account balance in Column (6) goes in line aligns with the literature 
on the non-robust evidence between widening current account deficit as a measure of 
increased financial need (or as a measure of country risk) and the different types of capital 
flows in EMs (Koepke, 2015). 
When we add the lagged capital controls index to the regression in Column 7, our results 
show that a one-unit increase in this index leads to a drop in FDI of around 0.041 percent 
(of GDP), an expected result, at the one percent significance level. This is in line with 
Asiedu and Lien (2004), who show that capital controls adversely affect FDI, with the 
results most significant during the 1990s relative to the 1970s and 1980s. Elo (2007) also 
found similar results whereby more capital controls decreases the duration of FDI 
investments at specific levels of country risk.215 
 
212 Table (1b) also showed that the coefficient of the lagged inflation rate shows a statistically insignificant impact on 
FDI, in line with a number of other studies. 
213 Our portfolio results also show that real interest rates, as well as the (nominal) policy rates were not a significant 
determinant of portfolio inflows, but the interest rate differential- in nominal terms- mattered. [More importantly, there 
little evidence of a link between the current account balance and FDI in this context, although Fry et al. (1995) held that 
a large current account deficit could worsen a country’s investment climate, thereby adversely affecting FDI. 
214 More importantly, there is not much evidence on the link between the current account balance and FDI in this context, 
although Fry et Al (1995).  held that a large current account deficit could worsen a country’s investment climate, thereby 
adversely affecting FDI. Another explanation behind  
215 Elo’s country risk parameter was financial distress. Other than through decreasing durations, FDI investors may decide 
not to enter at all into the results of that study.  
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As of Column 8, we introduce our push factors into the model, whereby we add the 
weighted average of the G-7 real GDP growth rate to the regression. In line with DasGupta 
and Ratha (2000), the coefficient of this variable implies that a one percent increase in the 
G-7 weighted average GDP growth leads to 0.458 percent increase in FDI. While all the 
previous results do not change in terms of sign and statistical significance, the G-7 real 
GDP growth rate is not significant. Column 9 shows a similar result, in that our second 
push factor, the G-7 real interest rate, had an insignificant effect on net FDI inflows to 
EMs.216  This result aligns with the majority of the literature, which finds an unclear 
relationship between interest and, respectively, growth rates in AEs and FDI in EMs 
(World Bank, 1997; Montiel & Reinhard, 1999; Hernandez, Mellado & Valdes, 2001; De 
Vita & Kyaw, 2008; Koepke, 2015), and that pull factors mattered more for FDI.217 
It is worth noting, however, that when we excluded capital controls, as in Table (1a), both 
push factors were significant; a one percent increase in the G-7 weighted average GDP 
growth leads to 0.973 (of GDP) percent increase in FDI, and a one percent increase in the 
G-7 real interest rate results in 0.209 drop in FDI in EMs. Albuquerque et al. (2005) present 
an exception to the push-factor literature above, which accords with Table (1a). They found 
that a proxy of the average G3 interest rate adversely affects FDI inflows within a that 
includes EMs and AEs. Yet, Gupta and Ratha (2000) find a robust positive relationship 
between FDI inflows and international real interest rates, so the results on push factors in 
the context of FDI varies. Given the lower significance of push factors in the FDI literature, 
we do not include further push factors, such as global risk aversion, which is normally 
highlighted as one of the most important push factors but was not found to have an impact 
on FDI based on the literature.218    
Based on the Arellano-Bond test, 219  we cannot reject the notion that there is serial 
correlation of order 1, which is expected given the construction of the model, but can reject 
and accept no serial correlation of orders 2 in all cases. Additionally, the Hansen test results 
 
216 Similar results for the two push factors were obtained in the simpler, published version shown in Table (1a). 
217 Cerutti et al. (2017) reached a similar conclusion, holding that the explanatory power of push factors, particularly 
monetary policy, is limited, both in absolute terms, and in relation to pull factors, as is shown above.  
218 Arbatli (2011) found correlation was limited to times of crisis between 2006 and 2008, when FDI inflows declined, 
but the decline was not necessarily VIX related. 
219 A null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is applied to the differenced residuals. The test in first order is usually expected 
to reject the null. The test in second order is in levels and that is why it is more important to detecting autocorrelation. 
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show that the instruments are satisfactory at all conventional levels. Therefore, the model 
and over-identifying conditions are appropriately specified.  
Table (1b) shows more parsimonious models of the impact of ratings on FDI.220 The results 
show no significant change in the coefficients of the remaining variables in terms of signs 
and statistical significance. The third specification (Column 3) shows the model with 
excluding only the capital control index from the regression, and the results again show no 
significant change in the remaining coefficients. The last specification (Column 4) reports 
the results after dropping inflation, real interest rate, current account, and capital control 
index from the regression, the results show that the coefficients of lagged FDI, real GDP 
growth, sovereign rating, G-7 real growth rate, and G-7 real interest rate are statistically 
significant.221 
Table 1b: FDI & Rating - Parsimonious Model  
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI 
     
FDI it-1 0.597*** 0.604*** 0.625*** 0.620*** 
 (0.0590) (0.0399) (0.0453) (0.0329) 
Real GDP Growth it-1 0.207*** 0.142** 0.165*** 0.124** 
 (0.0698) (0.0616) (0.0619) (0.0563) 
Rating it-1 0.223*** 0.188*** 0.132*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0446) (0.0406) (0.0430) 
Inflation it-1 0.0104  -0.0205  
 (0.0337)  (0.0276)  
Real Interest Rate it-1 -0.0192  -0.0150  
 (0.0411)  (0.0353)  
Current Account it-1 0.0111  0.0225  
 (0.0472)  (0.0520)  
Capital Controls Index it-1 -0.0438*** -0.0316*   
 (0.0164) (0.0166)   
G-7 Real GDP Growth it 0.477* 0.413* 0.514* 0.434* 
 (0.290) (0.224) (0.287) (0.224) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.0389 -0.0613 -0.180 -0.177** 
 (0.119) (0.0808) (0.114) (0.0865) 
     
Observations 359 442 404 507 
Number of country 23 24 23 24 
Arellano-Bond Test     
Order 1 p-value 0.0216 0.0185 0.0270 0.0208 
Order 2 p-value 0.2187 0.2198 0.2096 0.2134 
 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
220 Column 1 of the table shows the full model with all regressors included. Column 2 reports the results for a smaller 
model where the three insignificant regressors in Table (1) – inflation, real interest rate, and current account – are removed 
from the regression. 
221 We also test for autocorrelation in the differenced residuals, and the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation suggest 
no autocorrelation in second order.  Furthermore, to test the exogeneity of the instruments, we ran the Hansen test, and 
results confirm that all instruments used are exogenous to the error term of the regression. 
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Table (2) shows the parsimonious model with a dummy variable added for rating that is 1 
for investment grade and 0 for speculative grade. As expected, a movement from a 
speculative grade to an investment grade increases FDI by about 1.5 percent of GDP, 
suggesting that investors differentiate between those highly rated countries and lower rated 
countries when making their longer-term investment decisions.  
 
Table 2: Investment v.s Speculative Grade: Rating on FDI 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 




FDI it-1 0.655*** 
 (0.0279) 
Real GDP Growth it-1 0.183** 
 (0.0756) 
Dummy Rating it-1 1.488*** 
 (0.533) 
Capital Controls Index it-1 -0.00764 
 (0.0129) 
G-7 Real GDP Growth it 0.362 
 (0.227) 




Number of country 24 
  
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                   
 
0.03 
Order 2 p-value                                   0.22 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
6.1.1. Contagion or Interdependence: Does a Change in the Ratings in the BRICS 
Countries Affect FDI flows to other EMs? 
We investigate the contagion effect as a result of a change in the sovereign ratings of the 
BRICS countries, both as a regional bloc and separately, in their regressions, and their 
impact on FDI inflows in the rest of our sample.  In Table (3), the BRICS rating variable 
is simply a weighted average of the lagged ratings of the five countries that comprise the 
BRICS countries, weighted by their real GDP. As the results suggest, in all nine 
specifications, BRICS as a region exert a positive, statistically significant contagion effect 
on EMs in the sample. In this sense, the lagged ratings upgrade (downgrade) in the BRICS 
region as a bloc leads to an increase (decrease) in net FDI inflows to the other EMs in our 
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sample by 0.1-0.2% of GDP. Most of the pull factors, especially the lagged FDI, capital 
controls, and GDP growth, maintain their significance in the right direction. The G-7 real 
interest rate, however, is positive, and significant in this table. Like the literature reviewed 
above, this highlights that global interest rates are inconclusive as a push factor, in terms 
of direction. 
Table 3: BRICS Contagion Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
 Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
        
FDI it-1 0.612*** 0.616*** 0.619*** 0.619*** 0.614*** 0.629*** 0.623*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0251) (0.0256) (0.0275) (0.0335) (0.0514) (0.0528) 
Real GDP Growth it-1 0.288** 0.314** 0.346*** 0.343*** 0.387** 0.241*** 0.261*** 
 (0.116) (0.122) (0.126) (0.126) (0.155) (0.0942) (0.0900) 
BRICS Rating it-1 0.110*** 0.106** 0.105** 0.102*** 0.169*** 0.202*** 0.208*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0415) (0.0474) (0.0357) (0.0510) (0.0544) (0.0529) 
Inflation it-1  -0.0001 0.000199 0.000216 -0.00151 -0.0055 -0.0199 
  (0.00010) (0.000143) (0.000197) (0.0315) (0.0357) (0.0366) 
Real Interest Rate it-1   0.0303** 0.0321 0.0489 -0.0186 -0.0335 
   (0.0139) (0.0197) (0.0297) (0.0619) (0.0645) 
Current Account it-1    0.00982 -0.00536 0.00289 0.00306 
    (0.0590) (0.0667) (0.0562) (0.0557) 
Capital Controls 
Index it-1 






G-7 Real GDP 
Growth it 
     0.704* 0.643*’ 
      (0.407) (0.405) 
G-7 Real Interest it       0.132*’ 
       (0.0819) 
        
Observations 416 393 344 344 284 284 284 
Number of country 18 18 17 17 17 17 17 
Arellano-Bond Test 
















Order 2 p-value 0.2210 0.2185 0.2207 0.2185 0.2198 0.2041 0.2068 
Notes:   ***, **, * and *’ denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors 
 
To analyze the impact of the changes in country-specific ratings among the BRICS, Table 
(4) details the results of five regressions where each column highlights the effect of a 
change in the lagged rating of one of the five BRICS countries, on the rest of the sample. 
Similar to the results of Table (3), Table (4) shows that country-specific ratings changes 
among the BRICS countries have a positive and statistically significant contagion effect on 
the rest of the EMs in the sample.222 For instance, a one-notch upgrade (downgrade) in the 
rating of Brazil leads to 0.18% (of GDP) increase (decrease) in net FDI inflows to the rest 
 
222 The magnitudes of the coefficients in Tables (3) and (4) are largely similar.  
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of the countries in the sample. As can be shown in this table, Brazil’s and India’s 
coefficients are the largest, while that of Russia is the smallest, in terms of a contagion 
effect, but the difference in magnitude is relatively minor.223  Our results so far highlight 
the presence in cross-country interdependencies in FDI inflows, especially in the case of a 
ratings change among the BRICS countries.  
 
Table 4: BRICS Contagion Effect per Countries: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
 Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI 
      
FDI it-1 0.630*** 0.641*** 0.635*** 0.631*** 0.636*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0297) (0.0318) (0.0338) (0.0306) 
Real GDP Growth it-1 0.166** 0.167** 0.150** 0.158** 0.139** 
 (0.0706) (0.0793) (0.0671) (0.0704) (0.0650) 
Capital Controls 
Index it-1 
-0.0300** -0.0207 -0.0249* -0.0253* -0.0247 
 (0.0152) (0.0207) (0.0150) (0.0138) (0.0151) 
G-7 Growth it 0.425* 0.460* 0.430* 0.412* 0.447* 
 (0.236) (0.259) (0.236) (0.231) (0.237) 
G-7 Real Interest it 0.0511 0.128 -0.0473 0.0112 -0.0259 
 (0.0713) (0.0860) (0.0678) (0.0687) (0.0660) 
Brazil Rating it-1 0.182***     
 (0.0514)     
Russia Rating it-1  0.116***    
  (0.0364)    
India Rating it-1   0.165***   
   (0.0422)   
China Rating it-1    0.128***  
    (0.0338)  
South Africa Rating 
it-1 
    0.146*** 
(0.0367) 
      
Observations 428 428 428 428 428 
Number of country 23 23 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test      
Order 1 p-value                                                                       0.0228 0.0337 0.0254 0.0238 0.0314 
Order 2  p-value                                                                     0.2200 0.2097 0.2178 0.2175 0.2106 
      
           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively  






223 The sub i index attached to all the regressors of Table 4 refers to all countries in the sample with the exception of the 
country for which the regression is run. For instance, in Column 2 of Table 4, the rating of Russia is included in the model 
but Russia itself is excluded from the sample. The same goes for the other four regressions 
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6.1.2. Does Distance Matter? 
Another related effect to the spillover effects of a ratings change in the BRICS countries is 
whether distance matters in the contagion effect displayed above. That is, would a rating 
change in Brazil exert a contagion effect mainly in nearby Latin American countries, or 
would the impact be just as strong beyond this region? To investigate this, we divide our 
sample into three regions: the Asian, CEEMEA, and Latin American countries. Table (5) 
summarizes224 the results of the regional contagion effect for each of the five BRICS 
countries, and the main takeaway from this table is that the coefficient of the Asian 
countries is normally the highest. That is, a ratings upgrade (downgrade) in any of the 
BRICS countries has the largest positive (negative) spillover effects on the Asian countries, 
and the least impact among the Latin American countries. As the results of the first row of 
Table (5) suggest, a rating upgrade in Brazil leads to positive and statistically significant 
spillover effects across the other regions, particularly in. Thus, a one notch rating upgrade 
Brazil leads to a ~0.47% of GDP increase in FDI inflows to the Asian economies in our 
sample.  
By contrast, an upgrade in Brazil’s rating only leads to an increase of 0.13% of GDP in net 
FDI inflows to Latin America and 0.133% of GDP in CEEMEA, suggesting that distance 
may not matter. Similarly, a one-notch rating upgrade (downgrade) in any of the other 
BRICS countries leads to the largest inflows into Asia, followed by CEEMEA, with Latin 
America receiving the least, with all our results displaying a statistical significance at the 
1% and 5% levels. The fact that there are 9 countries in this group (Asia), versus seven 
both in Latin America and the CEEMEA region, could be driving these results225. Once 
again, for all regressions, the Arellano-Bond test fails to reject the presence of serial 
correlation of order 1 but rejects it for order 2, and the Hansen test confirms that the 
overidentifying restrictions are correctly specified.  
 
224 The details of this appear in Tables (5a), (5b), (5c), (5d), (5e) in Annex II, including the coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables. 




These results are relatively similar to those of Cai et al. (2018),226 who highlighted that 
regional spillover effects may exist, especially as FDI flows more to countries whose 
regional average ratings is high, which is the case with the Asian countries in our sample. 
Table 5: Countries of the BRICS Regional Effect: Sovereign Ratings on FDI  
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Asian EMEA Latin 
Brazil Ratingit-1 0.472** 0.133*** 0.130*** 
 (0.214) (0.0289) (0.0189) 
Observations 







Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                       0.09 0.03 0.08 
Order 2  p-value                                                                     0.08 0.30 0.75 
Russia Rating it-1 0.268** 0.141*** 0.0735*** 
 (0.118) (0.0409) (0.0228) 
Observations 







Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                       0.09 0.028 0.06 
Order 2  p-value                                                                     0.08 0.29 0.14 
India Rating it-1 0.512** 0.144*** 0.124*** 
 (0.219) (0.0326) (0.0291) 
Observations 







Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                       0.09 0.03 0.07 
Order 2  p-value                                                                     0.06 0.30 0.98 
China Rating it-1 0.370** 0.112*** 0.0916*** 
 (0.188) (0.0270) (0.0224) 
Observations 







Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                       0.09 0.03 0.07 
Order 2  p-value                                                                     0.07 0.30 0.98 
South Africa Rating it-1 0.417** 0.138*** 0.0934*** 
 (0.194) (0.0320) (0.0278) 
Observations 







Arellano-Bond Test:    
Order 1 p-value                                                                       0.09 0.05 0.07 
Order 2  p-value                                                                     0.07 0.29 0.99 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors.   
 
226 Cai et al. were more focused on regional ratings than on the BRICS. 
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6.1.3. Good Times versus Bad Times 
This section examines whether the results would differ in the presence of two types of 
crises:  the 2007 global financial crises and country-specific crises. To measure the total 
effect of the global financial crisis, we interact a dummy variable that takes 1 for the period 
of the global financial crisis and zero otherwise with the sovereign ratings variable.  The 
total effect of the presence of the crisis is calculated as the sum of the coefficient of the 
dummy variable and the coefficient of the interaction term. The standard error of this linear 
combination is also calculated and used to compute the t-statistic of the total effect (Emara 
and El Said, 2015). 
The results of Tables (6) suggest that the dummy variable representing the crisis is 
statistically insignificant. However, and more importantly, the total effect coefficient, 
calculated as the sum of the lagged rating coefficient in Column (2) and the lagged 
interaction term between the crisis dummy and the ratings variable,227 suggests that a 
change in the ratings has a greater effect on FDI during times of crisis. That is, a one-notch 
ratings upgrade (downgrade) during a crisis leads to an increase (decrease) in FDI (as a 
share of GDP) by 0.4%, relative to 0.2% in tranquil times. This is the crux of the repeated 
scrutiny credit rating agencies have been subjected to, over the last two decades, in terms 
of how their ratings actions in times of distress could aggravate economic and financial 
conditions. In this sense, the coefficient of the total effect shows a positive and a 
statistically significant coefficient, where, during the global financial crisis, a one notch 
rating downgrade leads to a 0.304% of GDP decrease in FDI inflows to EMs, relative to 



















Table 6: Global Financial Crisis Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI 
   
FDI it-1 0.606*** 0.604*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0394) 
Real GDP Growth it-1 0.145** 0.147** 
 (0.062) (0.063) 
Rating it-1 0.198*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0482) (0.047) 
Capital Controls Index it-1 -0.0304** -0.0291** 
 (0.0148) (0.0146) 
G-7 Real GDP Growth it 0.366** 0.362** 
 (0.179) (0.1772) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.075 -0.077 
 (0.078) (0.078) 
Crisis Dummy t-1 -0.397 -3.634 
 (0.746) (3.106) 
Crisis Rating Interaction it-1 
 
Total Effect of Ratings 
During Crisis 
             0.196 
           (0.162)        
            0.389** 
      (0.168) 
 
Observations 442 442 
Number of country 24 24 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  







 Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
Finally, Table 7 shows the impact of rating in the presence of a country-specific crisis.228 
As the results show, a ratings change has a greater impact on the flow of FDI in times of a 
country’s crisis, to an even greater extent than its impact show in in Table (6), during the 
global financial crisis. For instance, a one-classification decrease in the index results in a 
reduction in FDI flows by about 0.64% during a country-specific crisis respectively, but 
only 0.15% at other times. Both effects are statistically significant. Once again, this 
confirms the importance of country fundamentals, more than changes in global conditions, 













Table 7 Country’s Crisis Effect: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating 
  Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
   Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FDI FDI 
   
FDI it-1 0.605*** 0.611*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0341) 
Real GDP Growth it-1 0.146** 0.150** 
 (0.0642) (0.0630) 
Rating it-1 0.189*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0450) (0.0435) 
Capital Controls Index it-1 -0.0320* -0.0308* 
 (0.0166) (0.0162) 
G-7 Real GDP Growth it 0.405* 0.402* 
 (0.225) (0.226) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.0851 -0.106 
 (0.0818) (0.0841) 
Crisis Dummy t-1 1.099 -4.888*** 
 (0.891) (1.518) 
Crisis Rating Interaction it-1 
 
Total Effect of Rating 
And Crisis 
 0.454*** 
         
         0.638*** 
(0.122) 
 
Observations 442 442 
Number of country 24 24 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  







Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%  levels respectively 
 Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
6.2.Portfolio Flows Baseline Results 
Table (8) highlights the results from our base regressions using the Arellano-Bond System 
GMM estimation technique. In the case of portfolio flows, our model is estimated under 
12 specifications where gross portfolio inflows are regressed on the set of independent 
variables, comprising the push and pull variables of interest.   
Table (1) shows the results of estimating 12 specifications for the portfolio inflows baseline 
regression. Column (1) shows the results of the portfolio flows regressed on its own lag 
where the (positive) sign and statistical significance is as expected. In Column (2), the GDP 
growth rate is added to the regression, and both the GDP growth rate and the coefficient of 
the lagged portfolio flows remains statistically significant, as expected at the 1% level; 
results show that a 1% increase in GDP corresponds to an increase of about 0.315% percent 
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of GDP229 in portfolio inflows into EMs. Unlike for FDI, we use current values of the push 
and pull factors because of the volatile and fast nature of portfolio flows, which can respond 
to new data releases instantaneously. 
In Column (3), we add the sovereign credit rating to the regression, where we have a 
positive and significant relation at the 5% level, whereby a one notch rating upgrade leads 
to about 0.27% of GDP increase in portfolio inflows. All the sovereign ratings coefficients 
beyond Column (3) are positive and significant at the 1% level and are larger than the 
ratings coefficient in Column (3).230 
Column (4) shows the regression where inflation is added to the equation, whereby a 1% 
increase in inflation leads to a decline in portfolio inflows by0.03% of GDP.  This result is 
expected (Garibaldi et al., 2002) and is statistically significant only at the 10% level with 
inflation representing a proxy for macroeconomic risk. Inflation also has the smallest 
coefficient in this regression and appears to be of least significance for portfolio inflows. 
Under this specification, the ratings coefficient increases to 0.31. Columns (5) and (6) 
introduce the current account and fiscal balances231 – both as percent of GDP – into our 
regressions, with both variables having a negative and significant impact on portfolio 
inflows at the 10% level. This highlights the twin deficits argument, and that 1) the larger 
the fiscal deficits, the larger the need for foreign financing (Garibaldi et al., 2002); and 2) 
current account deficits lead to higher inflows to finance this deficit.232  
In fact, Hernandez et al. (2001) held that the size of the current account deficit is one of the 
most important variables that foreign investors look at to decide where to invest.  Our 
results show that  a 1% increase in the current account (and fiscal) deficit is associated with 
around 0.2% (and 0.23%) of GDP increase of portfolio flows inflows.   Column (6) presents 
all our pull factors together, and. with the exception of inflation, all our variables have 
 
229 Reference to the % increase (or decrease) in portfolio flows, thereafter, is a share of GDP.  
230 In this column, the coefficients of the lagged portfolio flows and GDP growth remain statistically significant, although 
real GDP growth becomes significant at the 5% level, rather than at 1%. 
231 These variables reflect balances as a percentage of GDP. A positive value indicates a fiscal (or current account) 
surplus, and a negative value indicates a deficit. Hence, the larger the fiscal (or current account) deficits, the larger the 
inflows to finance the former.  
232 See Kavli and Viegi (2014) for the importance of this in the case of South Africa, as an example. Other studies exclude 
the use of the current account given its links to capital flows- within a balance of payments perspective, but we include 
for reference purposes.  
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retained their significance either at the 1% or the 5% level at the expected sign, with the 
ratings coefficient being the largest and significant at the 1% level.   
Starting from column (7), we introduce our push factors, which, according to the literature 
matter for portfolio inflows (Sarno et al., 2016, and Cerutti et al., 2015b) relative to their 
importance for FDI. Column (7) includes the U.S. real GDP growth rate, which 
unjustifiably shows that a 1% increase in U.S. real GDP is associated with a 0.38% of GDP 
increase in portfolio flows into EMs. This result is only significant at the 10% level and 
becomes insignificant as we introduce additional push factors. But within this regression, 
its coefficient is even larger than that of the ratings (0.27). Cerutti et al. (2015b), 
alternatively employed the GDP growth rate of four advanced economies233 as a push 
factor, finding a similar positive result, holding that higher growth rates in core economies 
could trigger more cross-border flows, but more so in particular for bank flows, rather than 
portfolio flows.   
Column (8) introduces the VIX, which, in accordance with others’ findings (Cerutti et al., 
2015b for example), shows a negative relationship with portfolio flows into EMs, a result 
significant at the 1% level. That is, 1% increase in the VIX index implies a decline of 
0.17% of GDP in portfolio inflows to EMs as global uncertainty increases.234 As for the 
magnitude of ratings coefficient, it is important to note that it almost doubles from Column 
(7) to Column (8), from 0.27 to 0.56, with the introduction of the VIX into our model. This 
could be interpreted to mean that in times of uncertainty, a ratings action (mainly a 
downgrade) matters more, and can drive further portfolio flows out of EMs.  Fratzcher 
(2011) reaches a relevant conclusion by holding that countries with worse ratings endured 
the largest declines in outflows during crises. The significance of both the VIX at the 1% 
and the larger ratings coefficient hold for Columns (2)-(11), with Column (12) being the 
only exception.  
 
 
233 The four core economies Cerutti et al. discuss were the United States, the Euro area, Japan, and the United Kingdom.  




Table 8: Gross Portfolio Flows and Sovereign Rating 
Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 





REGRESSORS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
AR(1) 0.251*** 0.227*** 0.209*** 0.207*** 0.201*** 0.177*** 0.171*** 0.164*** 0.158*** 0.155*** 0.152** 0.152** 
 (0.0447) (0.0460) (0.0433) (0.0431) (0.0406) (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0555) (0.0524) (0.0522) (0.0612) (0.0618) 
Real GDP growth.  0.305*** 0.172** 0.166** 0.157* 0.251** 0.166 0.131 0.178 0.144 0.158 0.130 
  (0.0932) (0.0740) (0.0719) (0.0824) (0.0976) (0.114) (0.107) (0.143) (0.145) (0.180) (0.177) 
Rating   0.265** 0.286*** 0.310*** 0.279*** 0.270*** 0.558*** 0.605*** 0.567*** 0.609*** 0.560*** 
   (0.103) (0.108) (0.108) (0.0919) (0.0888) (0.142) (0.145) (0.137) (0.121) (0.110) 
Inflation    -0.0294* -0.0229 0.00271 -0.0173 0.0571** 0.0132 0.00713 -0.0744 -0.102 
    (0.0172) (0.0160) (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0286) (0.0397) (0.0387) (0.0927) (0.0986) 
Current Account     -0.207* -0.171* -0.167* -0.124 -0.141 -0.158 -0.233** -0.258** 
     (0.110) (0.0888) (0.0880) (0.0818) (0.109) (0.110) (0.116) (0.117) 
Fiscal Balance      -0.229* -0.231* -0.285** -0.259** -0.251** -0.201* -0.198* 
      (0.123) (0.122) (0.126) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) 
US RGDP growth       0.382* 0.0310 0.0527 0.153 -0.00115 -0.0968 
       (0.226) (0.231) (0.311) (0.330) (0.403) (0.391) 
VIX        -0.174*** -0.187*** -0.160*** -0.134*** -0.160*** 
        (0.0391) (0.0425) (0.0403) (0.0431) (0.0509) 
Policy Differential         -0.104* -0.106* -0.184* -0.196* 
         (0.0579) (0.0586) (0.0998) (0.100) 
US REER growth          -0.416** -0.502*** -0.450** 
          (0.163) (0.194) (0.201) 
Total Assets growth           -0.167*** -0.145** 
           (0.0543) (0.0593) 
US Treas. Yield            0.476 
            (0.300) 
             
Observations 2,066 1,889 1,813 1,786 1,735 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,399 1,399 1,324 1,324 
Number of Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 







































Column (9) includes the interest rate differential, the difference in policy rates between the 
Federal Reserve, and EMs’ specific policy rate, and, as expected, this variable has a negative 
sign, and is significant at the 1% level. The results align with other studies, including Hannan 
(2017), Erduman and Kaya (2014), which find that as the differential between EMs’ interests 
and that of the Federal Reserve widens, portfolio inflows to EMs increase. While we calculate 
this variable in the opposite direction, which produces the negative sign, the interpretation is 
the same. This suggests that, assuming the policy rate of EMs is constant, a hike in the Federal 
funds rate will lower the interest rate differential between the Federal reserve and EMs’ 
respective policy rate, which will drive portfolio flows away from EMs to the U.S. Our model 
shows that a 1% decrease in the interest rate differential, as a result of a hike in the Federal 
Reserve Funds rate, leads to a reduction in portfolio inflows to EMs by 0.1% of GDP, a result 
significant at the 10% level.  
Following Cerutti et al. (2015b), we introduce the growth (or change) in the U.S. REER in 
Column (10), and as expected, a 1% increase in the REER leads to a decline in portfolio flows 
by 0.42%, a result significant at the 1% level. The theory behind this relationship is that an 
increase in the U.S. REER lowers cross-border flows as borrowers are riskier and less solvent 
as their currencies depreciate relative to the U.S. dollar (Cerutti et al., 2015b). The coefficient 
of the U.S. REER is only second to that of sovereign ratings, indicating it is important in 
influencing portfolio inflows. This also aligns with Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Ceurtti et al. 
(2015b), whose regressions showed that the REER and the VIX were the most important push 
factors among those they examined.  
Columns (11) and (12) include our last two push factors representing the growth in the total 
assets of the Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the Bank of Japan, as well as the 10-year U.S. 
Treasury yield. The latter in Column (12) is insignificant, with a positive sign (opposite to the 
literature), while total asset growth, shown in Columns (11) and (12), has a negative sign and 
is significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. This is in stark contrast to the literature that 
identifies a positive relationship between the growth in total assets (a proxy for total liquidity) 
and portfolio inflows to EMs (Erduman and Kaya, 2014, and Hannan, 2017 for example). It 
may be that the longer-term of our sample, which includes 27 years, including almost a decade 
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of unconventional monetary policies, explains this inconsistency.235 Relatedly, Erduman and 
Kaya (2016) held that global liquidity mattered most only when unconventional monetary 
policies are first announced, after which its significance as a push factor decreases over time.  
We used alternative measures that could capture global liquidity, as will be shown in our 
robustness checks, but the results were still insignificant. The other odd result has been the 10-
year U.S. Treasury Yield, which had an unexpectedly positive, but insignificant relationship 
with portfolio inflows. As part of our robustness checks, we split the sample into debt and 
equity flows; the variables end up having a negative, but still insignificant relationship, with 
debt inflows to EMs. Given that the treasury yield could end up representing the interest rate 
channel and we already are accounting for interest rate differentials, it may be reasonable to 
assume this variable is insignificant, but we keep it in our last column for reference purposes.  
The results in Table (8) confirm that sovereign ratings have been the most important pull factor, 
as their significance across all regressions suggests, and the fact that ratings have largest 
coefficients after including the push factors into the model. This highlights the importance of 
sovereign ratings changes in influencing investment decisions in EMs, with ratings upgrades 
signaling confidence about long term investment opportunities. This aligns with some of the 
earlier findings, including those of Taylor and Sarno (1997). Beyond sovereign ratings, push 
factors mattered the most, particularly global risk aversion, the U.S. REER, and the policy rate 
differential, in line with previous work including Cerutti (2015b) and Koepke (2015).    
The estimation results of the Hansen test for all the estimation tables confirm that the p-value 
is large and the overidentifying restrictions are valid and cannot be rejected. This result ensures 
that the selection of the instruments is correct in such a way that they are not correlated with 
the error term and there are no issues of omitting important variables from the model. In other 





235 This result changes when we split the sample (see Table (12), which shows this variable being significant prior to the global 
financial crisis. After the financial crisis, however, it appears that additional liquidity injections had domestic purposes, 
stabilizing the markets in the United States, Eurozone, and Japan, rather than leaking/spilling over to EMs.  
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6.2.1. Contagion or Interdependence Effect: Does Being a BRICS Country Matter? 
As with FDI, we investigate the contagion effect as a result of a change in the sovereign ratings 
of the BRICS countries, both as a regional bloc and separately as individual countries. Instead 
of using the weighted average of the lagged ratings of the BRICS countries,236 we use the 
Principal Component of their sovereign ratings (rabrics_pca) in Table (9) to capture the 
contagion effect of a ratings change in this bloc on the rest of the EMs in our sample.  
Columns (3-12) show that a ratings upgrade (downgrade) within the BRICS countries as a bloc 
leads to a rise (fall) in gross portfolio inflows to other EMs in the sample by a minimum of 
0.21% of GDP and a maximum of 0.56% of GDP, with results significant across all regressions, 
mostly at the 1% and 5% level. The magnitude of the coefficients of sovereign ratings in Table 
(2) is slightly smaller than those in Table (1), confirming the results of Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) that ratings changes have stronger effects on the country being assessed, 
rather than on other countries.237 
Beyond the BRICS ratings, the lagged portfolio flows continue to be significant and positive 
at the 1% level, while real GDP growth is only positive and significant at the 1% level in 
Column (2), and only significant at the 10% level in Columns (2), (3), (4), and (6). Like GDP 
growth, inflation loses its significance in all 12 regressions, and most of the pull factors end up 
having lower significance, relative to Table (1), but carry the expected sign. Among the pull 
factors, the fiscal balance is most significant after the BRICs ratings, with the current account 
balance significant in Columns (11) and (12). This is in line with the findings of Bekaert et al. 
(2011) who held that the current account and fiscal balances are most important in shaping 
contagion risks. For the push factors, our results portray a very similar pattern, with the U.S. 
REER and VIX being the two main variables, that mostly affect portfolio flows into EMs. In 
this regression, however, the policy differential is no longer a significant variable, while the 
growth of the total assets and U.S. 10-year Treasury yield are significant, still taking the 
opposite sign.  
 
 
236 Using the lagged ratings weighted by each country’s real GDP yielded insignificant results. 
237 Unlike Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), however, who observe “substantial” stronger effects in the home country than in 
other countries, our results are closer in terms of magnitude. They also find that cross-country spillover effects are only 





Table 9: BRICS Contagion Effect: Gross Portfolio Flows and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
AR(1) 0.236*** 0.219*** 0.202*** 0.200*** 0.194*** 0.181*** 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.170*** 0.166** 
 (0.0472) (0.0495) (0.0476) (0.0479) (0.0441) (0.0628) (0.0636) (0.0630) (0.0547) (0.0544) (0.0654) (0.0671) 
Real GDP growth  0.288*** 0.210* 0.192* 0.188 0.263* 0.133 0.0693 0.110 0.0766 0.144 0.110 
  (0.0929) (0.115) (0.114) (0.126) (0.148) (0.195) (0.212) (0.264) (0.268) (0.304) (0.285) 
rabrics_pca   0.211* 0.246* 0.287* 0.275** 0.271** 0.521*** 0.526** 0.486** 0.562*** 0.499** 
   (0.130) (0.140) (0.157) (0.138) (0.136) (0.202) (0.211) (0.199) (0.190) (0.194) 
Inflation    -0.0601 -0.0552 -0.0983 -0.132 -0.0634 -0.136 -0.136 -0.129 -0.167 
    (0.0427) (0.0416) (0.0855) (0.0920) (0.102) (0.176) (0.172) (0.117) (0.128) 
Current Account     -0.211 -0.183 -0.190 -0.167 -0.200 -0.212 -0.298** -0.320** 
     (0.154) (0.122) (0.122) (0.119) (0.143) (0.140) (0.144) (0.143) 
Fiscal Balance      -0.297** -0.293** -0.331** -0.316** -0.309** -0.230 -0.217 
      (0.151) (0.148) (0.155) (0.141) (0.141) (0.147) (0.147) 
US RGDP Growth       0.561* 0.350 0.357 0.441 0.0788 -0.120 
       (0.318) (0.307) (0.394) (0.406) (0.497) (0.503) 
VIX        -0.137*** -0.140** -0.118** -0.0999** -0.153*** 
        (0.0531) (0.0563) (0.0505) (0.0396) (0.0556) 
Policy Differential         -0.0863 -0.107 -0.0575 -0.0901 
         (0.122) (0.114) (0.135) (0.124) 
US REER Growth          -0.410*** -0.458** -0.362* 
          (0.155) (0.184) (0.209) 
Total Assets Growth           -0.194*** -0.155** 
           (0.0684) (0.0756) 
US Treas. Yield            0.766* 
            (0.440) 
             
Observations 1,616 1,456 1,317 1,317 1,268 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,056 1,056 1,007 1,007 
Number of Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 





































Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 







Table (10) breaks down the contagion effect of the BRICS countries to show how country-
specific ratings changes affect portfolio inflows to the other EMs. Column (1) shows that a 
ratings upgrade in Brazil by 1 notch leads to an 0.53% of GDP increase in portfolio inflows 
to the rest of the EMs in the sample, while a ratings upgrade in Russia leads to an 0.45% of 
GDP increase in portfolio inflows to the rest of the EMs in the sample. Of largest 
significance is the result of rating upgrade in India. As Column (3) shows, it leads to a 0.6% 
of GDP increase in portfolio inflows to the rest of the EMs in the sample. Both China and 
South Africa witness smaller spillover effects as a result of their ratings changes, with 
portfolio inflows to other EMs rising by 0.34% and 0.35% of GDP respectively.  
 
Table 10: BRICS Contagion Effect per Country: Gross Portfolio Flows and Sovereign Rating 
 Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
 Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AR(1) 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.163** 0.162*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0629) (0.0593) (0.0693) (0.0624) (0.0618) 
Real GDP Growth 0.139 0.129 0.105 0.152 0.170 
 (0.231) (0.252) (0.234) (0.226) (0.211) 
Inflation -0.104 -0.159 -0.138 -0.116 -0.0960 
 (0.0929) (0.112) (0.110) (0.0867) (0.0773) 
Current Account -0.304** -0.330** -0.298** -0.319** -0.328** 
 (0.136) (0.144) (0.135) (0.138) (0.143) 
Fiscal Balance -0.212* -0.226* -0.197* -0.197 -0.205* 
 (0.120) (0.122) (0.109) (0.126) (0.123) 
US RGDP gr. 0.0342 0.0992 -0.122 -0.0773 -0.0832 
 (0.419) (0.426) (0.400) (0.415) (0.414) 
VIX -0.142*** -0.121*** -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.118** 
 (0.0512) (0.0374) (0.0513) (0.0483) (0.0459) 
Policy Differential -0.123 -0.182 -0.0863 -0.104 -0.0592 
 (0.105) (0.136) (0.111) (0.101) (0.0883) 
US REER growth. -0.470** -0.428** -0.355** -0.470** -0.448** 
 (0.201) (0.190) (0.175) (0.200) (0.201) 
Total Assets Growth -0.141** -0.165*** -0.142** -0.153** -0.157** 
 (0.0597) (0.0608) (0.0624) (0.0606) (0.0625) 
US Treas. Yield 0.848** 0.750** 0.607* 0.792** 0.747** 
 (0.357) (0.366) (0.354) (0.353) (0.368) 
Rating_Brazil 0.528***     
 (0.200)     
Rating_Russia  0.451***    
  (0.174)    
Rating_India   0.605***   
   (0.221)   
Rating_China    0.378***  
    (0.121)  
Rating_South Africa     0.355*** 
     (0.117) 
      
Observations 1,259 1,254 1,255 1,281 1,254 
Number of Countries 22 22 22 22 22 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 
















Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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All results in Table (3) are significant at the 1% level. These findings suggest that the 
sentiment of portfolio investors could improve as a result of a ratings change in one of the 
BRICS countries, with the coefficients of the ratings in Table (3) being the largest relative 
to all the push and pull factors included in the regression.238  This confirms previous results 
such as those of Kraussl (2003) and Christopher et al. (2012), which show that sovereign 
ratings changes in a particular country can significantly affect financial markets in other 
EMs.  
Tables (11)-(15) present evidence as to whether distance matters in the spillover effects of 
a ratings change in one of the BRICS countries. In this context, dividing the EM sphere into 
the same three regions yields interesting results. A ratings upgrade (downgrade) in Brazil 
by 1 notch leads to around 0.9% of GDP increase (decrease) in portfolio flows among the 
Asian countries, and only 0.3% of GDP increase (decrease) in portfolio inflows in Latin 
America.  Results for those two regions are significant at the 1% level, while the results are 
not significant for the CEEMEA region. 
       Table 11: Brazil’s Regional/Contagious Effect: Sovereign Ratings on Gross Portfolio 
Inflows to Other EMs 
                                                       Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
                                                       Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS Asian CEEMEA Latin 
    
AR(1) 0.0436 0.265*** 0.182** 
 (0.120) (0.0205) (0.0767) 
Real GDP growth 0.0975 0.548 -0.0978*** 
 (0.123) (0.443) (0.0368) 
Rating_Brazil 0.893*** 0.438 0.270*** 
 (0.346) (0.281) (0.0770) 
Inflation -0.268*** -0.302 0.0894** 
 (0.0659) (0.282) (0.0422) 
Current Account -0.268** -0.190 -0.0536 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.0659) 
Fiscal Balance 0.00109 -0.587** -0.0852*** 
 (0.0528) (0.290) (0.0294) 
US Real GDP geowth. 0.0884 -0.550 0.289** 
 (0.284) (0.716) (0.116) 
VIX -0.255** -0.175** -0.0151 
 (0.116) (0.0768) (0.0186) 
Policy Differential -0.295 -0.287 0.0687** 
 (0.208) (0.332) (0.0301) 
US REER growth -0.862** -0.267* -0.114* 
 (0.380) (0.160) (0.0631) 
Total Assets growth -0.0722 -0.171*** -0.0423* 
 (0.109) (0.0580) (0.0246) 
US Treas. Yield 1.056** 0.664** -0.356*** 
 (0.526) (0.259) (0.119) 
    
 
238 With the exception of the U.S. treasury yield coefficient, which we have concluded to be an anomaly. 
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Observations 513 481 265 
Number of Countries 9 8 5 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 










           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  
                                                  respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
Table (12) shows that a one-notch ratings upgrade (downgrade) in Russia leads to around 
0.6% of GDP increase (decrease) in portfolio flows among the Asian countries, and an 
increase (decrease) in portfolio inflows into Latin America of only 0.2% of GDP. Similar 
to Table (4) and to our finding regarding the global financial crisis, our results are only 
significant among Asian and Latin American countries.  
       Table 12: Russia’s Regional/Contagious Effect: Sovereign Ratings on Gross Portfolio 
Inflows to Other EMs 
                                                       Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
                                                       Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS Asian CEEMEA Latin 
    
AR(1) 0.0522 0.263*** 0.198*** 
 (0.112) (0.0228) (0.0568) 
Real GDP growth 0.0947 0.607 -0.0796** 
 (0.137) (0.514) (0.0370) 
Rating_Russia 0.598* 0.435 0.214*** 
 (0.323) (0.266) (0.0449) 
Inflation -0.305*** -0.353 0.0801* 
 (0.112) (0.308) (0.0476) 
Current Account -0.285* -0.106 -0.154** 
 (0.166) (0.128) (0.0784) 
Fiscal Balance -0.0268 -0.640* -0.0663 
 (0.0525) (0.346) (0.0492) 
US Real GDP Growth 0.246 -0.452 0.207* 
 (0.252) (0.816) (0.125) 
VIX -0.187** -0.191** -0.0151 
 (0.0784) (0.0805) (0.0155) 
Policy Differential -0.448** -0.507 0.0662* 
 (0.200) (0.451) (0.0373) 
US REER growth. -0.803** -0.294** -0.115** 
 (0.345) (0.137) (0.0534) 
Total Assets growth -0.105 -0.232*** -0.0572** 
 (0.107) (0.0798) (0.0228) 
US Treas. Yield 1.085* 0.392 -0.268 
 (0.576) (0.272) (0.172) 
    
Observations 513 411 330 
Number of Countries 9 7 6 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 










           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  
                                                  respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
Table (13) shows that a one-notch ratings upgrade (downgrade) in India increases 
(decreases) portfolio inflows to Asian countries by 1% of GDP, to the EMEA region by 
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0.54% of GDP, and by 0.3% of GDP to Latin America. It is important to note that within 
these regressions, most pull factors are no longer significant, which captures the fact that 
the spillover effects drive results.  
 
       Table 13: India’s Regional/Contagious Effect: Sovereign Ratings on Gross Portfolio Inflows 
to Other EMs 
                                                       Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
                                                       Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS Asian CEEMEA Latin 
    
AR(1) 0.00948 0.265*** 0.194*** 
 (0.136) (0.0192) (0.0521) 
Real GDP Growth. -0.00542 0.532 -0.0710* 
 (0.133) (0.442) (0.0425) 
Rating_India 1.009** 0.537* 0.290*** 
 (0.479) (0.276) (0.0235) 
Inflation -0.217 -0.323 0.0733 
 (0.193) (0.284) (0.0503) 
Current Account -0.217 -0.205 -0.107 
 (0.154) (0.144) (0.0719) 
Fiscal Balance -0.0145 -0.575** -0.0299 
 (0.0482) (0.290) (0.0515) 
US RGDP Growth -0.0974 -0.655 0.155 
 (0.166) (0.726) (0.118) 
VIX -0.260** -0.188** -0.0232 
 (0.127) (0.0757) (0.0181) 
Policy Differential -0.176 -0.308 0.0800** 
 (0.183) (0.347) (0.0341) 
US REER Growth -0.674* -0.257 -0.113** 
 (0.404) (0.161) (0.0561) 
Total Assets Growth -0.0762 -0.180*** -0.0528** 
 (0.134) (0.0612) (0.0244) 
US Treas. Yield 0.569 0.465 -0.313** 
 (0.734) (0.293) (0.155) 
    
Observations 444 481 330 
Number of Countries 8 8 6 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 










           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  
                                                  respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
Table (14) displays the same trends as a result of a one notch rating (upgrade) in China, 
with the most significant impact reflected on portfolio inflows to Asia (0.6% of GDP), 
CEEMEA (0.3% of GDP), and Latin America (0.2% of GDP). Table (15) displays similar 
trends from a ratings change in South Africa, with the greatest impact on portfolio flows in 
Asia, followed by CEEMEA, and then Latin America. These results may reflect the country 
representation in the sample, but the robustness of our results confirm the existence of 
spillover effects. Within these regressions, the anomalies within the push factors (growth 
in total assets and U.S. 10 year treasury yields) cease to exist for Latin America, suggesting 
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that these variables matter the most for countries with closer proximity to the U.S. 
 
 
       Table 14: China’s Regional/Contagious Effect: Sovereign Ratings on Gross Portfolio 
Inflows to Other EMs 
                                                       Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
                                                       Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS Asian EMEA Latin 
    
AR(1) 0.0393 0.265*** 0.195*** 
 (0.117) (0.0191) (0.0532) 
Real GDP Growth 0.106 0.533 -0.0715* 
 (0.151) (0.441) (0.0430) 
Rating_China 0.665** 0.302** 0.174*** 
 (0.265) (0.150) (0.0186) 
Inflation -0.233*** -0.307 0.0759 
 (0.0579) (0.276) (0.0492) 
Current Account -0.293** -0.205 -0.0999 
 (0.146) (0.141) (0.0695) 
Fiscal Balance 0.0429 -0.575** -0.0277 
 (0.0682) (0.292) (0.0498) 
US RGDP Growth  -0.132 -0.623 0.162 
 (0.262) (0.735) (0.117) 
VIX -0.270** -0.174** -0.0191 
 (0.113) (0.0679) (0.0179) 
Policy Differential -0.267 -0.293 0.0821** 
 (0.253) (0.335) (0.0324) 
US REER Growth -0.924** -0.260 -0.114** 
 (0.407) (0.162) (0.0564) 
Total Assets Growth -0.111 -0.179*** -0.0517** 
 (0.119) (0.0608) (0.0242) 
US Treas. Yield 0.983* 0.629** -0.237 
 (0.590) (0.262) (0.153) 
    
Observations 470 481 330 
Number of Countries 8 8 6 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 










           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  
                                                  respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
 




















  Table 15: South Africa’s Regional/Contagious Effect: Sovereign Ratings on Gross Portfolio Inflows to Other EMs 
                       Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
                       Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS Asian EMEA Latin 
    
AR(1) 0.0516 0.274*** 0.206*** 
 (0.116) (0.0173) (0.0483) 
Real GDP Growth 0.145 0.496 -0.0596 
 (0.124) (0.430) (0.0458) 
Rating_South Africa 0.603** 0.290** 0.172*** 
 (0.293) (0.135) (0.0167) 
Inflation -0.136** -0.325 0.0695 
 (0.0638) (0.283) (0.0513) 
Current Account -0.277* -0.166 -0.116 
 (0.151) (0.132) (0.0770) 
Fiscal -0.00158 -0.594* -0.0222 
 (0.0534) (0.304) (0.0511) 
US RGDP Growth -0.0997 -0.661 0.146 
 (0.176) (0.815) (0.118) 
VIX -0.220** -0.187*** -0.0122 
 (0.0944) (0.0685) (0.0189) 
Policy Differential -0.201 -0.259 0.0830** 
 (0.313) (0.333) (0.0379) 
US REER Growth -0.857** -0.149 -0.113* 
 (0.368) (0.153) (0.0590) 
Total Assets Growth -0.106 -0.159** -0.0555** 
 (0.109) (0.0640) (0.0253) 
US Treas. Yield 0.720 0.844*** -0.269* 
 (0.632) (0.265) (0.156) 
    
Observations 513 411 330 
Number of Countries 9 7 6 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 










           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  





6.2.2. Good Times vs. Bad Times 
Table (16) captures whether or not the impact of the ratings differ during the global financial 
crisis and the European debt crisis of 2007-2012, and we interact the sovereign ratings with 
a dummy that has a value of 1 during the calamities (Q4 2007- Q42012), and zero otherwise. 
While the interaction term in column (2) is significant at the 10% level, we are more 
interested in the total effect of the ratings. We calculate these as the sum of the coefficient 
of the Rating variable and the interaction term between the ratings and the dummy variable 
(Rating * Dfc). The coefficient of the total effect of ratings is (0.873), almost double the 
ratings coefficient per se (0.467), suggesting that the impact of sovereign ratings doubles 
during the crisis period, in that a rating downgrade during the global financial crisis led to 
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doubling the amount of portfolio outflows. This explains the severe scrutiny of sovereign 
ratings during the global financial crisis as well as during EM-specific crises, and we 
already witnessed a similar impact on FDI during bad times despite their less volatile nature.  
 
    
Table 16: Global Crisis 2007q4 – 2012q4: Gross Portfolio Flows and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS (1) (2) 
   
AR(1) 0.146** 0.142** 
 (0.0607) (0.0610) 
Real GDP Growth 0.0920 0.0800 
 (0.220) (0.204) 
Rating 0.506*** 0.467*** 
 (0.110) (0.0929) 
Inflation -0.132 -0.196 
 (0.126) (0.138) 
Current Account -0.263** -0.279** 
 (0.120) (0.121) 
Fiscal -0.196* -0.201* 
 (0.117) (0.116) 
US Real GDP Growth 0.0473 0.106 
 (0.527) (0.484) 
VIX -0.221*** -0.216*** 
 (0.0787) (0.0773) 
Policy Differential -0.243* -0.287** 
 (0.133) (0.140) 
US REERGrowth. -0.373* -0.375* 
 (0.203) (0.202) 
Total Assets Growth -0.124** -0.122** 
 (0.0591) (0.0602) 
US Treas. Yield 0.724 0.797 
 (0.493) (0.506) 
Crisis Dummy (Dfc) 2.384 -2.635 
 (2.401) (3.544) 
Rating * Crisis Dummy (Dfc)  0.406* 
  (0.245) 
   
Total Effect239  0.873*** 
(0.280) 
Observations 1,324 1,324 
Number of Countries 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                                  







           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  





239 Total effect is calculated by summing up the coefficients of the ratings and the interaction term (Rating * Crisis 
Dummy). For more information, refer to the methodology.  
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Table (17) captures the effect of sovereign ratings in the presence of country-specific 
crises,240 whereby the total effect of a ratings change during a country-specific crisis is more 
(0.622% of GDP) than in times of no crisis (0.524% of GDP). Thus, the global financial 
crisis exerts a more significant impact on the effectiveness of ratings relative to country 
specific crises in the case of portfolio flows. This confirms the superiority of global factors 
in driving portfolio flows, relative to the domestic factors driving FDI flows.  
 
    Table 17 Country’s Crisis Effect: Gross Portfolio Flows and Sovereign Rating 
    Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
    Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
REGRESSORS (1) (2) 
   
AR(1) 0.148** 0.147** 
 (0.0621) (0.0631) 
RGDP gr. 0.0952 0.0928 
 (0.176) (0.170) 
Rating 0.532*** 0.524*** 
 (0.104) (0.108) 
Inflation -0.0731 -0.0739 
 (0.0910) (0.0923) 
Current Account -0.270** -0.263** 
 (0.118) (0.130) 
Fiscal -0.199* -0.199* 
 (0.116) (0.115) 
US RGDP gr. -0.118 -0.101 
 (0.386) (0.344) 
VIX -0.148*** -0.147*** 
 (0.0496) (0.0487) 
Policy Differential -0.188* -0.197* 
 (0.0965) (0.104) 
US REER gr. -0.426** -0.429** 
 (0.196) (0.193) 
Total Assets gr. -0.131** -0.133** 
 (0.0577) (0.0573) 
US Treas. Yield 0.631** 0.633** 
 (0.315) (0.312) 
Dcc -2.603*** -3.548 
 (0.743) (2.608) 
Rating * Dcc  0.0977 
  (0.289) 
   
Total Effect  0.622** 
(0.270) 
Observations 1,324 1,324 
Number of Countries 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 







           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  




240 This is represented by a dummy variable equal to 1 during the Mexican crisis, for example, and zero otherwise. This 




Table (18) considers whether having an investment grade instead of a. speculative grade 
matters for portfolio inflows, with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is rated as an 
investment-grade, and 0 if it was rated a speculative grade. The dummy variable 
representing the ratings has not been significant, which implies that investors are more 
opportunistic in their investment decisions and could be driven more by carry-trade 
opportunities rather than by a country’s fundamentals or credit ratings.241 To understand 
when do investors take the speculative-grade rating into consideration, we re-estimated the 
regressions lowering the threshold dummy variable, one notch at a time, and we find that 
the speculative grade matters three notches below the investment grade (i.e. BB and below).  
That is, if the rating downgrade from investment to speculative grade is still above BB, will 
still maintain investor interest in EMs. Below this, the dummy variable introduced becomes 
significant.242 
                                                   
 
241 A carry trade involves a transaction in which investor borrows at a low interest rate in country A and invests in  an 
asset in Country B with a higher yield. Normally it is done to benefit from the uncovered interest parity (UIP). For more 
information, see  Agrippino and Rey (2013) and Sarno (2014).  
242 Notable exceptions exist. A country undergoing significant reform/under an IMF program with a devalued currency 
could still attract portfolio inflows for the carry trade opportunity. Egypt was an example at 5 notches below investment 




               Table 18: Investment v.s. Speculative Grade: Rating on FDI 
       Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 



















Policy Differential -0.108 
 (0.111) 
US REER gr. -0.500** 
 (0.196) 
Total Assets gr. -0.162*** 
 (0.0603) 




Number of Countries 23 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 




           Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  




As a robustness check to our base regression, we split the sample into before the global 
financial crisis and after the financial crisis, as shown in Table (19). In both cases, sovereign 
ratings are significant as is the VIX reflecting global financial conditions. What is most 
interesting in this regression is the significance, at the 5% level, of the growth of total assets 
in the expected (positive) direction, reflecting more normal global monetary conditions, a 




                                                 Table 19: Splitting the Sample to Before & After the Financial Crisis 
  Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
  Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) 
REGRESSORS 1990-2007q3 2007q4-2017q4 
   
AR(1) 0.165*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0452) 
RGDP gr. 0.188 0.150 
 (0.276) (0.238) 
Rating 0.690* 0.601*** 
 (0.384) (0.131) 
Inflation 0.0882 -0.127 
 (0.242) (0.174) 
Current Account -0.227** -0.459 
 (0.0909) (0.340) 
Fiscal -0.251 -0.157 
 (0.210) (0.111) 
US RGDP gr. 0.905 -0.298 
 (0.865) (0.481) 
VIX -0.215*** -0.118** 
 (0.0599) (0.0538) 
Policy Differential -0.140 -0.299 
 (0.198) (0.258) 
US REER gr. 0.492 -0.644*** 
 (0.648) (0.247) 
Total Assets gr. 0.335** -0.238*** 
 (0.170) (0.0674) 
US Treas. Yield -0.435 0.183 
 (1.160) (0.651) 
   
Observations 443 860 
Number of Countries 21 23 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 







          Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,  




6.3. Linking Macroprudential Policies, Capital Flows and Sovereign Ratings 
Tables (20)-(24) build on our baseline regression by introducing alternative measures of 
macroprudential policies and capital controls.  We also test for the interaction between both 
policies and sovereign ratings to see their joint effect on capital flows. As most of the 
literature would predict (see Forbes et al., 2013 and IMF, 2016), we find mixed effects with 
respect to the impact of macroprudential policies on portfolio flows.  As we explained 
earlier, the literature on the link between macroprudential policies and capital flows finds 
equivocal results, in part, because macroprudential policies are not designed to target the 
either the volume or composition of capital flows. Tables (20) and (21) show that most 
macroprudential policies included in the regression were insignificant except for two 
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variables that capture changes in sector specific capital buffers (SSCB)243:  those related to 
consumer credit (Table 21), and other sectors (Table 20). These measures represent the 
requirement of banks to finance a larger part of such exposures with capital. Table (20) 
shows that tightening capital buffers (for other sectors) leads to a decrease in portfolio flows 
by around (6% of GDP). 244  However, when this macroprudential tool interacts with 
sovereign ratings, that is, when a ratings upgrade is associated with a macroprudential 
tightening, portfolio flows rise by around 0.2% of GDP.  Another factor to observe is the 
total effects of macroprudential policies in the presence of a rating upgrade. 245 When the 
capital buffer is tightened in the presence of a sovereign ratings upgrade, portfolio flows 
decline by 5% of GDP, relative to the higher 6% highlighted above. This implies that an 
improvement in sovereign risk246 dampens the negative impact macroprudential policy may 
have on portfolio flows.247 Beyond this, sovereign ratings, the U.S. REER, and the VIX 
continue to be the most significant variables in our regression otherwise.  Table (21), on the 
other hand, shows that macroprudential tightening of capital buffers related to consumer 
credit increases portfolio flows, while its interaction with sovereign ratings decreases 







   
 
243 The Cerutti et al. (2016) database introduces three types of SSCBs: real estate, consumer loans, and other loans. The 
significant ones were those of the consumer loans and other loans, rather than real estate loans.  
244 The coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level, implying that introducing the macroprudential tool while 
holding sovereign ratings constant increases portfolio inflows.   
245 Refer to the methodology for an explanation of how the total effect is computed.  Results are available upon request 
in the interest of space.  
246 Proxied by higher ratings 
247 Also observing the total effect of a ratings change during a macroprudential tightening leads to an increase in portfolio 
inflows by 1.5% of GDP, relative to only 0.5% of GDP without a macroprudential tool in place. This adds more light on 
the interaction between sovereign risk, proxied by sovereign ratings, macroprudential policies, which is a tool to reduce 
systemic risk. Given the lack of a clear link between macroprudential policies and portfolio flows, we must exercise 
caution while interpreting these results.  
248 The total effects of ratings are contrary to the previous finding in Table (20). This time, the total effect of the ratings 
in the presence of a macroprudential policy is negative and insignificant. The total effect of the capital buffer in the 
presence of a ratings upgrade is positive and significant, but with a smaller magnitude than that reported in Table (21). 
Table (21) reports a rise in portfolio inflows by 17% of GDP, whereas the total effect of the capital buffer in the presence 
of a ratings upgrade is a 16% of GDP rise in portfolio inflows. 
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Table 20: Gross Portfolio Flows, Macroprudential Policies and Sovereign Ratings 
 Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
 Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES port Port port port port port port port 
         
AR(1) 0.201* 0.199* 0.198* 0.200* 0.200* 0.237** 0.348*** -0.110 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.115) (0.0945) (0.0258) (0.140) 
RGDP gr -0.0407 -0.0380 -0.0425 -0.0419 -0.0380 -0.0183 0.0964 0.0754 
 (0.126) (0.124) (0.123) (0.125) (0.122) (0.109) (0.166) (0.0971) 
Rating 0.514*** 0.507*** 0.507*** 0.510*** 0.490*** 0.560*** 0.331*** 0.384** 
 (0.116) (0.110) (0.110) (0.113) (0.107) (0.147) (0.122) (0.165) 
Inflation -0.0197 -0.0217 -0.0230 -0.0151 -0.0309 0.0786 0.0481** -0.337*** 
 (0.0806) (0.0790) (0.0804) (0.0813) (0.0781) (0.0891) (0.0195) (0.118) 
Current Account -0.269** -0.264** -0.268** -0.265** -0.265** -0.273** -0.213 -0.135** 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) (0.116) (0.132) (0.243) (0.0633) 
Fiscal -0.236 -0.241 -0.239 -0.239 -0.239 -0.274 -0.0883 0.0374 
 (0.162) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.162) (0.224) (0.137) (0.0694) 
Macropru_SSCB_RES 5.577        
 (3.918)        
Interaction_Rating_sscb_res -0.473        
 (0.346)        
US_RGDP gr 0.311 0.301 0.310 0.309 0.309 0.308 -0.0631 -0.0467 
 (0.220) (0.209) (0.208) (0.215) (0.215) (0.273) (0.268) (0.224) 
VIX -0.112** -0.114** -0.112** -0.112** -0.109** -0.105* -0.0761 -0.169 
 (0.0533) (0.0530) (0.0528) (0.0528) (0.0536) (0.0615) (0.0637) (0.128) 
Policy Differential -0.182** -0.185** -0.187** -0.179** -0.183** -0.0754 0.00879 -0.741*** 
 (0.0902) (0.0895) (0.0922) (0.0895) (0.0905) (0.0819) (0.0323) (0.254) 
US REER gr -0.627** -0.620** -0.631** -0.621** -0.624** -0.605** -0.475 -0.412 
 (0.247) (0.244) (0.248) (0.245) (0.248) (0.287) (0.364) (0.406) 
Total Assets gr -0.170** -0.169** -0.164** -0.168** -0.166** -0.196* -0.0793** -0.0399 
 (0.0779) (0.0779) (0.0774) (0.0773) (0.0775) (0.101) (0.0402) (0.104) 
US_Treas_Yield 0.258 0.283 0.267 0.259 0.324 0.124 -0.159 0.465 
 (0.207) (0.212) (0.214) (0.208) (0.216) (0.164) (0.282) (0.614) 
Macropru_SSCB_CONS  3.015       
  (20.28)       
Interaction_Rating_sscb_cons  0.0796       
  (1.710)       
Macropru_SSCB_OTH   -6.117**      
   (2.969)      
Interaction_Rating_sscb_oth   0.980***      
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   (0.253)      
Macropru_SSCB    3.322     
    (3.680)     
Interaction_Rating_sscb    -0.188     
    (0.310)     
Macropru_cap_req     1.830    
     (4.017)    
Interaction_Rating_cap_req     0.0297    
     (0.277)    
Macropru_concrat      2.818   
      (10.46)   
Interaction_Rating_concrat      -0.512   
      (0.850)   
Macropru_ibex       5.576  
       (4.795)  
Interaction_Rating_ibex       -0.747  
       (0.764)  
Macropru_ltv_cap        2.655 
        (7.304) 
Interaction_Rating_ltv_cap        -0.0798 
        (0.464) 
         
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 744 246 463 
Number of countryid 21 21 21 21 21 16 6 15 
         
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 


























Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 









Table 21: Gross Portfolio Flows, Macroprudential Policies and Sovereign Ratings 
Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES port port port Port port 
      
AR(1) 0.202* 0.200* 0.198* 0.200* 0.200* 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.114) (0.113) (0.114) 
RGDP gr -0.0397 -0.0309 -0.0148 -0.0458 -0.0490 
 (0.126) (0.122) (0.124) (0.129) (0.119) 
Rating 0.513*** 0.510*** 0.465*** 0.536*** 0.514*** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.107) (0.161) (0.144) 
Inflation -0.0372 -0.0221 -0.00205 -0.0571 -0.0424 
 (0.0734) (0.0827) (0.0710) (0.0912) (0.0893) 
Current Account -0.262** -0.266** -0.264** -0.285** -0.267** 
 (0.115) (0.118) (0.116) (0.122) (0.119) 
Fiscal -0.236 -0.236 -0.237 -0.232 -0.236 
 (0.161) (0.159) (0.162) (0.162) (0.160) 
Macropru_rr_foreign 7.011     
 (6.376)     
Interaction_Rating_rr_foreign -0.736     
 (0.622)     
US_RGDP gr 0.323 0.312 0.302 0.366 0.353 
 (0.234) (0.221) (0.231) (0.243) (0.222) 
VIX -0.113** -0.113** -0.112** -0.118** -0.117** 
 (0.0531) (0.0513) (0.0562) (0.0514) (0.0529) 
Policy Differential -0.197** -0.182** -0.202** -0.224** -0.187* 
 (0.0932) (0.0928) (0.0974) (0.114) (0.0998) 
US REER gr -0.635** -0.633** -0.621** -0.619*** -0.611*** 
 (0.251) (0.253) (0.248) (0.237) (0.237) 
Total Assets gr -0.177** -0.172** -0.169** -0.167** -0.166** 
 (0.0837) (0.0827) (0.0776) (0.0786) (0.0787) 
US_Treas_Yield 0.263 0.262 0.291 0.198 0.258 
 (0.213) (0.210) (0.233) (0.281) (0.253) 
Macropru_rr_local  2.566    
  (2.235)    
Interaction_Rating_rr_local  -0.244    
  (0.233)    
Macropru_cum_sscb_res   4.264   
   (2.722)   
Interaction_Rating_cum_sscb_res   -0.294   
   (0.230)   
Macropru_cum_sscb_cons    17.72*  
    (9.092)  
Interaction_Rating_cum_sscb_cons    -1.569**  
    (0.768)  
Macropru_cum_sscb_oth     11.62 
     (8.646) 
Interaction_Rating_cum_sscb_oth     -0.984 
     (0.837) 
      
Observations 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 
Number of countryid 21 21 21 21 21 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 

















Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 




Table (22) introduces cumulative indices from Cerutti et al. (2016) which sum up all 
changes in the macroprudential tool of interest before and during the quarter of interest 
since Q1 2000, to capture the extent of macroprudential tightness or looseness over time. 
Once again, most of the macroprudential variables in this table were insignificant except 
for three variables: the interaction term between the cumulation concentration ratio (the 
macroprudential tool) and sovereign ratings (int_ra_cum_concrat),  the aggregate 
Macropru cum_pruc, 249  and cum_pruc2. 250  In this table, we find that the interaction 
between the concentration limit and the ratings (higher ratings and macroprudential 
tightening) lowers portfolio inflows by around 0.3% of GDP. In the case of the cumulative 
macroprudential tools, the tightening of both tools increases capital inflows by around 0.6-
0.7% of GDP, while their interaction with rating lowers portfolio inflows by around 0.07% 
of GDP. In both cases sovereign ratings had a positive and significant impact on portfolio 
flows. Most of our results show that the interaction of macroprudential policies and ratings 
lower portfolio inflows, whereas both variables independently lead to higher inflows.251 We 
interpret this to mean that a ratings upgrade or a macroprudential tightening, holding the 
other constant, both point towards an improvement in the macroeconomic environment, and 
more financial stability, which attracts capital inflows. However, their interaction term 
suggests that macroprudential policies in response to higher ratings reduces portfolio 
inflows. Of course, there are a lot of other variables that point towards the insignificance of 
macroprudential policies, or the inconclusiveness of results, but we work to show the 
interaction between them together as both collectivley capture sovereign risk and systemic 
risk, both of which are of huge importance to foreign investors.    
It is worth noting that we should exercise caution in interpreting the cumulative 
macroprudential variables. While Cerutti (2016) held that these variables are useful to 
reflect the intensity of country-specific changes, they may be not be well-suited for cross-
country analysis, as the implementation of these tools could have been different at the 
 
249 This variable is the sum of the cumulative version of the 9 instruments by country c and time t. 
250 This variable is the sum of the cumulative version of the 9 instruments by country c and time t. Every macroprudential 
tool is then normalized/adjusted to have maximum and minimum changes of 1 and -1. Pruc and Pruc2 are similar to each 
other in what they capture, but they are constructed differently, and the variables that sum up to Pruc, all macropru 
variables, are adjusted to either take the value of 1, or -1, i.e. loosened or tightened, irrespective of the number of times it 
has changed in that particular quarter.  
251 The only such policies that do not is SSCB and other loans. 
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starting year (2000), the number of macroprudential tools differs across countries, and some 
changes may also have “qualitative” implications across countries that the index may not 
capture. We thus include them for reference purposes.  
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Table 22: Gross Portfolio Flows, Macroprudential Policies and Sovereign Ratings 
Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
           
VARIABLES Port port port port port port Port port port port 
           
AR(1) 0.228** -0.117 0.195* 0.192* 0.199* 0.192* 0.199* 0.191* 0.299*** 0.320
*** 
 (0.0959) (0.139) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115) (0.110) (0.115) (0.110) (0.0250) (0.020
6) 
RGDP gr -0.0347 0.0790 -0.0426 -0.0398 -0.0409 -0.0873 -0.0410 -0.0819 -0.0748 -
0.076
7 
 (0.0924) (0.0883) (0.124) (0.132) (0.123) (0.138) (0.123) (0.142) (0.149) (0.115
) 






 (0.175) (0.174) (0.132) (0.134) (0.114) (0.233) (0.114) (0.251) (0.393) (0.157
) 
Inflation 0.0814 -0.337*** -0.0353 0.0415 -0.0242 0.0289 -0.0243 0.0607 0.000290 -
0.049
9 
 (0.103) (0.124) (0.0806) (0.104) (0.0844) (0.119) (0.0844) (0.119) (0.0776) (0.079
0) 
Current Account -0.189 -0.144* -0.282** -0.294** -0.264** -0.288** -0.264** -0.297** -0.270** -
0.185
** 
 (0.132) (0.0827) (0.123) (0.132) (0.117) (0.141) (0.117) (0.145) (0.113) (0.086
2) 
Fiscal -0.268 0.0427 -0.229 -0.220 -0.237 -0.223 -0.237 -0.230 -0.294 -0.335 




2.013          
 (2.638)          
int_ra_cum_concra
t 
-0.287**          
 (0.142)          
us_rgdp_gr 0.319 0.00802 0.318 0.322 0.313 0.397 0.314 0.391 0.165 0.217 
 (0.232) (0.248) (0.230) (0.237) (0.226) (0.244) (0.225) (0.249) (0.242) (0.245
) 






 (0.0647) (0.129) (0.0530) (0.0490) (0.0524) (0.0509) (0.0523) (0.0499) (0.0385) (0.034
8) 
policydiff -0.0493 -0.660*** -0.239** -0.212** -0.188** -0.225** -0.187** -0.230** -0.0820 -
0.167
** 
 (0.0785) (0.179) (0.107) (0.0960) (0.0938) (0.0940) (0.0937) (0.0944) (0.0660) (0.071
0) 






 (0.287) (0.403) (0.242) (0.239) (0.264) (0.235) (0.264) (0.234) (0.194) (0.222
) 
dlog_totass2 -0.191* -0.0460 -0.170** -0.165** -0.167** -0.164** -0.167** -0.165** -0.207*** -
0.197
*** 
 (0.101) (0.100) (0.0783) (0.0762) (0.0826) (0.0773) (0.0824) (0.0774) (0.0643) (0.065
9) 
us_treas_yield -0.156 0.345 0.156 0.0388 0.258 -0.205 0.257 -0.261 -0.273 -0.104 
 (0.158) (0.567) (0.219) (0.252) (0.223) (0.402) (0.223) (0.446) (0.259) (0.185
) 




  (2.111)         
int_ra_cum_ltv_ca
p 
 -0.160         
  (0.113)         
Maxopru_cum_rr_
foreign 
  3.047        
   (2.026)        
int_ra_cum_rr_fore
ign 
  -0.304        
   (0.209)        
Macropru_cum_rr_
local 
   0.652       
    (0.897)       
int_ra_cum_rr_loc
al 
   -0.128       
    (0.103)       
Macropru pruc     1.395      
     (1.799)      
int_ra_pruc     -0.0989      
     (0.169)      
Macropru 
cum_pruc 
     0.590***     
      (0.228)     
int_ra_cum_pruc      -0.0711***     
      (0.0209)     
Macropru pruc2       1.418    
       (1.829)    
int_ra_pruc2       -0.100    
       (0.171)    
Macropru 
cum_pruc2 
       0.658**   
        (0.262)   




        (0.0289)   
Macropru_ 
log_avg_rr 
        -2.041  
         (1.296)  
int_ra_log_avg_rr         -0.0782  
         (0.0996)  
Macropru 
dlog_avg_rr 
         -
0.022
0 
          (0.122
) 
int_ra_dlog_avg_rr          0.003
54 
          (0.008
46) 
           




16 15 21 21 21 21 21 21 17 17 
     Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value 

































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 





Table (23) uses an alternative dataset of macroprudential tools introduced by Shim et al. (2013), 
also to capture tightening and loosening macroprudential measures.252  Similar to the previous 
results, most of our results were insignificant except for the LTV ratio. An LTV tightening 
leads to more portfolio inflows, whereas the interaction of this variable with ratings lowers 
portfolio inflows. Our earlier conclusions hold. 
 
Table 23: Gross Portfolio Flows, Macroprudential Policies and Sovereign Ratings 
Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES port port port port port 
      
L.port 0.176 0.170 0.176 0.173 0.175 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.114) 
rgdp_gr 0.106 0.0977 0.102 0.103 0.0999 
 (0.244) (0.244) (0.237) (0.239) (0.240) 
Ra 0.805*** 0.831*** 0.815*** 0.804*** 0.812*** 
 (0.252) (0.261) (0.256) (0.245) (0.251) 
Inf -0.152 -0.153 -0.161 -0.169 -0.167 
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.140) (0.139) (0.140) 
Ca -0.418** -0.430** -0.431** -0.427** -0.426** 
 (0.166) (0.171) (0.172) (0.167) (0.167) 
Fiscal -0.263 -0.264 -0.268 -0.262 -0.266 
 (0.199) (0.202) (0.200) (0.198) (0.200) 
d_rr 3.470     
 (5.434)     
int_ra_drr -0.323     
 (0.461)     
us_rgdp_gr -0.0898 -0.0734 -0.0892 -0.104 -0.0879 
 (0.434) (0.434) (0.433) (0.424) (0.431) 
Vix -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.215*** -0.215*** 
 (0.0717) (0.0760) (0.0744) (0.0740) (0.0740) 
Policydiff -0.309** -0.323** -0.319** -0.326** -0.330** 
 (0.143) (0.151) (0.146) (0.151) (0.152) 
dlog_us_reer -0.347 -0.356 -0.345 -0.341 -0.344 
 (0.269) (0.267) (0.266) (0.268) (0.267) 
dlog_totass2 -0.148** -0.152** -0.152** -0.149** -0.148** 
 (0.0735) (0.0723) (0.0734) (0.0719) (0.0719) 
us_treas_yield 0.0486 -0.0132 0.0516 0.0598 0.0378 
 (0.362) (0.362) (0.357) (0.350) (0.359) 
d_ltv  15.34*    
  (7.853)    
int_ra_dltv  -1.085**    
  (0.517)    
d_dsti   -9.520   
   (12.47)   
int_ra_ddsti   0.401   
   (0.801)   
d_rw    -6.464  
    (9.266)  
int_ra_drw    0.794  
    (0.876)  
d_prov     2.903 
     (5.633) 
int_ra_dprov     -0.253 
     (0.531) 
 
252 The measures from Shim et al. (2013) focus primarily on the housing market, so we include them as a robustness check, 
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Observations 850 850 850 850 850 
Number of countryid 23 23 23 23 23 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value    0.0726  0.0724 |               0.0712              0.0724                 0.0713 
Order 2 p-value    0.4760  0.5095               0.4739                    0.4443                 0.4684 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
 
Table (24) introduces various measures of capital controls from Fernandez et al. (2015 and 
2016). The overall restrictions index (represented by KA) is positive and significant at the 10% 
level. Interestingly the index on inflow restrictions leads to increased portfolio inflows, while 
the outflow restrictions index also leads to increased inflows. The results are in stark contrast 
to the literature, including Pasricha et al. (2015). However, Ahmed and Zlate (2014) 
highlighted that capital controls tend to lower net capital flows, whereas we are using gross 
portfolio flows.253 Binci et al. (2010) also held that capital controls tend to be more effective 
in advanced economics given the better institutional quality, so this may partly explain this 
anomaly For robustness, we also test for bond and equity specific capital controls, rather than 
broader measures of capital controls, and the results were not significant for overall gross 
portfolio flows.254 
Table 24: Gross Portfolio Flows, Macroprudential Policies and Sovereign Ratings 
Dependent variable: Gross Portfolio Flows (% of GDP) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
VARIABLES port port port 
    
L.port 0.199** 0.199** 0.196** 
 (0.0909) (0.0910) (0.0897) 
rgdp_gr 0.0621 0.0713 0.0675 
 (0.205) (0.205) (0.204) 
Ra 0.648*** 0.684*** 0.613*** 
 (0.154) (0.168) (0.143) 
Inf -0.189* -0.197* -0.182* 
 (0.0970) (0.105) (0.0951) 
Ca -0.309** -0.334** -0.308** 
 (0.132) (0.149) (0.127) 
Fiscal -0.165 -0.165 -0.164 
 (0.129) (0.132) (0.128) 
Ka 10.52*   
 (5.559)   
int_ra_ka -0.643   
 (0.405)   
us_rgdp_gr -0.171 -0.115 -0.195 
 (0.390) (0.394) (0.391) 
Vix -0.173*** -0.166*** -0.175*** 
 
253 Recall the significace of capital flows in reducing net FDI earlier in this chapter. We also used net portfolio flows as a 
dependent variable as a robustness check, but the results were not significant among most of our explanatory variables so we 
do not report these regressions.  
254 See robustness checks for further details.  
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 (0.0559) (0.0559) (0.0556) 
Policydiff -0.0944 -0.145 -0.0906 
 (0.0891) (0.0892) (0.0921) 
dlog_us_reer -0.476** -0.476** -0.472** 
 (0.228) (0.229) (0.226) 
dlog_totass2 -0.156** -0.159** -0.156** 
 (0.0664) (0.0681) (0.0669) 
us_treas_yield 0.189 0.213 0.203 
 (0.385) (0.369) (0.381) 
kai2  9.458*  
  (5.725)  
int_ra_kai2  -0.721  
  (0.498)  
Kao   9.327** 
   (4.681) 
int_ra_kao   -0.483 
   (0.340) 
    
Observations 1,111 1,110 1,111 
Number of countryid 22 22 22 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value    0.0632  0.0651  0.0626 
Order 2 p-value    0.6606  0.6633  0.6737 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard error 
 
7. Robustness checks 
A significant amount of robustness checks to confirm the soundness of our results.  We 
introduced alternative push and pull factors suggested in the literature, both for portfolio flows, 
and FDI. Other push factors that were included in alternative regressions comprised stock 
market indicators such as S&P 500 index, the S&P price to earnings ratio, measures of global 
liquidity proxied by U.S. credit growth and U.S. M2 growth, other measures of US monetary 
policy to capture expectations of future Federal Reserve actions, the real interest rate, and the 
slope of the yield curve, but most of the results were not significant. For the pull factors, we 
included additional measures such as the external debt to GDP ratio, M2 growth, and the public 
debt to GDP ratio. 
In line with the use of net FDI data, we re-estimated our portfolio flows regressions using net 
portfolio flows, and the results in the baseline regression were not significant for sovereign 
ratings or most of our push and pull variables. The main push and pull variables that continued 
to exercise significance were the current account, and the VIX. Otherwise, most of our results 
were insignificant.255 
 
255 Results available upon request.  
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We also breakdown portfolio flows into debt and equity gross inflows, to confirm the 
significance of our results.256 For equity flows, sovereign ratings at first was not significant 
until the introduction of the fiscal balance into our equation when it becomes significant. Our 
push variables remain significant in the same sequence. For the contagion effect, and changes 
in the BRICS ratings, the principal component of the BRICS ratings is only significant in three 
out of the 12 regressions, and contrary to expectations, U.S. GDP growth was the most 
significant push factor having both a positive and significant impact on equity flows into EMs.   
Bond flows, on the other hand, mimicked most of the results presented in this paper with 
sovereign ratings significant across all regressions, and the current account deficit being the 
other significant pull factor. For push factors the VIX had the most significant impact, but the 
coefficient of the ratings was still the largest. The introduction of the BRICS rating was only 
significant with the introduction of the VIX, and most other push and pull variables were not 
significant. However, country-specific ratings changes among the BRICS all had a significant 
and positive impact on portfolio flows to the rest of the countries in the sample, with, India’s 
rating most significant. Similar results were also obtained on the regional impact with the Asia 
being the most affected region by a ratings change, similar to the results presented in this 
chapter. The effect of a ratings changes also more than doubles during the global financial 
crisis, while once again, being an investment grade vs. a speculative grade rated country did 
not matter for bond inflows, suggesting the carry trade argument continues to hold for bond 
inflows.  
We also changed the threshold of the dummy variable to capture investment versus speculative 
grade- we already discussed this above- to see at which point foreign investors become 
cognizant of the risks in EMs that go beyond the carry trade opportunity and changing the 
threshold of the rating to see where it becomes significant (investment vs. speculative grade 
rating). We find that investors consider a rating of BB- or below - three notches below 
investment grade - as the warning signal that would deter them from investing in EMs.  
We also used alternative measures of capital controls- but from the same dataset from 
Fernandez et al. (2015) to capture controls on inflows, controls on outflows separately, as well 
as controls on equities versus debt. The only notable result is that controls on equity changed 
raised bond flows (which could have driven our results).  
 
256 Tables are available upon request for the bond and equity flows regressions. 
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8. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
The chapter analyzed how changes in sovereign ratings influence different types of capital 
flows - namely FDI and portfolio flows- to 23-24 EMs and whether the changes in capital flows 
in one country be explained by a sovereign ratings’ change in another country. This study also 
analyzed whether distance mattered when ratings changes occur within the EM sphere, and 
whether the presence of a crisis - country-specific or the global financial crisis - affected capital 
flows to EMs in the presence of a ratings change. Finally, this paper examined how changed in 
capital flows management tools- mainly capital controls and macroprudential policies affected 
portfolio flows.  The results of the study suggest that sovereign ratings continue to be a crucial 
factor for EMs’ access to international capital markets, whose effects on capital flows even 
more pronounced during crisis times, whether within a global context- such as the global 
financial crisis or the eurozone debt crisis- or a country-specific crisis. Sovereign rating has a 
statistically significant effect on both FDI (as a percent of GDP) and portfolio flows (as a 
percent of GDP) across most of our regressions. Our results also point to the fact that pull 
factors mattered more for FDI, while push factors mattered more for portfolio flows. In both 
cases, sovereign ratings had the most important impact on capital inflows to EMs, something 
that largely goes unnoticed, particularly in the recent wave of studies on capital flows since the 
global financial crisis.  
The results also suggest that capital inflows to EMs may continue to be susceptible to financial 
contagion, both during good times and bad times, given the interdependence among EMs.  
Sovereign ratings of the BRICS as either a group or individual countries exert a statistically 
significant contagion effect on capital flows into other EMs in our sample, and Asian countries 
seem to be the ones affected most by a rating change, while Latin America appears to be 
affected the least. The presence of a financial crisis increases the impact of sovereign ratings 
on both FDI and portfolio flows, with the effect more than doubling during crisis times, 
warranting the importance of the timing- and magnitude- of ratings changes. Push factors, and 
global crises/crises in AEs affect portfolio flows more than pull factors, and country-specific 
crises, which play a larger role as an FDI determinant. Our results re-emphasize the important 
role that sovereign ratings agencies play, and how their role in leading the market affects 
investor sentiment.  
We also introduce CFM policies into our regressions capturing both macroprudential policies 
and capital controls. For FDI, capital controls have a negative impact on FDI flows to EMs. 
For portfolio flows, the effect of capital controls is mixed as they appear to increase gross 
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inflows. More importantly is the recent use of macroprudential policies to control for systemic 
risk from any indirect consequences of capital inflows. While we obtain mixed effects as to the 
significance of macroprudential policies, most policies conclude that macroprudential policies 
alone, when tightened, encourage capital flows, which could be viewed as a sign of a prudent 
financial regulator aiming to achieve financial stability. However, when a rating upgrade is 
associated with a macroprudential tightening, portfolio flows decrease. The macroprudential 
tightening in this sense is a pre-emptive move towards maintaining financial stability. This 
could point towards the fact that investors observe both sovereign risk, and systemic risk when 
undertaking their investment decisions, but we must interpret these results with caution given 
the insignificance of a lot of other macroprudential tools, and the fact that these tools are not 
designed to target capital flows in the first place. Global risk aversion is one other important 
push factor throughout our results for portfolio flows. 
There is still a lot of scope to continue further work in this area. Examining the linkages 
between sovereign ratings- and even bank ratings- as well as cross-border bank flows is a direct 
extension to this chapter despite the slowdown of bank flows to EMs over the last decade. Their 
linkages to macroprudential policies is important, to compare the link between the impact of 
macroprudential policies on portfolio flows versus cross border bank flows. Examining the role 
of alternative- FX-related- macroprudential policies in addition to the ones examined above 
could be helpful to further understand the link between capital flows and macroprudential 
policies, and further establish the link between sovereign risk and systemic risk. Using 
alternative capital controls measure is another area to examine given how capital controls 




Annex I: Country List, Summary Statistics, and Variable Definition 
Table (1): List of EMs included in the Sample 
1 Argentina  13 Malaysia 
2 Brazil  14 Mexico 
3 Chile 15 Peru 
4 China 16 Philippines   
5 Columbia 17 Poland 
6 Czech Republic 18 Russia 
7 Egypt 19 Singapore 
8 Greece 20 South Africa 
9 Hong Kong 21 South Korea 
10 Hungary 22 Thailand 
11 India  23 Turkey 
12 Indonesia 24 Venezuela257  
 
Table (2): Summary Statistics- FDI Regressions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
FDI 582 3.894691 6.011288 -16.09 50.78 
Ratings 545 15.55475 3.924233 0 24 
Current Account 598 0.533612 6.082324 -14.48 25.97 
Real Interest Rate 529 6.958582 11.50592 -35.31 77.63 
Inflation 530 43.8527 374.7581 -4.02 7481.66 
Real GDP Growth 596 2.824765 4.124584 -14.57 16.23 
G-7 Real Growth 
Rate 
600 1.204 1.457589 -4.61 3.17 
G-7 Interest Rate 600 3.7228 2.221653 0.66 6.84 
Capital Controls 
Index 
456 48.82456 32.43387 0 100 
 
Table (3): Summary Statistics- Portfolio Flows Regressions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Portfolio Flows 2,090 3.082981 10.68442 -130.9708 104.2906 
Ratings 2,318 11.87628 3.898039 0 20 
Inflation 2,478 29.96338 450.061 -5.96 20263.9 
Current Account 2,275 0.503353 6.493229 -20.17 29.987 
Fiscal Balance 1,947 -1.680218 4.926885 -20.41 62.7 
US Real GDP Growth 2,484 2.438136 1.750688 -4.061911 5.266458 
VIX 2,576 19.41518 7.630756 9.58 58.49 
Policy Differential 2,034 -8.888304 19.70932 -347.32 37.72 
US REER Growth 2,185 0.0703124 2.547111 -5.089951 6.970024 
Total Assets Growth 1,633 2.54988 5.843655 -12.23536 36.45029 





























FDI 1         
Ratings 0.5238 1        
Current Account -0.0454 -0.153 1       
Real Interest Rate 
0.3246 0.3168 -0.2024 1      
Inflation -0.1692 -0.4584 -0.0641 -0.0548 1     
Real GDP Growth 
0.0771 0.1243 -0.1954 0.0193 -0.166 1    
G-7 Real Growth 
Rate 0.0094 -0.0584 0.0198 -0.06 0.059 0.3141 1   
G-7 Interest Rate 
-0.0857 -0.1348 0.2187 -0.143 0.2318 -0.1636 0.4215 1  
Capital Controls 































Portfolio Flows 1           
Ratings 0.087 1          
Inflation -0.0258 -0.5032 1         
Current Account -0.0957 0.2961 -0.131 1        
Fiscal Balance -0.0331 0.1421 0.0112 0.2838 1       
US Real GDP Growth 0.0706 -0.0673 -0.0189 -0.0191 0.0883 1      
VIX -0.1572 0.013 0.0499 0.0179 -0.0615 -0.5978 1     
Policy Differential 0.0492 0.5945 -0.7604 0.1571 0.0471 0.0689 -0.1214 1    
US REER Growth -0.1251 -0.0025 0.0373 -0.0263 -0.0214 0.0262 0.1459 -0.0525 1   
Total Assets Growth -0.0895 0.0282 0.0459 -0.0193 -0.0255 -0.2168 0.3682 -0.0569 -0.137 1  

















inflows (% of 
GDP) 
The sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. This series 
shows net inflows (new investment inflows less 
disinvestment) in the reporting economy from 








The capacity and willingness of a government to 
repay its obligations in full and on time. It is the risk 
facing an investor who holds debt securities issued 
by that government which in turn reflects its credit 
worthiness. 
 
AAA = 24, 















The lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 







Balance (% of 
GDP) 
The sum of net exports of goods and services, net 






Growth of real 
per capita GDP 
Change in the log of real GDP per capita (constant 






G-7 real GDP 
growth rate 
Weighted average by GDP per capita of real GDP 







G-7 real interest 
rate 
Weighted average by GDP per capita of real GDP per 








Overall restrictions index (all asset categories, 1997 
onwards), which includes restrictions on equity 
flows, bond flows, money markets, collective 
investments, local purchases by non-residents, 
purchases abroad by residents, and others 




258AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, C, RD, SD, D.  











flows (% of 
GDP) 
Cross border transactions and positions involving debt or 




Balance of Payments 
Statistics (BPM 6) 
Sovereign debt 
ratings 
The capacity and willingness of a government to repay its 
obligations in full and on time. It is the risk facing an 
investor who holds debt securities issued by that 
government which in turn reflects its credit worthiness. 
 
AAA = 24, AA+ 
= 23,.., D = 1259 
Standard & Poor’s 
 (By subscription). 
Real GDP 
growth rate 











Balance (% of 
GDP) 
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Weighted averages of bilateral exchange rates adjusted by 




Total Assets  Growth of total Assets of the Federal Reserve, Bank of 






10-year US Treasury yield; measure of long term return 





Table (8): Capital Flows Management (CFM) Policies 
 
Variable Name Definition 
 
Unit of Measurement Source 
Macropru_sscb_res Change in sector specific capital buffer: Real 
estate credit. Requires banks to finance a larger 
fraction of these exposures with capital.  
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_sscb_cons Change in sector specific capital buffer: 
Consumer credit Requires banks to finance a 
larger fraction of these exposures with capital.  
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_sscb_oth Change in sector specific capital buffer: Other 
sectors. Requires banks to finance a larger 
fraction of these exposures with capital.  
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_cap_req Change in capital requirements. Implementation 
of Basel capital agreements.  
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_concrat Change in concentration limit.  Limits banks' 
exposures to specific borrowers or sectors.  
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_ibex Change in interbank exposure limit.  Limits 
banks exposures to other banks.  
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_ltv_cap Change in the loan-to-value ratio cap.  Limits on 
loans to residential borrowers.  
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_rr_foreign Change in reserve requirements on foreign 
currency-denominated accounts.  
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_rr_local  Change in reserve requirements on local 
currency-denominated accounts.  1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 





259AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B, B-, CCC+, CCC, CCC-, CC, C, RD, SD, D.  







Debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratio (or debt 
service ratio) applied to borrowers for house 
purchases 
1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change), Numbers 
increase if there is more 
than one change per quarter 
Shim et 
al. (2013) 
RW Risk Weights on Housing loans 1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) Numbers 
increase if there is more 
than one change per quarter 
Shim et 
al. (2013) 
Prov Loan-Loss Provisions  1 (tightening), 1 (losening), 
or 0 (no change) Numbers 
increase if there is more 
than one change per quarter 
Shim et 
al. (2013) 
Macropru_sscb Sum of changes in sector-sepcific capital buffers 
across the residental, consumer, and other sectors 
(aggregate index). NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_PruC Country index by time t and country c, equal to 1 
if the sum of the 9 instruments is >=1 and -1 if 
the sum of the instruments is <=-1, 0 otherwise 





Macropru_PruC2 Country index by time t and country c, equal to 1 
if the sum of the 9 instruments is >=1 and -1 if 
the sum of the instruments is <=-1, 0 otherwise.  
In this case, all individual instruments are 
adjusted to have maximum and minimum 
changes of 1 and -1 (aggregate index)..  1, -1, 1 
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_cum_sscb_res Cumulative change in sector specific capital 
buffer: Real estate credit NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_cum_sscb_cons Cumulative change in sector specific capital 
buffer: Consumer credit NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_cum_sscb_oth Cumulative change in sector specific capital 
buffer: Other sectors NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
















Macropru_cum_rr_foreign Cumulative change in reserve requirements on 
foreign currency-denominated accounts NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_cum_rr_local Cumulative change in reserve requirements on 
local currency-denominated accounts NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_cum_sscb Cumulative change in the aggregate sector-
specific capital buffer instrument.  NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_cum_PruC Sum of the cumulative version of the 9 
instruments by country c and time t NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 
Macropru_cum_PruC2 Sum of the cumulative version of the 9 
instruments by country c and time t. In this case, 
all individual instruments are adjusted to have  
maximum and minimum changes of 1 and -1.  NA  
Cerutti et 
al. (2016) 







KAI Overall Capital Controls Index Capturing 





KAO Overall Capital Controls Index Capturing 







Table (10): Summary Statistics- CFM Measures 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Macropru_sscb_res 1,260 0.011111 0.131722 -1 1 
Macropru_sscb_cons 1,260 0.005556 0.084366 -1 1 
Macropru_sscb_oth 1,260 0.003968 0.12909 -2 2 
Macropru_sscb 1,260 0.020635 0.231484 -2 3 
Macropru_cap_req 1,260 0.026191 0.159765 0 1 
Macropru_concrat 943 0.015907 0.133392 -1 1 
Macropru_ibex 332 0.012048 0.109266 0 1 
Macropru_ltv_cap 572 0.050699 0.300408 -1 1 
Macropru_rr_foreign 1,260 0.018254 0.334156 -3 5 
Macropru_rr_local 1,260 0.014286 0.40228 -3 5 
Macropru_cum_sscb_res 1,260 0.283333 0.809912 -2 4 
Macropru_cum_sscb_c~s 1,260 0.115079 0.378444 0 2 
Macropru_cum_sscb_oth 1,260 0.115079 0.392861 -1 2 
Macropru_cum_sscb 1,260 0.513492 1.273787 -2 6 
Macropru_cum_cap_req 1,260 0.262698 0.567904 0 2 
Macropru_cum_concrat 943 0.589608 0.839686 -1 3 
Macropru_cum_ibex 332 0.358434 0.572128 0 2 
Macropru_cum_ltv_cap 572 0.949301 2.269701 -3 8 
Macropru_cum_rr_for~n 1,260 0.296825 1.653693 -6 12 
Macropru_cum_rr_local 1,260 0.203175 2.335618 -6 13 
Macropru_pruc 1,260 0.085714 0.462015 -1 1 
Macropru_cum_pruc 1,260 2.242857 4.972816 -8 25 
Macropru_pruc2 1,260 0.085714 0.460292 -1 1 
Macropru_cum_pruc2 1,260 2.030952 5.820576 -15 25 
Macropru_d_rr 1,148 0.021777 0.444334 -3 4 
Macropru_d_ltv 1,148 0.017422 0.190561 -1 2 
Macropru_d_dsti 1,148 0.012195 0.124677 -1 1 
Macropru_d_rw 1,148 0.00784 0.114088 -1 1 
Macropru_d_prov 1,148 0.00784 0.114088 -1 1 







Linear Transformation of Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
 
Ratings Transformation Methodology 
Using the linear transformations above, we convert a country’s sovereign rating into numbers, 
taking into consideration the day that a ratings change has occurred in addition to changes in 
the outlook (an outlook is either stable, or positive or negative).  Sovereign ratings are 
represented on a scale from 0 (Serial Default) to 20 (AAA), and every change in the ratings 
outlook is given a weight of +0.3 (positive outlook), -3 (negative outlook), and 0 (Stable 
Outlook), and a -0.5 for Negative Watch. The lower value of the positive and negative outlook 
(+0.3/-0.3), implies that a ratings change is possible within three months to a year, whereas a 
Negative Watch implies a more imminent ratings cut within three months or less. Hence it has 
 
260 Ratings of BB+ and below are classified as speculative- or junk- grade.  
























a slightly more weight relative to the Negative Outlook. For example, Brazil’s rating changed 
from BB/Watch Neg to BB/Negative on August 15, 2017. That is, its rating stood at 9 with -
0.5 for the negative watch, rendering it an 8.5 score for the first 15 days of August, and as of 
August 16, its rating gets numerically adjusted to 9 for the rating (BB), and -0.3 for the negative 
rating outlook, giving it a score of 8.7. On a monthly basis, Brazil’s rating would be calculated 
as follows 
August 2017 = (8.5*15+8.7*16)/31 
The average monthly rating is divided by the number of days in our month of interest. 
September’s rating- and onwards- would be 8.7 until another ratings change occurs, and a 
similar ratings adjustment occur, with the weighted average rating calculation driven by the 
number of days in the month. After obtaining a monthly series of ratings in numerical form, 



























APPENDIX III: Additional FDI RESULTS 
 
Table 1a: Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Rating, published in Emara and El Said (2015)261  
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 
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23/493 23/487 23/435 23/397 22/367 22/366 22/366 22/366 23/435 
Arellano-Bond Test 




































































Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively 
Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the 
















261 Once again, this is the table that Table (1) was originally built upon and is included here for reference purposes. The results 
presented here were published in a simpler version in 2015. For more information, see Emara and El Said (2015).  As the 
results of all specifications in Table 3 suggest no autocorrelation in levels between residuals. Finally, the results of Sargan test 
(null hypothesis instruments as a group are exogenous) suggest that the set of instruments used in all regressions are valid.  
262 In this specification, the three insignificant coefficients are dropped, and the model is re-estimated where the coefficients 
of lagged FDI, real GDP growth, sovereign rating, G-7 real growth rate, and G-7 real interest rate are statistically significant 




Table (5a): Brazil Regional Effect: Sovereign Ratings on FDI  
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 








VARIABLES Asian EMEA Latin 
    
FDI it-1 0.555*** 0.640*** 0.478*** 
 (0.114) (0.0520) (0.0404) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.337*** 0.121 0.0378 
 (0.112) (0.0786) (0.0264) 
Brazil Rating it-1 0.472** 0.133*** 0.130*** 
 (0.214) (0.0289) (0.0189) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0905** -0.0343** -0.00794 
 (0.0389) (0.0150) (0.00626) 
G-7 Growth it 0.438** 0.809 0.0466 
 (0.186) (0.732) (0.0644) 
G-7 Real Interest it 0.157 0.0178 0.121** 
 (0.135) (0.110) (0.0567) 
Observations 168 150 110 
Number of country 9 8 6 
Arellano-Bond Test    
Order 1                                     [0.0870] [0.0266] [0.0812] 
Order 2                                     [0.0762] [0.2976] [0.7533] 
Sargan Test P-Value                                     [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
  Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively.  
Numbers in round parentheses   are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the Arellano-Bond 
Autocorrelation Test P-value. 
 
Table (5b): Russia Regional Effect: Sovereign Ratings on FDI  
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 








VARIABLES Asian EMEA Latin 
    
FDI it-1 0.624*** 0.635*** 0.531*** 
 (0.0980) (0.0554) (0.0381) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.413*** 0.121 0.0257 
 (0.141) (0.105) (0.0290) 
Russia Rating it-1 0.268** 0.141*** 0.0735*** 
 (0.118) (0.0409) (0.0228) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0757** -0.0471** 0.000304 
 (0.0317) (0.0204) (0.00496) 
G-7 Growth it 0.347** 0.995 0.0764 
 (0.171) (0.851) (0.0681) 
G-7 Real Interest it 0.468** 0.0908 0.177*** 
 (0.220) (0.121) (0.0494) 
    
Observations 168 131 129 
Number of country 9 7 7 
Arellano-Bond Test    
Order 1                                     [0.0982] [0.0278] [0.0642] 
Order 2 [0.0775] [0.2881] [0.1420] 
Sargan Test P-Value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively.  
Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the Arellano-Bond 




Table (5c): India Regional Effect: Sovereign Ratings on FDI  
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 








VARIABLES Asian EMEA Latin 
    
FDI it-1 0.544*** 0.637*** 0.491*** 
 (0.112) (0.0513) (0.0374) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.324*** 0.107 0.0216 
 (0.103) (0.0764) (0.0262) 
India Rating it-1 0.512** 0.144*** 0.124*** 
 (0.219) (0.0326) (0.0291) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0910** -0.0354** -0.00488 
 (0.0365) (0.0152) (0.00562) 
G-7 Growth it 0.432** 0.810 0.0751 
 (0.183) (0.731) (0.0600) 
G-7 Real Interest it -0.0903 -0.0516 0.0572 
 (0.184) (0.118) (0.0574) 
    
Observations 149 150 129 
Number of country 8 8 7 
Arellano-Bond Test    
Order 1                                     [0.0959] [0.0272] [0.0698] 
Order 2 [0.0632] [0.2963] [0.9768] 
Sargan Test P-Value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively.  
Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are the Arellano-Bond 




Table (5d): China Regional Effect: Sovereign Ratings on FDI  
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 








VARIABLES Asian EMEA Latin 
    
FDI it-1 0.547*** 0.635*** 0.481*** 
 (0.131) (0.0520) (0.0362) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.330*** 0.112 0.0279 
 (0.0993) (0.0758) (0.0262) 
China Rating it-1 0.370** 0.112*** 0.0916*** 
 (0.188) (0.0270) (0.0224) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0966** -0.0374** -0.00536 
 (0.0453) (0.0160) (0.00518) 
G-7 Growth it 0.417** 0.799 0.0649 
 (0.195) (0.730) (0.0619) 
G-7 Real Interest it 0.0852 0.00209 0.110** 
 (0.158) (0.113) (0.0497) 
    
Observations 149 150 129 
Number of country 8 8 7 
Arellano-Bond Test    
Order 1                                     [0.0869] [0.0259] [0.0671] 
Order 2 [0.0658] [0.2966] [0.9787] 
Sargan Test P-Value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust 





Table (5e): South Africa Regional Effect: Sovereign Ratings on FDI 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) 








VARIABLES Asian EMEA Latin 
    
FDI it-1 0.562*** 0.645*** 0.513*** 
 (0.122) (0.0540) (0.0393) 
GDP Growth it-1 0.284*** 0.0698 0.0222 
 (0.0956) (0.0836) (0.0264) 
South Africa Rating it-1 0.417** 0.138*** 0.0934*** 
 (0.194) (0.0320) (0.0278) 
Capital Control Index it-1 -0.0903** -0.0346*** -0.00252 
 (0.0390) (0.0116) (0.00493) 
G-7 Growth it 0.434** 0.997 0.0670 
 (0.188) (0.850) (0.0583) 
G-7 Real Interest it 0.0244 -0.0644 0.0845 
 (0.151) (0.170) (0.0590) 
    
Observations 168 131 129 
Number of country 9 7 7 
Arellano-Bond Test    
Order 1                                     [0.0989] [0.0469] [0.0674] 
Order 2 [0.0666] [0.2852] [0.9058] 
Sargan Test P-Value [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
Notes:   ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively.  










On the Impact of Macroprudential Policies on Financial 
Inclusion263 
Abstract 
Financial Inclusion - access to financial products by households and firms - is one of the main 
albeit challenging priorities, for both Advanced Economies (AEs) as well as Emerging Markets 
(EMs), but more so for the latter. Financial inclusion facilitates consumption smoothing, lowers 
income inequality, enables risk diversification, and tends to positively affect economic growth. 
Financial stability is another rising priority among policy makers. This is evident in the re-
emergence of macroprudential policies after the global financial crisis, minimizing systemic 
risk, particularly risks associated with rapid credit growth. However, there are significant 
policy trade-offs that could exist between both financial inclusion and financial stability, with 
mixed evidence on the link between the two objectives. Given the importance of 
macroprudential policies as a toolbox to achieve financial stability, we examine the impact of 
macroprudential policies on financial inclusion - a potential cause for financial instability if not 
carefully implemented. Using panel regressions for 67 countries over the period 2000-2014, 
our results point to mixed effects of macroprudential policies. The usage (and tightening) of 
some tools, such as the debt-to-income ratio, appear to reduce financial inclusion whereas 
others, such as the RRR, increase it. Our results differ once we split the sample into AEs and 
EMs, given the different levels of financial development and institutional quality among the 
two groups. Specifically, both institutional quality and financial development appear to 
increase the effectiveness of macroprudential policies on financial inclusion. Institutional 
quality helps macroprudential policies boost financial inclusion, with mixed effects as a result 
of financial development, but the results are more significant when we include either 
institutional quality or financial development. This leads us to believe that macroprudential 
policies conditional on better institutional quality and financial development improves 
financial inclusion. This has important policy implications for financial stability. 
 
263 This is part of a bigger project on financial inclusion and financial stability. It will be published as a joint paper with 
professor Joseph Pearlman and Professor Noha Emara. I am also working on linking financial inclusion to enterprise access 
to finance, but this chapter is concerned with household access to finance and macroprudential policies. I am also working on 
examining the interaction between financial inclusion and macroprudential policies to test for their joint impact on financial 




Financial inclusion − access to, and use of, financial products and services by households or 
firms −  is one of the main, albeit challenging priorities in Emerging Markets (EMs), and a key 
factor for financial development264. Regional blocs265and international financial organizations, 
including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, and 
the African Development Bank, are among the many entities currently prioritizing access to 
finance. Financial inclusion units, both within Central Banks, and Finance Ministries, have 
been on the rise, and bolstering access to finance has become an issue that  has been repeatedly 
addressed in various G-20 statements (see Beck, 2016)).266 Over the last decade, the global 
average of ATMs per 100,000 adults has increased by at least two thirds,267 while the global 
average of holders - especially for depositing purposes - has more than doubled (IMF, 2018), 
as shown in Figure (1).  
Figure (1): Evolution in Financial Inclusion Trends Over the Last Decade 
 
Source: IMF Financial Access Survey (via IMF, 2018)  
 
264 The literature on financial inclusion over the last decade established that financial development goes well beyond economic 
growth (see for example Beck, 2016), Levine, 2005, and Beck, 2009), with financial development contributing to improved 
income distribution, and reduced poverty (Beck, 2016), even if financial inclusion was lagging 
265 G20, APEC, ASEAN, and GCC. 
266 Yet, still over half of the central banks globally have no financial inclusion mandate, but rather objectives related to financial 
inclusion (Tissot and Gadanecz, 2017). 
267 From 30 in 2004, to almost 50 in 2015.  
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Financial inclusion is of key importance, particularly to EMs and frontier markets whose levels 
of financial development, as well as access to finance, are well below those of advanced 
economies. Financial inclusion can thus help consumption smoothing with significant welfare 
gains (see, for example, Jappelli and Pagano, 1989; Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997; Ludvigson, 
1999), and help in lowering income inequality by increasing the income of the poorest quintile 
(Beck et al., 2007), thus boosting savings (Dupas and Robinson, 2013). Moreover, it can act as 
a lever to reduce the significant rise in extreme global inequality (IMF, 2018), while playing a 
crucial part in risk diversification and building trust in the financial system, (Cihak et Al., 
2016), something that EM and frontier economies lack. Its contribution, therefore, when it 
comes to growth (IMF, 2016), as well as in terms of alleviating poverty and inequality, cannot 
be ignored. Ideally, financial inclusion should ensure the sufficient provision of financial 
services to households, corporates, and governments, in order to improve individual (and 
overall) welfare (Beck, 2016), without jeopardizing financial stability.  
Conversely, financial stability is another priority among global policy makers (see Basel III, 
and the Financial Stability Board, for example), and macroprudential policies have re-emerged 
as an important policy tool for achieving financial stability and minimizing risks (systemic, 
mainly) created by rapid credit growth.268 However, policy trade-offs could exist between both 
financial inclusion and financial stability (see Gould and Melecky, 2017 and Tissot and 
Gadanecz, 2017). On the one hand, increased usage of macroprudential policies lowers credit 
growth in the quest to achieve financial stability,269 even though one of the less discussed 
priorities of both financial stability and macroprudential policies is the stable provision of 
financial intermediation services270  to the economy (Bank of England, 2009).  On the other, a 
rapid increase in financial inclusion (via credit expansion) can jeopardize financial stability, as 
not all borrowers may be creditworthy. The global financial crisis, triggered by the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage crisis, is the epitome of this jeopardy whereby - excessive borrowing- more 
financial inclusion- implied less financial stability. Among EMs, there was the 2010 Andhra 
Pradesh microfinance crisis (India) as a consequence of the rapid growth of microfinance 
entities in South India. Both crises provide examples of a deteriorating financial sector, or non-
financial sector balance sheets, as a result of increased financial inclusion. There is also a 
possibility that financial inclusion affects the transmission of monetary policies, adversely 
 
268 More broadly, any risks that can jeopardize the health of the banking/financial sector.  
269 Refer to Chapter Two for the relevant literature.  
270 Specifically highlighting payment services, credit intermediation and insurance against risk in the quest to circumvent 
boom-bust cycles in liquidity and credit supply in a similar manner to the global financial crisis (Galati and Moessner, 2011). 
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affecting financial stability (see Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015). Hence, there could be 
unintended, or indirect, consequences of an inappropriate implementation of policies and 
targets (Cihan et al., 2016; Ayyagari et al., 2017).   
Given the importance of managing credit cycles, particularly using macroprudential policies, 
the aim of this chapter is to examine the link between macroprudential policies and financial 
inclusion, both in Advanced Economies (AEs), and EMs. There has been an increase in the 
literature on the link between financial inclusion and financial stability (see Han and Melecky, 
2013, and Morgan and Pontines, 2014, for example). However, to our knowledge, the link 
between financial inclusion and macroprudential policies is barely examined.271 The reason we 
focus on financial inclusion is twofold: first, the rising literature on both the redistributive and 
unintended consequences of macroprudential policies272 attempts to examine their impact on-
income inequality. Second, the IMF (2018) and others, established that financial inclusion does 
reduce income inequality.273  Thus, this chapter aims to tackle several of the ongoing issue 
surrounding macroprudential policies that have not been sufficiently examined in the literature. 
Specifically, we will address the following questions:  
1. How do changes in the various types of macroprudential policies affect financial 
inclusion? 
2.  Does the impact differ among AEs and EMs? How does the level of financial 
development and institutional quality - both important factors for financial inclusion 
- influence the effectiveness of macroprudential policies?  
Given the rising literature on the redistributive impact of macroprudential policies and their 
impact on income inequality, we focus on household financial inclusion274 by examining both 
 
271Financial Development and Macroprudential Policies has been touched upon in the literature, but not the question of 
financial inclusion (Baskaya et. al., 2016)  
 Recently there is a rise in the literature that examines the redistributive impact of macroprudential policies, both theoretically 
and empirically. Empirically, the focus has been on income inequality, which we briefly touch upon given the rising literature 
on inequality and financial conclusion. The closest paper to this chapter is that of Ayyagari et al. (2017) that examines the 
impact of macroprudential policies on firm-financing and discusses the intended consequences of macroprudential policies.  
272 As macroprudential policies primarily target financial stability, the implementation of macroprudential policies may have 
spill-over effects on variables that were not primarily target. See Ayyagari et al. (2017) for an example whereby smaller firms 
adversely affected by macroprudential policies relative to larger firms. Relatedly there is a growing literature on the regulatory 
regimes for microfinance institutions, which is indirectly related to the work of Ayyagari et al. (2017).  For example, Santos 
et al. (2019) use OLS and fixed effects on credit union data in Brazil over the period 2008-2014 and finds that the number of 
clients and microcredit operations executed by Brazilian credit unions was directly linked to the 2011 regulatory changes, 
thereby increasing financial inclusion. For more information, see Cull et al. (2009), Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007).  
273 With more work done on financial deepening, for example, has been found - both theoretically and empirically to play a 
crucial role in alleviating poverty in Emerging Markets (EMs). Within this context, the largest, and most immediate effect on 
welfare is obtained as a result of boosting to access to payment services, or access to finance, more broadly, and financial 
inclusion.  (see Beck (2016))  
274 We are also working on enterprise access to finance, building on the work of Ayyagari et al. (2017), but this is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  
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aspects of financial inclusion: access and usage of financial services. Making this distinction 
is important, as access, in terms of availability of financial services does not imply their usage 
- borrowing, and depositing- by households.275 In this case, financial access, the broadest sense 
of which is owning an account at a formal financial institution, is necessary for financial 
inclusion. However, it is insufficient for using formal financial services (Pal and Pal, 2012). 
We aim to answer these questions by using various macroprudential variables that capture the 
usage of these tools, and whether these tools have been tightened or loosened, to understand 
their dynamics.  
The rest of this chapter is divided as follows: section II briefly highlights the recent trends in 
financial inclusion globally; section III reviews the relevant literature, ; section IV outlines the 
data used for our estimation; section V explains the methodology employed; section VI 
presents our results; and section VII presents our conclusions.  
2. Recent Trends in Financial Inclusion276 
EMs277 have been characterized by lower levels of financial development relative to AEs. The 
fact that most of EMs’ financial systems continue to be bank-based meant that financial 
inclusion is lower among these economies relative to AEs.278 There is also a preference for 
using informal financial services - the most basic form of which is borrowing from family - 
due to the lack of trust in the formal financial system. The high collateral requirements, low 
share of firms with credit and high borrowing costs, constrain financial inclusion efforts, 
particularly among frontier markets, even relative to EMs (Dabla-Norris, 2015).279  
In the last decade, prioritizing financial inclusion has led to newer datasets that attempt to 
capture access to finance at more disaggregated levels beyond merely account ownership, 
which still remains an important tool to gauge progress on financial inclusion. As Figure 1 
shows, accounts in financial institutions are still the main driver behind financial inclusion, 
with mobile money accounts on the rise among developing countries. Yet, this trend is not even 
(see Figure 4) whereby the pace of account ownership has been much faster in some countries 
(Egypt and India, for example) compared to others (Philippines and Mexico), remaining largely 
unchanged in EMs between 2014-2017 (World Bank, 2018). 
 
275 Pal and Pal (2012) note that usage of financial services may not occur even if there is access due to the lower cost of 
informal financial services, and the higher price of financial services relative to other goods.  
276 Data and Charts for this section are obtained from the World Bank’s 2017 Findex Database (World Bank, 2018). 
277 And frontier markets. 
278 Whose financial systems are more non-bank based.  
279 However, data on macroprudential policies in lower-income and frontier market is not available, so we exclude them from 
our estimations when splitting the sample within our robustness checks.  
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Figure 1: Financial institution accounts is the main driver behind growth in account 
ownership since 2011 
 
Source: 2017 Global Findex Database   
Despite the rise in account ownership, Figure 2 shows that poorer adults are less likely to own 
an account compared to richer adults, with a global gap of almost 13%. Specifically, 74% 
among the richest 60% globally have a bank account, whereas only 61% among the poorest 
40% of households do. This gap is even larger, at 15%, among developing countries. Figure 2 
also shows the countries with a gap in account ownership between rich and poor households, 
both among economies with high account ownership – such as Brazil and China (with a 20% 
gap between rich and poor adults), as well as those with low account ownership (such as Egypt 
and Indonesia, with a gap of also around 20%). Such gaps do not exist in high-income countries 
except for some, such as Israel (World Bank, 2018). 
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Figure 2: Lower likelihood of Poorer Adults to Own an Account, with a Larger Gap of 
Account Ownership among Developing Countries 
 
Source: 2017 Global Findex Database   
Figure 3 shows that this gap in account ownership has barely changed since 2011. Richer adults 
were 17% more likely to have an account compared to poorer adults since 2011. However, this 
gap slightly tapered among developing countries, decreasing from around 20% to around 14% 
in 2014, and stabilizing since then (World Bank, 2018). 
Figure 3: Minor Changes in the Gaps in Account Ownership Between the Richer and 
the Poorer Over Time: Adults with an Account (%) 
 
Source: 2017 Global Findex Database   
Figure 4 highlights the varying progress in financial inclusion among EMs, with the share of 
adults owning a bank account almost doubling over the period 2011-2017 (see, for example, 
the case of India and Egypt). Other countries, however, saw smaller change in account 
ownership, as in the case of Pakistan and the Philippines (World Bank, 2018). 




Source: 2017 Global Findex Database   
3. Literature Review 
Our literature review is focused on the determinants of financial inclusion as well as the 
redistributive impact of macroprudential policies. The literature on financial inclusion uses 
several types of data to capture both the determinants and the effects of financial inclusion 
(Fowowe, 2017). It is important to highlight the findings on the links between financial 
inclusion and inequality, as well as inclusion and financial stability, as our questions lie within 
the core of those two strands when linking financial inclusion to macroprudential policies.280 
We will briefly highlight the effects of financial inclusion, as well as the transmission channels- 
both direct and indirect- through which it affects financial stability and inequality. We will then 
review the literature on the determinants of financial inclusion. For more information on the 
link between macroprudential policies and inequality, as well as their theoretical 
underpinnings, see Annex II.  
a. Financial Inclusion, Inequality and Poverty Reduction 
1- Direct Channels: The availability and efficiency of payment systems facilitates 
household and entrepreneurial access to more efficient, safer, cheaper, and more 
flexible means of moving payments. This increases economic transactions and 
aggregate output, therefore directly affecting income earning opportunities, 
 
280 A detailed analysis of these links is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it well worth highlighting, to shed on the broader 
strands within which this chapter lies.  
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including the income of the poor (Odhiambo, 2009, Pradhan, 2010; Akhter et 
al., 2010, Dabla-Norris, 2015, and Beck, 2016). 281 
2- Indirect Channels: Increased financial inclusion 1) permits human capital 
accumulation (Galor and Zeira, 1993); 2) allows investments in micro-
enterprises by the poor, paving the way for higher income earning opportunities 
and eventually resulting in more incomes (Banerjee and Newman, 1993); 3) 
facilitates savings through the use of savings accounts in financial institutions, 
allowing for additional productive investments, reduces vulnerabilities to 
shocks (Dupas and Robinson, 2013), and supports investment in education 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2017); 4) permits consumption smoothing in periods of 
income or expenditure shocks (for more information, see Jappelli and Pagano, 
1989; Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997; Ludvigson, 1999);282  and 5) facilitates 
expansion of firms’ operations, capital expenditure, and innovation (OECD, 
2006), propping up job creation and poverty reduction. In fact, by offering 
alternatives to households and firms to manoeuvre income shocks, financial 
inclusion can also become a preventative tool for avoiding poverty in the first 
place (Demirgunc-Kunt et al., 2017).  
 
3.2. Transmission Channels between Financial Inclusion and Financial Stability 
1- Direct Channels: Financial inclusion can enhance the efficiency of financial 
intermediation by increasing both savings and the amount and value of transactions, 
improving investment cycles. The increased intermediation of domestic savings and 
the greater access to bank deposits boost the resilience of the deposit funding base 
of the banking sector, particularly during times of stress. This occurs by lowering 
the likelihood of correlated deposit withdrawals. Financial inclusion also improves 
banking sector liquidity (due to increased deposits) and lowers liquidity risks 
(Prasad, 2010, OCC, 2012, and Han and Melecky, 2013). All this improves the 
balance sheets of both households and corporates, as well as the banking sector.  
2- Indirect Channels: Financial inclusion enhances the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, as a greater proportion of economic activity comes under the umbrella of 
 
281 Dabla-Noris (2015) also argue that more efficient financial contracts reduce credit participation and monitoring costs (limit 
waste from financial frictions), which helps in the reallocation (or redistribution) of funds to untalented agents, lowering 
income inequality.  
282 Beck (2016) elaborates further on this by holding that access to finance, savings, and insurance - financial development, 




the interest rate channel, and financial exclusion impedes the transmission 
mechanism of an inflation targeting policy, potentially lowering inflation (Mehrotra 
and Yetman, 2015, Lenka and Bairwa, 2016, and Brownbridge et Al., 2017).283 This 
is particularly significant as we argue that the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policies in financially underdeveloped markets is dampened, as financial inclusion 
levels are small in these economies.284  Also, since informal financial services could 
constitute a source of financial instability (Cull et Al., 2012),285 reducing access to 
such informal services may lead to lower financial instability.  
It is important to note that the literature on financial inclusion and financial stability is still in 
its infancy; an opposing, though less common view also exists, according to which increased 
inclusion reduces financial stability (Mehrotra and Yetman, 2015) if inclusion leads to rapid 
credit growth286. There is also the argument that the link between financial inclusion and 
financial stability depends on the measure of financial inclusion under consideration.287 
3.3. Determinants of Financial Inclusion 
The literature on financial inclusion highlights several types of data that capture the 
determinants - and effects - of financial inclusion (Fowowe, 2017). First, there are cross-
sectional studies that combine household or firm-level data with macroeconomic indicators of 
financial development, as well as inclusion (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, Beck et 
al.,2006 and 2008b, and Demirguc-Kunt et al.,2006). Second, there are country-specific studies 
that merge firm-level data as well as access data with financial development (Butler and 
Cornaggia, 2011) and Girma et al., 2008). Third, some studies use firm-level data288 on several 
indicators that capture access to financial markets (Beck et al., 2005, Ayyagari et al., 
2008, Dinh et al., 2010, Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier, 2010, Aterido et al., 2011, and 
Fowowe, 2017). The first set of studies are of the highest interest to this thesis; however, we 
touch upon some of the main findings of the other two sets, for reference purposes. Although 
the impact of financial inclusion is beyond the scope of this analysis, it is important to note that 
 
283 Related to this is the argument of Granville and Mallick (2009) that inflation targeting is beneficial for financial stability.  
284 Along those lines, Boar et el. (2017) held that macroprudential policies are more effective in the presence of more financial 
development.  
285Cull et Al. (2012) give the example of pyramid schemes that are set up as means of informal savings and investment 
opportunities could trigger social, and political unrest, as well a lack of confidence in the traditional banking system, already 
a common characteristic among EMs, and frontier economies.  
286 Particularly if it leads to greater bank exposure to low quality/not creditworthy borrowers. 
287 For more information on the link between financial stability and financial inclusion, see Aiyar et al. (2016), Sahay et al. 
(2015), Morgan and Pontines (2014), and Lopez and Winkler (2016). The latter is particularly interesting as they show how 
financial inclusion could have helped moderate the credit crunch during the global financial crisis.  
288 Mainly from the World Bank - based on firm responses (Fowowe, 2017). 
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despite the recent increase in the research on this topic and the fact that financial inclusion is a 
top policy agenda, there is still an unclear link between financial inclusion and macroeconomic 
outcomes (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017).   
Until recently, and mainly due to limited data availability,289 most empirical research focused 
on financial development290 rather than financial inclusion and income inequality.291 As the 
literature on the determinants of financial inclusion is still at a relatively early stage,292 financial 
development was assumed to automatically lead to financial inclusion. This, however, is not 
necessarily the case. We argue that financial development is necessary but insufficient for 
financial inclusion. Relatedly, Evans (2015) holds that while financial development has 
increased over the last decade among African countries, the breadth and coverage of formal 
finance is still well below their peers.293 In this context, most studies on financial inclusion 
focus primarily on EMs, and frontier markets, using mainly country-specific data rather than 
cross-country analysis.294  
Once again, financial inclusion and financial development are two distinct concepts, both of 
which are of huge importance, with existing overlaps.  Financial inclusion is normally captured 
by ownership of an account by households (and enterprises,) either at a financial institution, or 
even through a mobile money service provider. 295  Financial development, however, is 
measured by broader macro-level indicators that capture both bank and non-bank size, as well 
as health and efficiency of the financial sector.296 Financial development is also a necessary 
condition for financial inclusion, but is insufficient if financing constraints prevent households 
and firms from using the available financial services.  Among the first studies to address the 
question of financial inclusion beyond the greater scope of financial development was that of 
Beck et al. (2007b). Using data for banking sector outreach297 for 99 countries over the period 
 
289 Data collection efforts on financial inclusion began around 2004 (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017) 
290 Financial development is a process by which funds are efficiently channelled from savers to borrowers, by reducing 
information, and transaction costs. A lot of work during the last decade has attempted to measure financial development. For 
more information, see the World Bank (2008). Common indicators that have been used to capture financial development 
typically cantered on indicators related to financial depth, and efficiency. For more information on financial development, and 
how it is measured, see World Economic Forum (2008) 
291 For more information, see King and Levine 1993; Beck et al. 2000; Clark et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2007; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2009.  
292 The more common strand of literature focuses on financial development, while access is lumped as part of it.  
293 Other EMs and frontier markets. 
294 As is more commonly the case, with the broader literature on financial development.    
295 Demirguc-Kunt (2017) elaborates further that accounts can be either a deposit or transaction account to be used to make 
and receive payments, store, and save money. Inclusion as such also includes access to credit for borrowing purposes, and the 
use of insurance products to better manage financial risks. 
296 For a comprehensive list of variables comprising financial development, see the World Economic Forum (2008). Financial 
development generally refers to the size and depth of an economy’s financial markets, both banks and non-banks (equity, bond 
markets, insurance markets, as well as shadow banks as examples).  
297 Covering both access and use of financial services indicators. 
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2003-2004, they found that institutional quality affects financial inclusion positively, while the 
degree of government ownership of banks has a negative effect.298 299 Other determinants of 
financial inclusion include GDP per capita, governance, and the institutional quality and the 
regulatory environment.  (Rojas-Suarez, 2010, Karlan et al., 2013, Park and Mercado, 2015, 
and Allen et al., 2016,). 
Some of the most interesting studies on the determinants of financial inclusion include that of 
Sarma and Pais (2008), who employ data for 49 countries to study the determinants of financial 
inclusion. They find that higher GDP per capita, physical infrastructure300, telephone and 
internet subscriptions, financial development, and adult literacy have a positive and significant 
impact on financial inclusion. However, a higher percentage of rural population, a high share 
of foreign bank ownership, non-performing loans, as well as highly capitalized banking 
systems - as measured by the capital asset ratio (CAR) - were inversely associated with 
financial inclusion. The authors conclude that there is an element of cautiousness associated 
with lending when it comes to banks with a high CAR.   
Honohan (2008) uses financial access data for 160 countries within an OLS context and finds 
that increased mobile phone penetration 301  and better institutional quality (as well as 
governance) are positively correlated with their access variables - the number of bank accounts 
per 100 adults - even when per capita income is controlled for. Another important factor is 
greater proximity to financial intermediaries, which could also be in line with Honohan and 
King’s (2009) result that mobile phone penetration matters for higher household financial 
penetration ratios. Generally, levels of economic development and financial inclusion are 
highly correlated (Sarma and Pais 2011), suggesting that for more developed economies, fewer 
unbanked households302 are to be expected.  
Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot’s (2012) study examines the link between financial development 
and access to finance, and specifically whether banking and capital market characteristics can 
increase banks’ ability to increase credit to the private sector while boosting financial inclusion. 
Using data for 138 countries over the period 2002-2009, they employed GMM and panel vector 
 
298 Other control variables that had a positive impact on inclusion - or outreach as the authors refer to it - have been the log of 
GDP per capita, as well as indicators capturing infrastructure, and communications (telephone mainlines).  
299 However, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2015) highlight the role that governments can play in fostering financial inclusion, by 
transforming government payments from cash into bank (and ever more recently into mobile) accounts.  
300 Such as a country’s network of paved roads. 
301 Related to this is the rising literature on the role of digital payments in raising income and promoting financial inclusion. 
For more information, see Beck (2016). 
302 Or more financial inclusion, and less financial exclusion. 
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error correction models.303 They found that financial development – evident by more developed 
equity markets – increases access to finance as they offer opportunities for banks to develop 
tools to increase access to their supply and services. They also found that a larger banking 
sector size hinders access to finance, and smaller banks with strong proximity to their clients 
are better for financial inclusion.  The health, as well as efficiency of the banking sector is 
hugely important in terms of access to finance, particularly lower NPLs and higher bank capital 
to asset ratio, and lower fees on deposit accounts. Institutional quality was also found to be a 
determinant for access to finance, and they held that an increase in Tier 1 bank capital asset 
ratio had a negative impact on credit. This implied that while higher capital requirements were 
effective in lowering credit boom related vulnerabilities, lower credit expansion meant lower 
financial inclusion. It is very important to note that Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot’s (2012) paper 
is one of the few - to our knowledge - that linked financial inclusion to macroprudential policy. 
Beyond capital market development, the authors find that macroprudential regulation304 (as 
measured by tier 1 banking capital asset ratios as a proxy for capital requirements) is important 
for financial stability; however, it lowers financial inclusion, via lower credit extensions. 
Another strand of the literature on financial inclusion focuses on country or region-specific 
studies. Pal and Pal (2012) employed maximum likelihood in the 35 States and Union 
Territories in India and found that per capita income is an important determinant of households’ 
propensity to use formal financial services. They also found that the increased availability of 
banking services boosts financial inclusion, especially among the poor. Other determinants of 
financial inclusion include education, employment status, and household size. In particular, 
household income and employment status have the strongest effect on financial inclusion in 
urban areas in India.   
Fungáčová and Weill (2015) use the 2011 World Bank Global Findex database to study the 
determinants of financial inclusion in China, compared to other BRICS countries. They find 
that higher income, improved education, and being an older male are linked to an increased use 
of formal accounts and formal credit in China. Educational attainment and income tend to affect 
the use of alternative sources of borrowing.305 Tuesta et al. (2015) used a series of probit 
 
303 Credit results are beyond the scope of this chapter, so we only report the financial inclusion related results.  
304 The authors held that more regulation is important to lower the likelihood of boom-bust cycles, especially in credit lending. 
A 1% increase in tier 1 banking to capital asset ratio has an adverse impact on credit, Thus increases in capital requirements - 
while efficient in lowering credit boom related vulnerabilities - lower credit growth.  
305 Borrowing from friends and family, borrowing from an employer, or another private lender.  
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models306 to study the determinants of financial inclusion in Argentina, and found that the level 
of education, income, and age are all important determinants of inclusion.   
Oyelami et al. (2017) studied the determinants of financial inclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa 
using Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL), and their proxy for financial inclusion 
were 1) depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 adults, and 2) borrowers from commercial 
banks per 1,000 adults. They found that financial inclusion is significantly influenced by both 
supply and demand side factors. Demand side factors include the level of income and literacy 
(primary school enrolment), while the supply side factors are the interest rates (both deposit 
and lending), and ATM usage as a proxy for bank innovation. GDP per capita was not found 
to have a positive impact on financial inclusion, which contradicts some of the earlier findings 
in the literature (Honohan and Beck,2007) and Sarma & Pais, 2011 for example).  307 
The determinants of financial inclusion in advanced economies have only recently become a 
subject of interest among policy makers and academics. Ampudia, and Ehrmann (2017) use 
household-level data for 14-euro area countries and the US, over the period 2009-2010, to study 
the determinants and effects of being unbanked in these areas. Using a probit model and a 
propensity score matching approach, they find that financial exclusion is common among low-
income, unemployed households, as well as households with low education. They also find that 
being banked significantly increases net wealth compared to those unbanked, with a gap of 
around €74,000 for the euro area, and USD 42,000 for the United States.308 Education, lower 
unemployment, and government policies that encourage the recipients of transfer payments to 
open bank accounts were found to be contributing to financial inclusion.  
4.  DATA 
Our analysis addresses financial inclusion using both measures that capture access to, and 
usage of, financial services. For variables related to financial access, we focus on ownership of 
an account, availability of bank branches, and ATM machines. We also capture access using 
variables that combine access to financial markets and financial institutions, as calculated by 
the IMF’s Financial Development Database (Svirydzenka, 2016), as a broader measure of 
financial access reflecting access to bond and equity markets. The IMF’s Financial 
 
306 The authors hold that probit models allow the analysis of existing correlations between financial inclusion and certain 
variables of interest.  
307 Other control variables GDP per capita, CPI, institutional quality, trade openness (sum of exports and imports as a share of 
GDP) to capture the degree of international openness, and a measure of human capital captured by the logarithm of gross 
secondary enrolment rate (Zahonogo, 2017) 
308 This wealth difference is potentially caused by the fact that banked households are have a significantly higher potential to 
accumulate wealth by owning their primary residence. 
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Development Database includes bank branches and ATMs as their proxy for financial 
institutions access, while financial markets access is proxied by the percentage of market 
capitalization outside of the top-10 largest companies and the total number of issuers of debt 
(see Table 3 in Annex I for further details).  For variables related to usage of financial services, 
we use the number of borrowers and depositors with commercial banks per 1000 adults.  
We follow the literature for our explanatory variables and include the unemployment rate, 
education (proxied by secondary enrolment), urbanization, and openness in our baseline 
regressions. We also include a host of additional explanatory variables for robustness purposes. 
For our macroprudential variables, we follow Cerutti et al. (2015) and Shim et al. (2013) to 
capture the various macroprudential tools and their usage within a loosening and tightening 
context. Cerutti et al. (2015) use dummy variables to reflect the usage (1) of macroprudential 
policies versus their absence (0). Shim et al. (2013) use a positive scale to capture the number 
of tightening instances (2 for example, if the macroprudential tool of interest was tightened 
twice in the period of interest), a negative number to present a loosening instance (-3, if there 
were three loosening instances), and 0 if there was no change.  We supplement those databases 
with actual data on reserve requirements and provisioning to capture the magnitude of change 
of those two macroprudential policies rather than simply the use of dummy variables. The full 
list of macroprudential variables are presented in Table 4 in Annex I, reflecting the 32 measures 
employed.309  
The dataset is constructed as a cross-country panel310 using annual data over the period 2000-
2014. Beyond the macroprudential tools and the IMF Financial Development Database, the 
rest of our dependent variables and explanatory variables are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators database and the World Bank Financial Access Survey. The data set 




309 The 32 measures are not distinct. Most of those from Shim et al. (2013) are included in Cerutti’s (2015) database, but the 
former reflects instances of tightening and loosening, while the latter only has dummies to reflect their usage. We supplement 
these with actual RRRs to reflect the magnitude of changes in RRRs and their impacts. A similar effort was conducted for the 
collection of LTV ratios and provisioning, but data inconsistencies (including short time series availability) yielded 
inconclusive results for these variables. 
310 We also have cross-sectional results using ordinary least squares, and two staged least squares, but we focus on panel 
regressions in this chapter.  
311 We are cognizant that data on macroprudential regulation on frontier markets are not commonly available and most of them 
get dropped out of the sample, out of an original sample including 114 countries and an extensive effort to collect data on 
macroprudential policies for these countries. Robustness checks are thus only conducted for AEs and EMs.  
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5. Model Specification and Methodology 
The analysis of the relationship between macroprudential policies and financial inclusion is 
divided into two parts. First, we study the impact of employing various macroprudential 
policies on financial inclusion using measures to reflect access and usage of financial services. 
Second, we examine how financial development and institutional quality affect the relationship 
between macroprudential policies and financial inclusion.   
To analyze the impact of macroprudential policies, the following dynamic panel regression 
model of financial inclusion is used:  
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = α +  ρ𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +  βXi,t + δ𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑙i,t + εi,t               (1) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t= 2000,…T 
 
where 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡denotes the financial inclusion variable of interest as described below, 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1  is the autoregressive (lag) term of order one,
312  Xit is the matrix of 
independent variables which includes the unemployment rate (%), urban population (% of total 
population), secondary school enrolment (% of gross), and openness. The variable Toolit 
represents the different macroprudential tools used by country i at time t, with variables such 
as the RRR, the LTV ratio, DTI ratio used inter-changeably to capture the impact of 
macroprudential policies, and εit is the error term of the regression.  
Our first measure of  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is the principal component of the IMF’s Financial 
Institutions Access variable and the Financial Markets Access variable as defined by 
Svirydzenka (2016) in the IMF’s index of financial development. In this case, Financial 
Institutions Access is a proxy of bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 
adults, while Financial Markets Access is a proxy of the percentage of market capitalization 
outside of the top-10 largest companies and the total number of issuers of debt (domestic, 
external, financial, and non-financial corporations). This variable aims to capture the ability of 
households and corporates to access financial services (Svirydzenka, 2017).  
Our second measure of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 takes into account the number of ATMs, bank branches, 
and bank accounts,313 by solely focusing on access to financial institutions irrespective of 
financial markets, which was already captured in our first measure. To capture usage of 
 
312 Lagged values are included to account for causality. 
313 Also, calculated as the Principal Component Analysis of ATMs, bank branches, and bank accounts. 
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financial services, our third measure of 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 include measures that capture borrowers 
and users. Specifically, we compute the principal component of borrowers at commercial banks 
per 1,000 adults, and depositors at commercial banks per 1,000 adults. We then re-estimate the 
equation for depositors and borrowers separately to understand the determinants of each 
variable separately. We thus end up with five dependent variables all of which capturing 
financial inclusion.314 include the principal component of borrowers and depositors to capture 
usage of financial services broadly, in line with financial access.   
The hypothesis tested here is that macroprudential policies significantly affect financial 
inclusion. In other words, a macroprudential tightening (loosening) for country i will affect the 
different types of financial inclusion in our panel. Using the datasets from Cerutti et al. (2015), 
Shim et al. (2013), as well as actual data for the reserve requirements, we test for the 
effectiveness of a total of 32 macroprudential tools that capture the presence of macroprudential 
policies, as well as the ways in which they operate (in a tightening vs. loosening manner).   
For our panel regression, Equation 1 and its variations - using alternative dependent variables 
- will be estimated using the dynamic panel system General Method of Moments estimator 
(GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, 
Bond, and Windmeijer (2000). The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Least Square 
Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimators cannot be used in the case of a dynamic panel data model. 
This is because the former would result in biased estimators, while the latter would result in 
inconsistent estimators (Hsiao, 2003). More specifically, the presence of a lagged endogenous 
variable suggests that correlation will exist between it and the error term, resulting in biased 
estimators; there is thus strong evidence suggesting that financial inclusion depends on its lags. 
Therefore, and as the GMM circumvents correlation problems (Yaffee, 2003), it will 
consistently estimate the dynamic panel data model (Kitazawa, 2003). 
To overcome the bias problems of the difference GMM methodology, it is important to follow 
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996), Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and 
Bond (1991). We estimate Equation 1 using the dynamic panel System GMM, as elaborated 
by Arellano and Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer 
 
314 Once again, our dependent variables are 1) Principal component of financial markets access and financial institutions 
access; 2) principal component of ATMs, bank branches, and bank accounts to capture access only to financial institutions; 3) 
principal component of borrowers and depositors with commercial banks to capture usage of financial services; 4) depositors 
with commercial banks per 1000 adults, and 5) borrowers from commercial banks per 1000 adults. Variables 4 and 5 comprise 
variable 3.  
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(2000).315  This is achieved by combining the standard set of moment conditions in first-
difference and lagged levels as instruments with an additional set of moments conditions 
derived from the equation in levels. Thus, removing the unobserved fixed effects, we take the 
first difference of Equation 1 as follows: 
(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1)
= α +  ρ(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1) +  β(Xi,t − Xi,t−1) + δ(𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑙i,t
− δ𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑙i,t−1)  +  (εi,t − εi,t−1 )                                               (2)  
 
Within the literature of financial development and access, Zahongo (2017) highlights the 
importance of using System GMM as a way to control for country specific effects and the 
endogeneity issue that may arise between the control variables and the endogenous variables 
(poverty, in their case).  Ahamed and Mallick (2017) highlight the importance of using system 
GMM in this context, where the lagged variables are used as instruments, thus optimizing the 
efficiency of the estimates with more moment conditions. Furthermore, the System GMM 
methodology assumes that the correlation between the dependent variable and the error term 
and the set of the independent variables and the error term is as follows: 
𝐸[△ 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0, 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑇 
           𝐸[△ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0, 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 2,… , 𝑇                                (3) 
 
where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the set of all the explanatory variables of Equation (1). In this context, this 
methodology offers a vigorous solution to the endogeneity bias, while being more rigorous in 
terms of measurement errors relative to cross-sectional regressions. Moreover, it continues to 
be consistent in spite of the possibility of endogenous explanatory variables, since E[Xt εs] ≠ 0 
for s ≤ t, if the instrumental variables are appropriately lagged (Pontines and Morgan, 2014). 
The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation is reported under each table. The null hypothesis 
assumes no autocorrelation, and the test for AR(2), which is normally more important, as it 
detects autocorrelation in levels (Neaime and Gaysset, 2018). We also check both the Sargan 
and Hansen tests to confirm that our model is correctly specified.  
 
315 Other papers examining financial inclusion - within a financial stability context - that also employed System-GMM include 
Pontines and Morgan (2014).  
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Given the varying levels of institutional quality and financial development between AEs and 
EMs, we divide into two groups based on the IMF country definition of AEs and EMs, to see 
how the results differ. Furthermore, we re-estimate Equation 1 and its variations by introducing 
measures of financial development and institutional quality316 interacted with macroprudential 
policies. This will help us understand how the results would differ in the presence of those two 
factors. Thus, Equation 1 will be re-estimated, also using Sytem GMM, as follows 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = α +  ρ𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +  βXi,t + δ𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑙i,t  + ϑ(FinDevi,t ∗ Tooli,t)
+  εi,t               (4) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t= 2000,…T 
 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = α +  ρ𝐹𝑖𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +  βXi,t + δ𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑙i,t  + ϑ(Governancei,t ∗ Tooli,t)
+  εi,t          (5) 
                            i = 1, 2,…N, t= 2000,…T 
Whereby FinDevi,t in Equation 4 is our measure of financial development, calculated as a 
principal component of two variables that comprise the financial depth and financial efficiency 
within a country’s institutions and markets. These have been obtained from the IMF (2017) 
Financial Development Database (Svirydzenka, 2016). The Financial Depth indicator is a 
proxy for financial depth within financial institutions and financial markets, and is comprised 
of  private sector credit to GDP, pension fund assets to GDP, mutual fund assets to GDP, stock 
market capitalization to GDP, stocks traded to GDP, international debt securities of 
government to GDP, total debt securities of financial corporations to GDP, and total debt 
securities of non-financial corporations to GDP. The financial institutions efficiency indicators 
reflects efficiency also within financial institutions and financial markets, and is a proxy of the 
net interest margin, lending-deposits spread, non-interest income to total income, overhead 
costs to total assets, return on assets, return on equity., and the stock market turnover ratio 
(stocks traded to capitalization) (Svirydzenka, 2016). The IMF Financial Development 
Database provides an aggregate measure for financial institutions depth, financial institutions 
efficiency, as well as financial markets depth and efficiency. Once again, we calculate their 
 
316 We only report the interacted terms between financial development and the various macroprudential tools, as well as the 
governance and macroprudential tools, as this is our main interest rather than the coefficient of each variable alone.  
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principal component analysis; all of them should represent a country’s level of financial 
development.     
For institutional quality, we calculate a principal component analysis to capture the World 
Bank’s six governance indicators that we use as a proxy for institutional quality. Variables in 
this database include rule of law, political stability, government effectiveness, voice and 
accountability, regulatory quality, and control of corruption.  
After conducting our System GMM estimations for equations 4 and 5, we report the total effect 
of governance and financial development, to capture the impact of macroprudential policies in 
the presence of either improved governance or financial development. This is estimated by 
adding up the coefficient δ to the coefficient 𝜗, in equations 4 and 5 above, and their statistical 
significance is determined by their variances and covariances. 
6. Results 
Once again, we employed a total of 32 macroprudential policies- capturing their usage, as well 
as instances of loosening/tightening- to test for their impact on financial inclusion.317 We 
examined several aspects of financial inclusion to capture both financial access and usage of 
financial services.  We begin by highlighting our baseline regressions for the full sample, then 
we outline our results after splitting the sample into AEs and EMs, and then we proceed to 
discuss the role of institutional quality, proxied by governance indicators, and financial 
development in affecting the role of macroprudential policies. 
6.1.Baseline Regression Results 
As was the case in the previous chapters, macroprudential policies yielded mixed results in 
terms of their impact on financial inclusion, with a number of insignificant results. In this 
section, we only report the macroprudential policies that yielded significant results - either 
positive or negative - on financial inclusion.318 Tables (1) and (2) summarize319 the impact of 
the various macroprudential tools on financial inclusion- both access and usage- for our full 
sample, and when our sample is divided into AEs and EMs, seeing that the levels of financial 
inclusion in advanced economies surpasses those of EMs.320 
 
 
317The full list of macroprudential tools and a description of how they operate is available in the Annex to this chapter.  
318 The rest of our results - the insignificant ones - are available upon request. This is done in the interest of time/space.  
319 This table - and this section as a whole - only displays the significant results for our regressions. Additional results of the 
full (and insignificant) are available in the annex.  
320 Annex VII displays the results of our sample split into EMs and advanced economies. 
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Table (1): Summary of Results: Access to Financial Services 
 
In terms of access, the use of provisioning as a macroprudential tool is the only tool that has a 
positive impact on access to financial services, within our entire sample, while tighter liquidity 
requirements and debt to income ratios lowered financial access. On dividing our sample 
between AEs and EMs markets, we see a slightly different pattern. For AEs, with already high 
levels of financial inclusion - and financial development overall - macroprudential policies do 
not contribute to increased financial access - captured by increased accounts, branches, or ATM 
machines, an expected result. Tighter provisioning, and tighter RRRs lowered access, however, 
in this case.  
For EMs, dynamic provisioning appeared to reduce financial access, while provisioning321 and 
RRRs increased access.322 One striking observation is that both provisioning and RRRs had a 
positive impact on financial access in EMs, and an adverse impact on access in AEs. Given the 
different levels of financial access - and broader financial development - between EMs and 
advanced economies, we thus are seeing differences in the results between both sub-groups. 
One broad conclusion we can draw from these results is that macroprudential policies in EMs 
- which tend to be financially underdeveloped - improves access, and it decreases it in AEs, 
with already high levels of access and financial intermediation.  
In terms of usage, Table (2) shows that most of the macroprudential policies employed had a 
positive impact on usage of financial services across our full sample- both in terms of the 
number of borrowers and depositors- and upon dividing our sample into EMs and AEs.  For 
the full sample, only taxes imposed on financial institutions only adversely affected the number 
 
321 If not applied countercyclically. 
322 Similar to Pearlman (2015).  

















Limits on Foreign 
Currency Loans
Emerging MarketsFull Sample Advanced Economies
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of borrowers.  This could be a result of the fact that financial institutions pass on the additional 
taxes as fees on borrowers. For AEs, borrower-Targeted Instruments (LTV ratios and debt to 
income ratios) positively affected usage of financial services, particularly depositors.  No 
instrument appeared to adversely affect the usage of financial services among AEs. For EMs, 
tighter weights, and the use of RRRs had a positive impact on the usage of financial inclusion, 
while LTV caps, and dynamic provisioning lowered the usage of financial services.   
Table (2): Summary of Results: Usage (Borrowing and Depositing) of Financial Services 
Full Sample Advanced Economies Emerging Markets 

























RRRs (Domestic or 
FX);  








          
We now proceed to analyze the abovementioned results in more detail. Table (3) presents our 
baseline regression with the dependent variable, Financial Access323, which captures the ability 
of both individuals and enterprises to access financial services.  Once again, this variable is the 
principal component of the IMF’s Financial Institutions Access variable and Financial Markets 
Access variable to capture the ability to access the different financial institutions and market 
within an economy. Column (1) shows our baseline regression where Financial Access is 
regressed on its lag, which as expected is positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
unemployment rate displays a negative relationship, also as expected with financial inclusion, 
whereby a 1% increase in unemployment lowers financial access by 0.1-0.2%. This is a similar 
 
323 Financial access and inclusion will be used interchangeably in this section.  
211 
 
result to Ampudia, and Ehrmann (2017) whereby unemployment increases financial exclusion. 
Both urbanization and secondary enrolment exert a positive and significant impact on financial 
inclusion, although their magnitude is small. Openness - contrary to the literature (Zahonogo, 
2017) has a negative and significant impact on financial inclusion, but in only one of the 
regressions in this table.  
Columns (2)-(8) introduces various macroprudential measures to this regression, whereas the 
tightening of the debt to income ratio and the liquidity ratios lowered financial inclusion, in 
Columns (2) and (3). Any variable preceded by LT (Loosening/tightening) represents a variable 
that captures the change in the policy tools as described by Shim et al. (2013). Specifically, we 
find that a one-notch tightening in the debt-to-income ratio - which normally happens to restrict 
the provision of housing credit - lowers financial inclusion by 0.9%. The idea behind this tool 
is that financial authorities stipulate either 1) a specific percent of the borrower’s monthly 
income as the maximum amount of monthly repayments on a home loan; 2) a specific multiple 
of the household’s income as the minimum debt-service - to-debt ratio; or 3) a shortening of 
the maturity of mortgage contracts or abolishing any preferential interest rates for mortgage 
loans (Shim et Al., 2013). This result supports Shim et Al’s (2013) argument any of the above-
mentioned actions that would raise (or tighten) the debt to income ratio, raises the debt 
repayments of borrowers, which forces them to borrow less. We also find that a one notch 
tightening in the liquidity requirement - the minimum ratio for highly liquid assets that ensure 
that banks can endure episodes of severe cash outflows in situations of distress in Column (2) 
also lowers financial inclusion by 1%.  
Similarly, tighter liquidity appears to have a slightly larger impact on inclusion, whereby a one 
notch tightening in the liquidity ratio reduces financial inclusion by 1%. Generally, tighter 
liquidity requirements imply that banks are required to hold an adequate stock of high quality 
liquid assets to mitigate instances of distressed funding, which could adversely affect the 
volume of lending (Berben et al., 2010).324 Column (5) introduces a measure that captures the 
dynamic provisioning, which shows that tighter provisioning - when introduced in a 
countercyclical manner - increases financial inclusion. 325  Thus, as dynamic provisioning 
reduces the procyclicality in the financial sector (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-Herrero, 2010), 
 
324 Ultimately affecting access to finance. 
325 Recall that the conventional loan-loss provisioning is tied to loan delinquency, and that implies that in good times, the 
banking sector does not to need to hold provisions, while in bad times, they need to increase provisioning once delinquencies 
appear. Traditionally, this lowers their available capital and their ability to extend lending (Fernandez de Lis and Garcia-
Herrero, 2010).  
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the higher the financial inclusion, by 0.6%.326  It is important to note that Column (4) introduces 
an alternative measure of provisionings not implemented countercyclically, and this variable 
was not significant in affecting access to financial services. Columns (2), (3), and (5) show that 
the statistical significance of the other expalanatory variables- except for openness- is 
preserved with the introduction of macroprudential tools. 
 
326 All other measures in Table (1) are not significant. 
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Table (3): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Financial Access Variable (PCA of Financial Markets Access and Financial Institutions Access to capture overall access within an economy) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES finacc finacc Finacc finacc finacc finacc finacc finacc 
         
AR(1) 0.950*** 0.931*** 0.949*** 0.930*** 0.939*** 0.947*** 0.931*** 0.977*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0244) (0.0141) (0.0226) (0.0154) (0.0232) (0.0194) (0.0173) 
Unemployment -0.00136*** -0.00134** -0.00134** -0.00160** -0.00143*** -0.00100* -0.00173*** -0.000850** 
 (0.000492) (0.000658) (0.000618) (0.000669) (0.000428) (0.000561) (0.000581) (0.000346) 
Secondary enrolment 0.000257** 0.000301* 0.000210 0.000327* 0.000359*** 0.000211 0.000337** 0.000117 
 (9.94e-05) (0.000162) (0.000141) (0.000168) (0.000112) (0.000162) (0.000149) (8.29e-05) 
Urbanization  0.000247** 0.000336** 0.000341** 0.000317** 0.000198 0.000298* 0.000334*** 0.000156 
 (0.000111) (0.000142) (0.000131) (0.000151) (0.000134) (0.000159) (0.000118) (0.000128) 
Openness -3.19e-05 1.28e-05 -1.88e-06 1.61e-05 -2.75e-05 4.19e-07 3.48e-06 -3.45e-05* 
 (2.32e-05) (3.11e-05) (2.38e-05) (2.96e-05) (2.18e-05) (3.16e-05) (2.66e-05) (2.04e-05) 
lt_liquidity   -0.0102*       
  (0.00598)       
lt_DTI   -0.00935*      
   (0.00515)      
lt_Provisioning    0.0130  0.0115   
    (0.0111)  (0.0130)   
Dynamic provisioning     0.00652* 0.00638   
     (0.00360) (0.0133)   
lt_Exposure limits       0.00884  
       (0.00632)  
RRR (actual)        0.000510 
        (0.000369) 
         
Observations 950 542 542 542 661 446 542 893 
Number of code 100 55 55 55 81 51 55 97 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           


























  0.881 
 




Beyond these measure all other macroprudential policies included in this Table (1) were not 
significant. Recall that our baseline regression includes our entire sample, including both 
advanced economies, and emerging markets, whose levels of financial inclusion, and more 
broadly financial development varies greatly. The additional macroprudential tools included in 
this table were not significant.327   
Annex (1) contains four additional tables which build on the previous model introducing 
additional macroprudential policies - both in terms of presence (dummy variables to reflect 
whether or not they are in place in the Table, and the actual loosening or tightening variables 
(whereby each tool is denoted by LT) - but none of these policies were of significance. 
Macroprudential policies in these table were a combination of RRRs, credit growth limits, 
housing related taxes, risk weights from Shim et al. (2013), as well as Cerutti et al. (2015)’s 
overall macroprudential index, as well as indices capturing instruments that target the 
borrowers versus those targeting the financial institutions.328  
The estimation results of the Hansen test for all the estimation tables in this chapter confirm 
that the p-value is large, ensuring the validity of the overidentifying restrictions, and cannot be 
rejected. These results warrant the correct selection of instruments in such a way that they are 
not correlated with the error term. The results also confirm that there are no issues of omitting 
imperative variables from the model, ensuring that the chosen models are correctly specified. 
Table (2) introduces an alternative financial inclusion measure that is comprised of the 
principal component analysis of bank branches, ATM machines, and accounts. This purely 
focuses on access to financial institutions, whereas the results of Table (1) includes access to 
financial markets as well.  It is a replica of Table (1) using a slightly different dependent 
variable, and the results show the insignificance of the previous macroprudential policies, while 
this time, the significant variable has been the variable that captures provisioning, a similar 
result to that displayed in Table (1). In this case, provisioning as a macroprudential tool is found 
to increase financial inclusion by 9% (relative to 0.6% in Table (1)) suggesting the importance 




327 Additional variables tested in this regression but were not significant  
328 Borrower targeted instruments in this case represent the debt to income ratio and the LTV Cap, while the financial targeted 
instruments represent all other instruments; dynamic provisioning, the countercyclical capital buffer/requirement, leverage 
ratio, capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), concentration limits, countercyclical reserve 




Table (2): Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Financial Access Variable (PCA of Bank Branches, Accounts, and ATMs per 100,000 people; % of 
Adults) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES         
        
AR(1) 0.935*** 0.957*** 0.966*** 0.943*** 0.946*** 1.021*** 0.956*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0369) (0.0390) (0.0123) (0.0322) (0.0153) (0.0171) 
Unemployment -1.396 -0.837 0.723 0.693 -0.836 -2.576* 0.382 
 (0.990) (0.663) (0.805) (0.524) (0.644) (1.360) (0.354) 
Secondary_enrollment 0.356* 0.157 -0.00248 0.00515 0.222 -0.0255 0.0405 
 (0.209) (0.155) (0.149) (0.142) (0.161) (0.209) (0.101) 
Urbanization 0.0653 0.131 0.214 0.238 -0.0652 0.387* -0.00815 
 (0.246) (0.249) (0.178) (0.144) (0.158) (0.197) (0.118) 
Openness 0.181** 0.174** 0.179** 0.139** 0.204*** -0.00454 0.164*** 
 (0.0738) (0.0801) (0.0843) (0.0599) (0.0722) (0.0481) (0.0522) 
Taxes -31.72       
 (29.34)       
Cg329  -19.15      
  (17.32)      
RRR   -13.39     
   (17.96)     
RRRR (change)    -3.806    
    (3.446)    
Interbank Exposure 
limits 
    13.75   
     (13.46)   
lt_LTV      -3.739  
      (7.123)  
Provisioning       0.0932*** 
       (0.0343) 
        
Observations 198 198 269 248 198 85 234 
Number of code 42 42 47 45 42 19 43 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
Order 2 p-value                               
 
0.071                 
0.630                 
 













0.141              




Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table (3) introduces an alternative measure of financial inclusion representing the usage of 
financial services. This variable represents the principal component of borrowers and 
depositors (per 1000 adults) within the financial system.  In line with the results in table (2), 
Column (7) shows that a one notch tightening in provisioning increased usage of financial 






329 Limits on domestic currency loans 
330 Annex 4 displays the results of the remainder of the macroprudential tools and their impact on usage of financial services.  
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Table (3): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Depositors and Borrowers from the Banking Sector (Principal Component Analysis of Both 
depositors and borrowers with commercial banks per 1000 adults) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
AR(1) 1.014*** 1.007*** 1.002*** 0.987*** 1.002*** 1.009*** 1.016*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0297) (0.0190) (0.0209) (0.0263) (0.0181) (0.0262) 
Unemployment 0.518 0.746 0.274 1.558 0.940 -3.420 1.107 
 (2.716) (1.848) (1.494) (1.373) (0.914) (3.054) (2.489) 
Secondary enrolment -0.391 -0.387 -0.699 -0.417 -0.291 -0.171 -0.570 
 (0.768) (0.449) (0.477) (0.288) (0.342) (0.400) (0.401) 
Urbanization 0.935 0.760* 0.657* 0.997*** 1.012* 1.122** 0.594 
 (0.633) (0.406) (0.368) (0.309) (0.548) (0.404) (0.407) 
Openness -0.0814 0.0134 -0.116 -0.0619 -0.136 -0.160 -0.0791 
 (0.135) (0.169) (0.139) (0.135) (0.148) (0.148) (0.132) 
Taxes -32.05       
 (20.93)       
CG331  -5.860      
  (13.74)      
RRR   52.19     
   (47.89)     
RRR_magnitude332    -1.543    
    (1.270)    
Interbank exposure limits     -35.13   
     (25.14)   
lt_LTV      79.70  
      (50.03)  
Provisioning       0.226* 
       (0.118) 
        
Observations 204 204 254 232 204 96 221 
Number of code 36 36 37 35 36 18 33 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
Order 2 p-value                               
 
0.153                 
0.187                 
 













0.302              




Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We then highlight the results of borrowers alone versus depositors alone to understand how 
macroprudential policies affect both of them. Table (4) outlines the results of our GMM 
regressions with borrowers as our dependent variable. Three interesting results emerge. First, 
tightening RRRs (Column (1)) increases borrowers at commercial banks by 5 individuals (per 
1000 adults). This result is in line with Pearlman (2015) and Pearlman and Mirza (2017) who 
shows that there is a distributional effect of RRRs, with gains to borrowers when the RRR is 
tightened, as more potential borrowers are effectively able to borrow. Column (8) and (9) show 
 
331 Limits on domestic currency loans 
332 Representing the rate change of RRR to capture the actual magnitude of loosening versus Tightening 
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that imposing countercyclical reserve requirements, 333  and financial-institution-targeted 334 
instruments335 increases financial inclusion by 42.3 and 10.8 individuals (per 1000 adults) 
respectively. With the addition of macroprudential tools, other explanatory variables lose 
significance. 336  Other macroprudential tools in this table, including an overall index that 
captures all macroprudential policies implemented, as well as those solely targeting borrowers, 
were not significant. It is worth noting that the other explanatory variables from lose their 
significance with the introduction of macroprudential policies, so we still exercise caution 
while interpreting them.  
Table (5) displays additional macroprudential policies having an impact on borrowing. Most 
specifically, imposing taxes on financial institutions reduces borrowers by around 44 
individuals (per 1000 adults) as can be shown in Column (1).  This is an expected results as 
higher taxes on financial institutions could be translated into higher surcharges on the 
commercial banks’ clients if banks seek to maintain their profitability. This, in turn, reduces 
the number of borrowers from commercial banks.  Columns (2) and (7), however, show that 
provisions and limits on domestic currency loans - which aims to limit credit growth - increases 
the number of borrowers. Once again, this could be interpreted as a rise in the number of 
borrowers, but borrowers obtain smaller amounts, which increases access (and usage) of 
financial services (Pearlman 2015 and 2017).   
 
333 Another RRR measure from an alternative data, which captures restrictions to RRRs either by i) imposing a wedge on 
foreign currency deposits or ii) operates countercyclically. 
334 Instruments focused on financial institutions, rather than those targeting borrowers - as shown in Column 7 - and includes 
dynamic provisionings, countercyclical reserve requirements, limits on systemically important financial institutions. It is an 
aggregate instrument that captures the measures that target financial institutions. Annex I contains the full breakdown of the 
variables constituting this measure.   
335 Rather that instruments targeting borrowers.  
336 With urbanization and secondary enrolment showing some significance in additional tables as shown in Annex V. 
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Table (4): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Borrowers from the Banking Sector: Borrowers from commercial banks per 1,000 adults 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
AR(1) 1.008*** 0.984*** 0.992*** 0.992*** 0.979*** 0.983*** 1.003*** 0.986*** 1.023*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0209) (0.0203) (0.0233) (0.0323) (0.0222) (0.0190) (0.0277) 
Unemployment 0.657 2.192 2.075 1.834 0.606 0.510 0.00885 -0.979 0.363 
 (0.913) (1.776) (1.570) (1.544) (0.756) (0.947) (1.207) (0.918) (0.951) 
Secondary enrolment -0.0106 -0.328 -0.343 -0.292 0.0359 -0.0564 0.0246 0.110 -0.112 
 (0.183) (0.218) (0.230) (0.203) (0.167) (0.178) (0.160) (0.180) (0.198) 
Urbanization 0.0953 0.383* 0.386 0.345 0.200 0.0892 0.134 -0.0634 -0.268 
 (0.216) (0.219) (0.253) (0.228) (0.184) (0.191) (0.168) (0.173) (0.282) 
Openness -0.0189 0.0612 0.0519 0.0376 -0.0700 0.0138 -0.0108 0.113 0.0659 
 (0.0694) (0.104) (0.100) (0.0994) (0.0813) (0.0711) (0.0609) (0.0689) (0.0881) 
lt_RR 4.761**         
 (1.970)         
lt_Credit Growth  0        
  (0)        
lt_Taxes   2.755       
   (5.199)       
lt_Risk Weights    3.678      
    (12.59)      
lt_rr2     4.552     
     (4.899)     
Overall Macropru Index (MPI)      3.074    
      (2.933)    
Borrower-Targeted Macropru       -1.560   
       (8.341)   
Counter-cyclical RRR        42.27***  
        (11.54)  
Fin-Inst Targeted Macropru         10.80** 
         (5.215) 
          
Observations 261 133 133 133 339 287 287 287 287 
Number of code 41 23 23 23 47 46 46 46 46 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           








0.098         0.099 

















  0.186 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Overall MPI reflects all macroprudential policies in use. Borrower-Targeted Macropru focuses on LTV and DTI 




Table (5): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Borrowers from the Banking Sector: Borrowers from commercial banks per 1,000 adults 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
AR(1) 1.032*** 1.050*** 1.041*** 1.007*** 1.048*** 0.985*** 1.023**
* 
 (0.0339) (0.0299) (0.0218) (0.0147) (0.0293) (0.0224) (0.0208) 
unemployment -0.579 -0.128 -0.151 0.776 -0.480 2.094 1.874** 
 (1.135) (0.857) (0.924) (0.776) (1.034) (1.963) (0.730) 
Secondary enrolment 0.0263 0.230 -0.176 -0.0651 0.167 -0.332 -
0.316** 
 (0.197) (0.206) (0.214) (0.156) (0.192) (0.281) (0.137) 
Urbanization 0.244 -0.263 -0.0644 0.183 -0.0362 0.402 0.0770 
 (0.219) (0.237) (0.188) (0.148) (0.183) (0.242) (0.150) 
Openness -0.0298 -0.109 -0.112 -0.0637 -0.0705 0.0383 0.0163 
 (0.0697) (0.0729) (0.0685) (0.0720) (0.0845) (0.0808) (0.0701) 
Tax -43.46**       
 (18.47)       
Domestic Loans Limits  25.06*      
  (13.61)      
RRR   32.47     
   (21.07)     
RRR_Magnitude    -0.584    
    (1.258)    
Interbank-Exposure     -14.01   
     (17.74)   
lt_ltv      13.47  
      (8.949)  
Provisioning       0.140** 
       (0.0665) 
        
Observations 287 287 363 335 287 133 303 
Number of code 46 46 49 46 46 23 44 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
























Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
220 
 
Tables (6) and (7) display the results for the depositors with commercial banks as an alternative 
measure of usage of financial services, to capture the impact of macroprudential policies on 
depositor activity. Only two macroprudential tools seem to affect financial inclusion, and it 
appears that macroprudential policies affect depositors the least relative to other forms of 
inclusion. Specifically, Table (6) shows that concentration limits - limits on the fraction of 
assets held by a limited number of borrowers - increases depositors by 114 individuals (per 
1000 adults).  Relatedly, Column (3) in Table (7) shows that imposing - and increasing - taxes 
on commercial banks increases depositors by 35 individuals (per 1000 adults). This result is in 
stark contrast with the impact of taxes on borrowers shown in Table (5), and it could be the 
result that individuals understand that taxes are employed as a means to safeguard the health of 
the banking sectors, and thus have trust in the commercial banking services, and hence the 
number of depositors in commercial banks rise. The same applies to the concentration limits, 
and we can view this result - provided the presence of financial literacy - that macroprudential 
policies help increase the number of depositors as prudential measures are employed to 
maintain financial stability. 
6.2.Emerging Markets Versus Advanced Economies337  
 
Annex III splits the sample into AEs, and EMs. (Describe based on the tables above), and we 
only present selected results from these regressions in this section.  When we split the sample, 
we see that the results differ between advanced and Emerging Markets, and we are inclined to 
believe that this could be driven by institutional quality and governance factors.  For EMs, 
Tables (1) and (2) show that a 1% rise in limits on foreign currency loans reduces access to 
financial services by 1%, while tighter provisioning increases access to financial services, but 
by a significantly large magnitude. With the exception of the lagged financial access variable, 
and the unemployment rate, all other explanatory variables are insignificant. Table (3) shows 
that provisioning tends to increase financial access by 1%, while changes in the magnitude of 
the RRR (in Table 4) increases financial inclusion.  Among AEs, Table (10) shows that a 
tightening in provisioning reduces access to finance by around 2.8%. Similar to the results of 
EMs, lost other explanatory variables- except for urbanization- lose their significance in these 
regressions, so we exercise caution in interpreting these results, and analyze deeper the role of 
governance and financial development in affecting the behavior of macroprudential policies.
 
337 We consider the sample split here to be our first robustness check, paving the way for the introduction of financial development, 




Table (6): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Depositors within the Banking Sector: Depositors at commercial banks per 1,000 adults 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
AR(1) 0.985*** 0.970*** 0.982*** 0.984*** 0.977**
* 
 (0.0246) (0.0328) (0.0252) (0.0245) (0.0202) 
Unemployment -0.0368 -3.452 0.248 0.849 -2.261 
 (2.956) (2.881) (3.128) (3.183) (3.349) 
Secondary enrolment -0.633 -0.209 -0.781 -1.031 -0.140 
 (0.481) (0.442) (0.575) (0.652) (0.431) 
Urbanization 1.428** 1.738** 1.546** 0.378 1.170** 
 (0.588) (0.829) (0.614) (0.912) (0.568) 
Openness 0.322** 0.305 0.366** 0.618*** 0.299** 
 (0.123) (0.190) (0.146) (0.194) (0.141) 
Countercyclical Capital 
Requirement 
36.66     
 (34.90)     
Levies  -30.48    




  186.1   
   (166.0)   
Concentration Limits    114.4**  
    (49.17)  
Foreign Currency Loan 
Limits 
    37.13 
     (43.87) 
      
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 
Number of code 64 64 64 64 64 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           


















Standard errors in parentheses 




Table (7): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Depositors with Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
          
AR(1) 0.966*** 0.974*** 0.983*** 0.983*** 0.969*** 0.971*** 0.982 0.978*** 0.972*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0176) (0.0130) (0.127) (0.0269) (0.0265) (79.41) (0.0258) (0.0311) 
Unemployment 0.335 1.674 1.464 1.862 0.438 -0.741 -1.435 -1.661 -0.604 
 (1.406) (2.143) (2.710) (47.12) (2.009) (2.882) (2,884) (3.487) (3.172) 
secondaryenrolment -0.916* -1.694*** -1.624** -1.692 -0.718 -0.525 -0.530 -0.349 -0.465 
 (0.472) (0.608) (0.707) (8.974) (0.573) (0.560) (1,105) (0.557) (0.539) 
Urbanization 2.416*** 3.064*** 2.632*** 2.887 1.972 1.641** 1.460 1.056 1.375 
 (0.614) (0.822) (0.808) (13.20) (1.273) (0.790) (1,869) (0.850) (1.415) 
Openness  0.231 0.282 0.353** 0.210 0.220 0.364*** 0.349 0.463*** 0.383** 
 (0.157) (0.180) (0.153) (3.269) (0.145) (0.127) (449.6) (0.159) (0.159) 
lt_RRR 0.536         
 (9.756)         
lt_Tax   34.62*       
   (18.42)       
lt_Risk Weights    77.26      
    (775.1)      
lt_RR2     -22.48     
     (17.78)     
MPI      1.198    
      (8.742)    
Borrower-Targeted 
Tools 
      5.328   
       (31,822)   
Countercyclical RRR        77.24  
        (52.38)  
Fin-Inst TargeteTools         5.326 
         (22.27) 
          
Observations 369 259 259 259 494 427 427 427 427 
Number of code 55 37 37 37 66 64 64 64 64 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           








0.035         0.099 
















  0.768 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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6.3.Role of Governance 
We now present our results when we interact governance with macroprudential policies, to 
determine the impact of regulatory/institutional quality on the effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies. We already highlighted that several studies, including Beck et al. 
(2007b) and Honohan (2008) found that institutional quality increases financial inclusion. 
Table (8) summarizes our results when we include financial development and institutional 
quality/governance indicators interacted with the various macroprudential tools for our full 
sample.338  Institutional quality appears to increase both usage and access to financial 
services across the spectrum of the macroprudential tools employed, with no negative 
impact on access. Financial development, on the other hand, appears to have mixed effects 
on our results, depending on the tool employed, with no negative impact on usage. This 
sheds light on the importance of institutional quality both from a regulatory perspective, as 
well as an inclusion perspective, in terms of affecting the behavior of macroprudential 
policies and how they affect financial inclusion. Financial development, on the other hand, 
yields mostly mixed results in our regressions.  
Table (8): Results with the Introduction of Governance and Financial Inclusion  
 
Table (9) presents our baseline model as before, which includes the various 
macroprudential policies, followed by their interaction with the governance indicators. As 
 
338 We do not split the sample in these regressions, as by definition, AEs have better institutional quality, and higher levels of financial 
development. 
Positive Impact Negative Impact Positive Impact Negative Impact
Provisionings
General Countercyclical Capital 
Buffer/Requirement 




Limits on Domestic Currency Loans
Magnitude (rate of 









FX and/or Countercyclical Reserve 
Requirements
Financial Institution Targeted 
Instruments 
Provisionings 
Tax required reserve ratio Borrower Targeted Instruments
Provisionings LTV ratio





Limits on Interbank 
Exposures
LTV Caps
Risk Weights Debt to Income Ratio
Required Reserves, Levies, 

















can be seen in columns 1-4, all the interaction terms between the overall macroprudential 
index (MPI) in Column (1),339 provisioning in Column (2) and (4), and counter cyclical 
reserve requirements in Column (3) are positive and significant. The total effect of 
macroprudential policies (presented in the last row), to signify the effect of 
macroprudential policies in the presence of improved institutional quality, also shows a 
statistically significant result, highlighting that as institutional quality improves, 
macroprudential policies increase financial inclusion. For example, Column (1) shows that 
increased use of macroprudential policies (proxied by Cerutti et al.’s (2015) overall 
macroprudential index in the presence of increased governance increases financial 
inclusion by 8% (relative to their insignificant impact on their own). 
Table (9): Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy: Role of Governance 
Dependent variable: Financial Access Variable (PCA of ATMs, Branches, and Accounts) in Columns (1); (2), and Financial 
Institutions and Markets Access (PCA of access to both institutions and markets), broader definition of access in Columns (3) ;(4).  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Acc acc finacc finacc 
     
AR(1) 0.935*** 0.955*** 0.927*** 0.901*** 
 (0.00915) (0.0140) (0.0164) (0.0223) 
Unemployment -0.0170 0.500 -0.00156*** -0.000279 
 (0.468) (0.405) (0.000521) (0.000478) 
Secondaryenrol 0.186 -0.0773 0.000362*** 0.000239* 
 (0.125) (0.120) (9.75e-05) (0.000142) 
Urbanization -0.130 -0.0459 0.000358** 0.000291 
 (0.117) (0.124) (0.000150) (0.000231) 
Openness 0.217*** 0.224*** -4.89e-05* -5.70e-05 
 (0.0556) (0.0568) (2.88e-05) (3.65e-05) 
Macropru Index 3.315    
 (2.050)    
Interaction:gov_mpi 4.631***    
 (1.553)    
Provisioning  0.205***  0.000147 
  (0.0406)  (9.07e-05) 
Interaction: Gov_provisions  0.113***  0.000141** 
  (0.0286)  (5.85e-05) 
     
     
Coutnercyclical RRR   0.0192**  
   (0.00764)  
Interaction: gov_RRR   0.0803***  
   (0.0270)  








     
Observations 198 234 811 776 
Number of code 42 43 92 88 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           





   0.171 
   0.749 
 
   0.000                           0.000 
  0.862                            0.931 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; lincom implies linear combination to calculate total effect 
Table (10) presents the results of usage of macroprudential policies, combining both borrowers 
 
339 Represents all macroprudential policies employed per country.  
340 That is, the effect of macroprudential policies conditional on governance/institutional quality. 
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and users using principal component analysis. In this case, only the general countercyclical 
capital buffer/requirement yielded a positive and significant result on usage of financial 
services,341 whereby the (total) effect of macroprudential policies almost doubles as institutional 
quality improves.  
Table (10): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Depositors and Borrowers from the Banking Sector (Principal Component Analysis of Both) 


















Interaction: gov_CTC 118.8*** 
 (42.38) 
Effect of Macroprudential 






Number of code 36 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           





Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; lincom implies linear combination to calculate total effect 
Table (11) presents our results using borrowers as the dependent variable. We observe that the same 
variables as before displayed positive statistical significance, in addition to limits on domestic loans 
(CG, in Column (3)). The interaction terms have been significant except for taxes, provisioning, and 
the financial-targeted instruments.342 However, the total effect of macroprudential policies343 was 
significant in increasing financial inclusion, across all variables in Table (11), except for Columns (4) 
and (5), for provisioning and RRRs.  Column (6) includes another measure of RRR tightening based 
on our own data collection relative to Column (5) from Shim et al.’s (2013) database, and our variable 
was positive and significant when interacted with institutional quality, confirming earlier findings.  
 
 
341 Otherwise, results were insignificant. 
342 Note the mixed effect of the RRR in this table, versus its significance in the baseline regression.  
343 Conditional on improved institutional quality. 
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Table (11): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Borrowers from Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
         
AR(1) 1.035*** 1.026*** 1.044*** 1.020*** 1.016*** 0.978*** 0.958*** 1.006*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0334) (0.0333) (0.0220) (0.0298) (0.0228) (0.0195) (0.0227) 
Unemp 0.102 -0.480 -0.221 1.812** 0.604 0.667 -1.009 0.540 
 (1.381) (1.223) (0.934) (0.688) (0.969) (0.861) (0.924) (1.096) 
Secondaryenrol -0.0341 0.0315 0.475** -0.313** 0.0148 0.0312 0.163 -0.0541 
 (0.205) (0.202) (0.221) (0.138) (0.212) (0.180) (0.176) (0.221) 
Urb 0.0676 0.259 -0.457* 0.0833 0.0461 0.197 0.0662 -0.311 
 (0.143) (0.229) (0.243) (0.149) (0.267) (0.166) (0.244) (0.272) 
Openness -0.0195 -0.0391 -0.217** 0.0180 -0.0295 -0.0653 0.0690 0.0527 
 (0.0611) (0.0688) (0.0877) (0.0724) (0.0757) (0.0780) (0.0842) (0.0944) 
Countercyclical Capital 
Buffe (CTC) 
40.56        
 (28.43)        
Interaction: gov_ctc 30.88*        
 (17.52)        
Taxes  -46.09**       
  (20.68)       
Interaction: gov_tax  8.712       
  (23.02)       
Domestic Loans Limit 
(cg) 
  47.14**      
   (18.15)      
Interaction: gov_cg   48.44*      
   (27.67)      
Provisioning    0.138**     
    (0.0685)     
Interaction: 
gov_provisioning 
   -0.0296     
    (0.0471)     
lt_RR     4.760**    
     (2.310)    
Interaction: gov_lt_rr     4.765    
     (5.258)    
lt_rr2      6.762   
      (4.147)   
Interaction: gov_lt_rr2      12.35**   





      62.14***  
       (12.55)  
Interaction: gov_rrrev       79.87*  
       (43.77)  
         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
         
Fin-Target Macropru        12.55** 
        (6.131) 
Interaction: gov_fintgt        5.548 
        (4.840) 
Effect of 
Macroprudential 


















         
Observations 287 287 287 303 261 339 287 287 
Number of code 46 46 46 44 41 47 46 46 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           



























        
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; LT RR2; based on our own compilation of RRRs, and converting based on Shim et al’s (2013) scale to reflect loosening or tightening. lincom implies linear 




Table (12) presents alternative usage measure capturing depositors, and except for Column (5), which 
represents the magnitude of tightening (or the rate of change of the reserve requirements), 
macroprudential policies appear to have a positive and significant impact on depositors. Interestingly, 
two other measures capturing the RRRs show their positive impact; variables capturing their 
countercyclicality (Column (3)) and tightening and loosening (Column (1)). The last row represents 
the total effect, and confirms this pattern for most regressions, showing that the impact of 
macroprudential policies in the presence of governance increases the number of depositors. Overall 
results point towards the fact that institutional quality matters for the effectiveness of the 
macroprudential policies, and that better governance helps increase financial inclusion as a result of 
the implementation of macroprudential policies. These results, thus, shed light on the importance of 
governance- as a proxy for institutional and regulatory quality- in affecting the operation – and 
effectiveness – of macroprudential policies. 
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Table (12): Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policy 
Dependent variable: Depositors in Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
 AR(1) 0.968*** 0.984*** 0.969*** 0.958*** 0.960*** 0.997*** 0.983*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0114) (0.0320) (0.0272) (0.0190) (0.0149) (0.0343) 
Unemployment  0.402 2.006 -1.635 -1.494 -0.833 -1.071 0.855 
 (1.265) (1.937) (3.512) (1.231) (1.848) (1.307) (3.449) 
Secondaryenrolment  -0.921** -1.740*** -0.340 -1.588** -0.577 -0.756** -1.049 
 (0.439) (0.589) (0.647) (0.752) (0.460) (0.352) (0.672) 
Urbanization  2.319*** 2.939*** 1.372 1.925** 2.184*** 0.941 0.399 
 (0.559) (0.710) (1.049) (0.728) (0.673) (0.638) (0.904) 
Openness  0.263** 0.186 0.434*** -0.0440 0.205 0.240** 0.629** 
 (0.103) (0.149) (0.160) (0.291) (0.176) (0.118) (0.293) 
lt_RRR 3.457       
 (8.796)       
Interaction: gov_lt_RRR 21.26**       
 (10.55)       
lt_Risk Weights  109.0*      
  (62.24)      
Interaction: gov_lt_Risk Weights  -68.72      
  (76.25)      
Countercyclial Capital Buffer   111.1***     
   (40.54)     
Interaction: Gov_Capital Buffer   185.9     
   (152.4)     
RRR    152.1*    
    (79.45)    
Interaction gov_rr    11.35    
    (30.65)    
RRR (change)     -8.819   
     (5.915)   
Interaction: gov_rrr chane     -17.20*   
     (9.319)   
provisioning      0.396**  
      (0.198)  
Interaction: gov_provisioning      0.0382  
      (0.191)  
Concentration limits        115.2** 
       (51.89) 
Interactions: gov_concentration limit       2.644 
       (51.64) 
Total Effect of Macroprudential Policies 24.72                   40.27          297.02 *             163.41*                       -26.021*                    0.4347*           117.834 
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under findev (lincom) (16.375) (46.654) (159.12) (96.08) (15.074) (0.2444)  (87.665) 
        
Observations 369 259 427 519 483 452 427 
Number of code 55 37 64 67 64 58 64 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           





0.030                     0.056                         





            0.031                           
        0.846            
 
0.049 






Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  lincom implies linear combination to calculate total effect 
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6.4.Role of Financial Development 
Table (13) highlights our results when we include a proxy for financial development- capturing 
the depth and efficiency of a country’s financial sector- and interacting this variable (findev) with 
our macroprudential indicators.344 Once again, we only highlight the significant results in this 
section. In these regressions, we have mixed results on the impact and effectiveness of 
macroprudential policies. Column (1) indicates that the interaction of the RRR with financial 
development lowers access to finance, while the RRR on its own has no impact, a result that 
contrasts previous findings in our baseline regressions, and upon the introduction of governance 
indicators.  The total effect (the last row) confirms the negative impact of the RRR as a result of 
increased financial development. Similar results are obtained using the LTV ratio (Column 5), but 
this is an expected result. Limits on the fraction of liabilities held by the banking sector or by an 
individual in Column (3) also yielded a negative impact on financial access. Only taxes appear to 
have a positive impact on access in Column (2).  
Table (13): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Financial Access Variable (PCA of ATMs, Branches, and Accounts) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
AR(1) 1.028*** 0.932*** 0.944*** 1.000*** 1.021*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0383) (0.0177) (0.0152) 
Unemployment  0.253 -1.176 -1.178 0.471 -3.024* 
 (0.663) (0.899) (0.891) (0.495) (1.642) 
Secondaryenrolment  0.0433 0.367* 0.275 -0.0386 0.0236 
 (0.165) (0.201) (0.225) (0.113) (0.220) 
urbanization -0.0574 -0.0210 -0.0947 0.0468 0.385* 
 (0.175) (0.222) (0.171) (0.132) (0.197) 
Openness  0.0294 0.198*** 0.196** 0.120** -0.0142 
 (0.0596) (0.0700) (0.0776) (0.0486) (0.0441) 
lt_RRR 8.207     
 (5.463)     
Interaction: findevv_lt_rr -140.3**     
 (66.06)     
Tax   -60.42    
  (37.86)    
Interaction: findevv_tax  369.4*    
  (198.0)    
Inter-bank exposure   27.11   
   (16.41)   
Interaction: findevv_interbank   -94.63*   
 
344 We are mainly interested in the role of financial development interacted with macroprudential policies, so we do not report the 
coefficients of the financial development variables. Nor do we include them in our regressions. Econometrically, researchers either 




   (54.27)   
RRR change345    1.311*  
    (0.778)  
Interaction: findevv_drr_act    -10.25  
    (10.47)  
lt_ltv     14.03 
     (10.81) 
findevv_lt_ltv     -65.96** 
     (30.39) 
Effect of Macroprudential 







(49.84)   
-8.94               (9.75)  -51.92 ** 
(21.57) 
Observations 172 198 198 220 85 
Number of code 36 42 42 44 19 
 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           


















Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table (14) shows that that risk weights (Column (1)) also have a negative impact on financial 
inclusion when interacted with financial development, while provisioning and the 
(countercyclical) reserve requirement appear to have a positive impact. Risk weights generally 
























345 Actual RRRs values not dummies 
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Table (14): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Financial Access Variable (PCA of ATMs, Branches, and Accounts) 
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
AR(1) 0.913*** 0.939*** 0.946*** 0.922*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0146) (0.0217) (0.0266) 
Unemployment  -0.00189*** -0.00134** -0.00126*** -0.000615* 
 (0.000637) (0.000525) (0.000404) (0.000353) 
Secondaryenrol  0.000413** 0.000309*** 8.50e-05 0.000297** 
 (0.000165) (0.000106) (0.000130) (0.000122) 
Urbanization  0.000388*** 0.000258* 0.000241* 0.000212* 
 (0.000137) (0.000137) (0.000125) (0.000127) 
Openness  1.17e-05 -2.56e-05 -3.76e-05 -6.04e-05 
 (2.93e-05) (2.12e-05) (4.04e-05) (3.69e-05) 
lt_Risk Weights (RW) 0.0158    
 (0.00986)    
Interaction: findevv_lt_RW -0.0639**    
 (0.0291)    
Countercyclical RRR  -0.00779   
  (0.00922)   
Interaction: findevv_rrrev  0.176**   
  (0.0852)   
RRR   0.0172*  
   (0.00906)  
Interaction: findevv_rr   0.0176  
   (0.0232)  
Provisioning    2.35e-05 
    (6.69e-05) 
Interaction: findevv_prov    0.000316* 
    (0.000173) 
     
Effect of Macroprudential 
Policies under findev (lincom) 
    -.048**   
(0.2630) 
0.167  **                  
(0. 0792)  
0.0348 
(0.02582) 
0.0003       
(0.0001) 
Observations 542 811 950 776 
Number of code 55 92 100 88 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           








0.000      0.000        
0.866      0.835 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
Table (15) shows the results of usage of financial services whereby both depositors and borrowers, 
comprise our dependent variable (using principal component analysis).  Unlike access to financial 
services in Table (14), all the results within Table (15) showing that macroprudential policies, in 
the presence of financial development leads to a positive and significant impact on usage of 
financial services.  Interestingly, the strongest results are those concerning the LTV and DTI ratios 
in Columns (5) and (6). Columns (5) and (6) show that tightening the LTV ratio and DTI ratios 
lowers usage- both depositing and borrowing- by 36% and 45% respectively. However, their 
interaction with financial development alters this result, whereby they both become positive and 
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significant.  Even more so, the total effect of tightening both LTV ratios and debt o income ratios 
continues to be positive and significant. All other tools in this table display a positive and 
statistically significant impact on usage of financial services.  
 Upon dividing usage from Table (15) into borrowers (Table 16), and depositors (Table 176) only 
two variables, required reserves and levies, that appear to have a positive impact on usage in the 
presence of financial inclusion. What is important to observe here is that macroprudential policies 
do not appear to have a negative impact on usage of financial services when we account for 
financial development.   
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Table (15): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Usage of Financial Services, borrowers and depositors in commercial banks (per 1000 adults).  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES DepBor DepBor DepBor DepBor DepBor DepBor DepBor 
        
AR(1) 0.996*** 0.998*** 0.990*** 1.005*** 1.003*** 0.984*** 1.013*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0223) (0.0208) (0.0174) (0.0186) (0.0168) (0.0191) 
Unemployment 1.206 1.148 3.079* 0.286 0.0220 0.0812 -0.649 
 (2.674) (1.986) (1.646) (1.473) (1.716) (2.476) (1.928) 
Secondaryenrolment -0.261 -0.651 -0.790** -0.0762 -0.307 -0.488 -0.463 
 (0.671) (0.548) (0.331) (0.557) (0.486) (0.560) (0.425) 
Urbanization 0.792 0.567 1.114** 0.756 1.055** 0.888* 1.026** 
 (0.547) (0.725) (0.413) (0.546) (0.478) (0.472) (0.398) 
Openness -0.254* 0.0413 -0.00422 -0.325*** -0.217* 0.110 -0.0778 
 (0.138) (0.161) (0.129) (0.107) (0.124) (0.161) (0.114) 
Borrower-Targeted Macropru -22.36***       
 (7.978)       
Interaction: findevv_borrtrg 218.9***       
 (56.63)       
Financial_Inst Targeted Macropru  3.844      
  (7.785)      
Interaction: findevv_fintgt  73.69*      
  (40.41)      
rr_act   -0.562     
   (0.622)     
Interaction: findevv_rr_act   8.777*     
   (4.952)     
ltv_cap    -39.19**    
    (16.52)    
Interaction: findevv_ltv_cap    250.6***    
    (75.76)    
Ltv     -36.30**   
     (16.20)   
Interaction: findevv_ltv     173.3**   
     (69.34)   
DTI      -45.65**  
      (21.08)  
Interaction: findevv_dti      595.4***  
      (191.8)  
Countercyclical Capital Buffer       116.5** 





      -3,354 
       (2,526) 
        
Effect of Macroprudential 















        
        
Observations 198 198 208 198 198 198 198 
Number of code 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           



















   0.181 








Table (16): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Borrowers from commercial banks (per 1000 adults).  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES borrowers_banks borrowers_banks 
   
AR(1) 0.982*** 0.986*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0222) 
Unemployment  2.105*** 2.139 
 (0.587) (1.998) 
Secondaryenrolment  -0.231* -0.371 
 (0.118) (0.259) 
Urbanization  0.249* 0.415* 
 (0.135) (0.239) 
Openness  -0.00748 0.0612 
 (0.0628) (0.0847) 
RRR (actual) -0.693  
 (0.587)  
Interaction: findevv_rr_act 8.253**  
 (3.457)  
lt_LTV  42.16* 
  (24.11) 
Interaction: findevv_lt_ltv  -112.6 
  (93.57) 
Total Effect 7.560** 
(3.023) 
-70.47             (71.086) 
   
Observations 303 133 
Number of code 46 23 
   
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           







Standard errors in parentheses 




Table (17): Financial Inclusion & Macroprudential Policy  
Dependent variable: Depositors in commercial banks (per 1000 adults).  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
AR(1) 0.982*** 0.970*** 0.993*** 0.999*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0237) (0.0335) (0.0147) 
Unemployment 1.822 -4.293* -2.217 -1.200 
 (2.861) (2.405) (2.267) (1.870) 
Secondaryenrolment -1.694** -0.329 -0.821 -0.661 
 (0.686) (0.499) (0.694) (0.410) 
Urbanization 2.902*** 2.074*** 0.0280 1.669*** 
 (0.767) (0.731) (0.938) (0.578) 
Openness 0.219* 0.295* 0.580* 0.202 
 (0.120) (0.152) (0.347) (0.188) 
lt_Risk Weights (RW) 95.96**    
 (46.21)    
Interaction: findevv_lt_rw -66.46    
 (108.5)    
Levies  -184.0***   
  (65.19)   
Interaction: findevv_lev  327.4***   
  (118.3)   
Concentration Limits   141.1***  
   (46.75)  
Interaction: findevv_conc   -31.48  
   (177.7)  
LTV Ratio    -63.92** 
    (30.93) 
Interaction: findevv_ltv    57.30 
    (84.74) 
Total Effect 29.502               (76.178) 143.35**          (70.309) 109.616             (173.854) -6.614 
(71.1241) 
     
Observations 259 421 421 421 
Number of code 37 63 63 63 
Arellano-Bond Test 
Order 1 p-value                           
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7. Robustness checks 
As part of our robustness checks, we employed a significant number of additional explanatory 
variables including alternative measures of education, dependency ratios, fiscal and investment 
data, value added by industry, investment, household expenditure, GDP per capita, inflation, 
savings, and interest rates. Most of them, however, were not significant. We also performed 
cross-sectional regressions (using ordinary least square and two stage least squares), with the 
results differing, particularly for the former due to endogeneity, using alternative definitions of 
financial inclusions. The splitting of our sample was the first robustness check to identify the 
difference between EMs and AEs, paving the way for the role of institutional quality and 
financial development introduced into our estimations. 
8. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This chapter attempted to analyze the impact of macroprudential policies on financial inclusion 
in a panel of 67 countries over the period 2000-2014. Using System-GMM regressions, this 
chapter finds that macroprudential policies have mixed effects on financial inclusion, and 
results differed based on levels of governance, institutional quality, and financial development, 
in addition to whether the country is an AE or EM. Overall provisioning appears to have a 
consistently positive impact on financial inclusion, both in terms of access, and usage of 
financial services, while debt to income ratios and LTV ratios reduced it. Reserve requirements, 
particularly if implemented countercyclically, had a positive impact on financial inclusion, a 
result that supports some of the theoretical research recently conducted. Even more so, reserve 
requirements have a positive impact on financial inclusion when implemented with better 
governance and financial development. When our sample is divided into AEs and EMs, 
provisioning continues to have a positive impact on financial access for EMs. However, if 
implemented countercyclically, dynamic provisioning lowers access and usage in EMs. LTV 
caps, and limits on foreign currency loans also reduce usage and access in EMs, while tighter 
risk weights, borrower and required reserves increase it. Overall, our results also point to 
differing patterns whereby macroprudential policies operate in AEs and EMs. 
In AEs, only borrower targeted instruments appear to increase usage of financial services while 
tighter provisioning and tighter RRRs reduce it. Overall, it appears that EMs are more affected 
by macroprudential policies, given their lower levels of financial inclusion and financial 
development, relative to AEs. In this context, governance, and institutional quality appear to 
improve the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in a way that does not jeopardize 
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financial inclusion.   Financial development helps macroprudential policies improve usage of 
financial services - both borrowing and depositing - but does not significantly help in increase 
financial access.  This is a plausible argument as it is assumed that higher development could 
potentially translate into higher financial access, and macroprudential policies would not 
necessarily affect it. Macroprudential policies, thus appear to increase the usage of financial 
services as financial development increase, among those already financially included.   
As for governance, we find that improved institutional quality increases both financial access, 
and usage, with limited adverse effects either on usage or access. Our results point to important 
policy implications. A country’s level of institutional quality and financial development plays 
an important role in the effectiveness of the macroprudential policies employed. Specifically, 
an improvement of institutional quality, irrespective of a country’s level of financial 
development, increases the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in boosting financial 
inclusion. This is a result not necessarily achieved in the absence of strong institutions, and 
increased levels of financial development. These findings are important as they shed light on 
the importance of institutional quality in improving the effectiveness of macroprudential 
policies. 
Overall, the benefits of macroprudential policies for financial inclusion appears to outweigh 
their costs. Given the importance of financial inclusion for financial stability, we are inclined 
to believe that macroprudential policies contribute to financial stability given their impact on 
financial inclusion. While some unintended - negative - consequences exist, institutional 
quality appears to help dampen those negative consequences.   
Further research will assess the interaction of both macroprudential policies and financial 
inclusion on financial stability, as well as the impact of the various macroprudential tools on 
firm access to finance and compare them to household access to finance, to reach even more 
robust conclusions. Using alternative measures that capture institutional quality (International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) or Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI)), and 
macroprudential policies will be a useful extension to test the robustness of the presented 
results, in addition to using actual values of macroprudential policies to examine the magnitude 
of their impact on financial inclusion will be important. We believe that this is an unexplored 





Table (1): List of Advanced Economies included in the Sample346 
Australia Hong Kong Portugal 
Austria Ireland Singapore 
Belgium Israel Slovakia 
Canada Italy Slovenia 
Cyprus Japan South Korea 
Czech Republic Luxembourg Spain 
Denmark Malta Sweden 
Finland Netherlands Switzerland 
France New Zealand United Kingdom 
Germany Norway United States 
Greece     
Table (2): List of EMs included in the Sample 
Albania Bulgaria Hungary Macedonia Philippines 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Algeria Burundi India Malaysia Poland Tunisia 
Angola Chile Indonesia Mauritius Qatar Turkey 
Argentina China Jamaica Mexico Romania Ukraine 




Bahrain Costa Rica Kazakhstan Morocco Saudi Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Belize Croatia Kuwait Oman Serbia Venezuela 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Ecuador Latvia Pakistan South Africa   




Lithuania Peru Thailand   
 
 
346 Country Classification is based on the IMF 
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Variable Name Definition Source
Financial Institutions Access Bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Financial Markets Access
Percent of market capitalization outside of top 10 largest companies and Total number of issuers of 
debt (domestic and
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Account (% age 15+) [ts]  Percent of respondents who report having an account (by themselves or together with someone else). World Bank Findex Database
Account at a financial institution (% age 15+) [ts]
 Percent of respondents with an account (self or together with someone else) at a bank, credit union, 
another financial institution (e.g., cooperative, microfinance institution), or the post office (if 
World Bank Findex Database
Automated teller machines (ATMs) (per 100,000 
adults)
Automated teller machines are computerized telecommunications devices that provide clients of a 
financial institution with access to financial transactions in a public place.
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults IMF Financial Access Survey
Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults)
Commercial bank branches are retail locations of resident commercial banks and other resident banks 
that function as commercial banks that provide financial services to customers and are physically 
separated from the main office but not organized as legally separated subsidiaries.
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Borrowers at commercial banks per 1,000 adults
Number of resident customers that are nonfinancial corporations (public and private) and households 
who obtained loans from commercial banks and other banks functioning as commercial banks per 
1000 adults.
IMF Financial Access Survey
Depositors with commercial banks per 1,000 
adults
Reported number of deposit account holders at commercial banks and other resident banks 
functioning as commercial banks that are resident nonfinancial corporations (public and private) and 
households. 
IMF Financial Access Survey
Financial Institutions Depth 
Private-sector credit to GDP ;Pension fund assets to GDP ; Mutual fund assets to GDP ;Insurance 
premiums, life and non-life to GDP
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Financial Markets Depth
Stock market capitalization to GDP; Stocks traded to GDP; International debt securities of government 
to GDP; Total debt securities of financial corporations to GDP; Total debt securities of nonfinancial 
corporations to GDP
IMF Financial Development 
Database
Unemplyment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate) WDI
Secondaryenrol Progression to secondary school (%) WDI
Urbanization Urban population (% of total) WDI
Terms of Trade Net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100) WDI
Savings Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) WDI
Financial Development 
A measure capturing financial depth (size and liquidity of markets),  and 
financial efficiency in financial markets and financial institutions  (ability 
of institutions to provide financial services at low cost and with 
sustainable revenues, and the level of activity of capital markets). IMF FD Database
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Table (4): Macroprudential Tools  
Tool Definition Source 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Constrains highly levered mortgage downpayments by enforcing or 
encouraging a limit or by determining regulatory risk weights. 
Cerutti (2015) 










Requires banks to hold more capital during upturns. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Leverage Ratio Limits banks from exceeding a fixed minimum leverage ratio. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Capital Surcharges on 
SIFIs 
Requires Systemically Important Financial Institutions to hold a higher 
capital level than other financial institutions. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Limits on Interbank 
Exposures 
Limits the fraction of liabilities held by the banking sector or by 
individual banks. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Concentration Limits Limits the fraction of assets held by a limited number of borrowers. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Limits on Foreign 
Currency Loans 




Limits credit growth; can also be targeted to limit foreign-currency 
credit growth. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Limits on Domestic 
Currency Loans 
Limits credit growth directly. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Levy/Tax on Financial 
Institutions 
Taxes revenues of financial institutions. 
Cerutti (2015) 
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps Restricts to LTV used as a strictly enforced cap on new loans, as 
opposed to a supervisory guideline or merely a determinant of risk 
weights. Cerutti (2015) 
FX and/or Countercyclical 
Reserve Requirements 
Restricts to RR which i) imposes a wedge of on foreign currency ; or 




An index capturing the measures included in Cerutti's index if they 
were implemented; LTV ratios, Dti ratios, concentration limits, 
counter-cyclical capital buffer, taxes on financial institutions, capital 




An index reflecting macroprudential policies that target borrowers; 
Debt to Income Ratio and Loan to Value Ratio 
Cerutti (2015) 
Financial Institution-
Targted Instruments  
An index capturing macroprudential policies that target financial 
incstitutions; dynamic provisionings, countercyclical capital buffers, 
and RRR's, levies, surcharges on systemically important financial 
institutions, limits on interbank exposurs, concentation limits, foreign 
currency limites, and limits on domestic currency loans Cerutti (2015) 
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LT_Liq Losening/Tightening Liquidity Requirements 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
rr_act 
Actual Required Reserve Ratio Figures 
Authors' 
Collections  
Credit Growth Limits 
Imposition of a quantitative ceiling on the rate of credit growth over a 
specific period of time 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
Risk Weights 
Higher risk weights makes it more expensive for banks to extend 
particular types of loans (e.g. housing loans) 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_LTV Losening/Tightening LTV 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_Provisioning Losening/Tightening LTV 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_Risk credit growth 
limits Losening/Tightening of monthly limits on credit growth 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_Taxes Losening/Tightening Taxes 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_RR2 Losening/Tightening of required reserve based on our own collections 
Authors' 
Collections  
LT_LTV Losening/Tightening LTV 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
LT_LTV Losening/Tightening LTV 
Shim et. Al. 
(2016) 
rr magnitude 
Reflects changes in required reserve ratios to show the extent of the 
change and its impact 

















Table (5): Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Urbanization 1,921 62.05214 22.19357 8.352 100 
Unemployment 1,594 8.923777 6.646062 0.1 57 
Openness 1,909 92.24231 59.22104 19.1008 442.62 
Secondary Enrolment 1,458 87.66564 23.79722 13.77945 166.8085 
Financial Institution Depth 1,665 0.3310777 0.2832979 0.0045977 1 
Financial Institution Access 1,665 0.3948678 0.2894931 0 1 
Financial Institution Efficiency 1,665 0.5929839 0.1414308 0.0906417 0.8792366 
Financial Markets Depth 1,665 0.3106568 0.3026897 0 0.9994659 
Financial Markets Access 1,665 0.3089447 0.3185427 0 1 
Financial Markets Efficiency 1,665 0.3292632 0.3658282 0 1 
ATMS 1,213 50.81656 47.24685 0 290.14 
Bank Accounts 551 710.6393 570.0839 0.41 3371.49 
Bank Branches 1,275 20.78522 19.96302 0.45 257.7 
Provisioning 1,266 73.62769 46.63855 0 604.07 
LTV Caps 1,456 0.1641484 0.3705374 0 1 
Debt to Income Ratio 1,456 0.125 0.3308325 0 1 
Dynamic Provisioning 1,456 0.0776099 0.2676486 0 1 
Countercyclical Capital Requirements 1,456 0.0178571 0.1324776 0 1 
Levies 1,456 0.1229396 0.3284806 0 1 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
Surcharges 1,456 0.0096154 0.097619 0 1 
Interbank Exposure Limits 1,456 0.2527473 0.4347366 0 1 
Concentration Limits 1,456 0.6057692 0.4888527 0 1 
LTV ratio caps 1,456 0.2156593 0.4114203 0 1 
Taxes 1,456 0.1195055 0.3244938 0 1 
Limits on Domestic Currency Lending 1,456 0.0947802 0.2930118 0 1 
Countercyclical Reserve Requirements 1,456 0.1565934 0.3635419 0 1 
Reserve Requirements 1,939 0.8509541 0.3562256 0 1 
Foreign Currency Limits 1,459 0.107608 0.3099909 0 1 
Overall Macroprudential Index 1,456 1.854396 1.580624 0 8 
Borrower Targeted Instruments 1,456 0.3166209 0.6533223 0 4 
Financial Targeted Instruments 1,456 1.565247 1.322759 0 6 
Required Reserve Ratio (Actual data collection) 1,669 7.332819 7.441161 0 80 
Losening/Tighening_ rr 1,142 0.0140105 0.9133233 -6 10 
Losening/Tighening_ liq 741 0.0080972 0.2985357 -3 6 
Losening/Tighening_ cr 741 0.0013495 0.0821884 -1 1 
Losening/Tighening_ ltv 741 0.048583 0.3894747 -1 5 
Losening/Tighening_ dti 741 0.0350877 0.241302 -1 2 
Losening/Tighening_ rw 741 0.0215924 0.2314891 -1 1 
Losening/Tighening_ prov 741 0.0296896 0.236377 -1 3 
Losening/Tighening_ expo 741 0.0013495 0.1423673 -2 1 
Losening/Tighening_ tax 741 
-
0.0107962 0.3818759 -3 2 





0.0578917 2.742392 -56 20 
Governance: Corruption 1,824 0.1411042 1.047821 -1.722249 2.469991 
Governance: Government Effectiveness 1,815 0.2628747 0.9552625 -2.058268 2.436975 
Governance: Political Stability 1,812 
-
0.0247487 0.9542523 -2.810035 1.760102 
Governance: Regulatory Quality 1,814 0.2867892 0.9054986 -2.027446 2.260543 
Governance: Rule of Law 1,824 0.1610754 0.990082 -2.178493 2.100273 
Governance: Voice and Accountability 1,824 0.1135349 0.9391642 -1.907197 1.800992 
Borowers within Commercial Banks (per 1000 
adults) 669 231.6199 219.2247 0.0182538 1232.996 
Depositors within Commercial Banks (per 1000 





















Macroprudential Policy and Inequality: A Primer 
There has been a recent surge in the literature examining the redistributive effects of monetary, 
and macroprudential policies. Empirical work on the redistributional effects of monetary 
policy- both conventional and unconventional policies- includes the work of Coibon et al. 
(2012), Saiki and Frost (2014), Montencino and Epstein (2015), O’Farell et al. (2016), and 
Furceri et al. (2016).  Most of this work point to the mixed impact of monetary policy on 
inequality, but generally, tighter monetary policy increases inequality. As for macroprudential 
policies, given their impact on financial conditions (especially during bad times), they could 
have an impact on inequality. The empirical literature focuses mostly on monetary policy and 
inequality, as well as on the latter’s drivers/determinants, while macroprudential policy and its 
distributional effects is being empirically understudied.  Canova et al. (2015) held that 
prudential policies tend to lead to a redistribution of losses across agents within a country, and 
that they should be used in alongside distributive fiscal policies, especially that they are 
designed without welfare purposes in consideration. 
Theoretically, there are clear underpinnings as to how macroprudential regulation can affect 
income and wealth distribution (Monnin, 2017). Korinek and Kreamer (2013) held that 
financial regulation has key redistributive repercussions if 1) financial markets are imperctct; 
and 2) the financial sector (especially banks) is the main entity facilitating credit 
intermediation.   Iacoviello et al. (2015) held that if LTV ratios are significantly- and 
inefficiently- low, implying high borrowing constraints, increasing the LTV, effectively 
macroprudential loosening, is welfare improving both for borrowers and lenders. However, if 
the LTV ratio is significantly high, then tightening macroprudential policy by lower the LTV 
ratio will be only welfare improving for borrowers, not lenders. Relatedly, Carpantier et al. 
(2016) showed that wealth inequality is linked to the magnitude of LTV ratio, house prices, 
and cost of credit.  Schroter and Yao (2016) also focused on LTV ratios, as well as the loan to 
income ratio, and held that LTV ratios increase the inequality of homeownership in a model 
incorporating risky housing investment. Rubio and Unsal (2017) held that while active 
macroprudential policies, i.e. time-varying policies, which can also be referred to as the 
counter-cyclical policies-are welfare superior, these policies increase inequality in low-income 
and developing countries.  
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The recent increase in empirical studies focusing on the effect of macroprudential policies hold 
that some macro-prudential policies affect credit growth.  However, the majority of these 
studies do not examine the effect of macroprudential policies on household wealth, housing, 
welfare distribution (Carpantier et al., 2016), or inequality. Relatedly, most of the research on 
the link between macroprudential policies and inequality has been theoretical in nature.347 In 
this context, Carpantier et al. (2018) hold that inequality is normally disregarded as a possible 
consequence of macroprudential policies. Two potential hypotheses emerge: macroprudential 
policies should lower the probability of financial crises, which would tend to lower inequality 
over the medium to long term. On the other hand, tools such as the LTV and debt to income 
limits tend to restrict the capacity of households - particularly those within lower income 
brackets - from purchasing property and using it as collateral for investment (Frost and van 
Stralen, 2018). This would in turn increase inequality. We outline in the remaining section 
some of the literature that examines the links between macroprudential policies and inequality. 
Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot (2011) study the determinants of income distribution using a panel 
Bayesian structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model, for 49 countries over the period 
1994–2002.348 The authors find substantial causality between financial sector development and 
income distribution. Specifically, the banking sector – on which the chunk of macroprudential 
policies focuses - appears to have a deeper effect on inequality, and this relationship depends 
on the features of the financial sector (for example, bank concentration, ownership type) rather 
than on  size, which implies the need to implement prudential policies to enhance the ability of 
the banking sector to closely monitor risk. 
Agnello et al. (2012a) use an unbalanced panel of 62 countries over the period 1973-2005 to 
examine the impact of financial reforms on income inequality. Some of their measures of 
financial reforms are effectively macroprudential tools, especially the use of directed 
credit/reserve requirements and banking supervision indicators.349  Their results imply that 
directed credit and elimination of unreasonably large reserve requirements are particularly 
significant in lowering income inequality. They also find that lower regulation, especially in 
 
347 See, for example Colciago et. al (2018) for a survey of this literature.  
348 Their measures of income distribution were the Gini coefficient, the main measure for inequality, as well as the Estimated 
Household Income Inequality based on the UTIP-UNIDO pay inequality index. Other variables included GDP, GDP per capita, 
trade openness, as well as international financial integration, proxied by the sum of the stock of portfolio equity and direct 
investment assets and liabilities to GDP.The authors also included banking sector and capital market variables including 
domestic credit (as a share of GDP), the interest rate spread (as a measure of efficiency), and the market capitalization, as well 
as the turnover ratio. 
349 Their banking supervision indicator was based on Abiad et. Al (2005), and the adoption of capital adequacy ratios under 
Basel, the independence of the financial regulator, and efficiency of the financial regulator.  
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more democratic economies with strong institutions, can prop up access to credit, contributing 
to a decrease in inequality. Moreover, when reserve requirements are significant– in the case 
of legislations obliging banks to deposit a sizeable portion of savings with the central bank –
inequality will almost certainly increase. 
Ampudia et al. (2014) examine the impact of LTV caps on losses (of financial institutions) in 
the case of household default and distress during times of crises, and find that there is an 
optimal range in which LTV ratios limit the number of distressed households. Using the Gini 
Index as a measure of inequality, Carpantier et al. (2016) use OLS regressions in support of 
their theoretical model and find that LTV ratios have a positive impact on wealth inequality in 
9 out of 12 countries. They also find that the magnitude of the LTV coefficients is bigger in 
countries with a lower number of households with HMR revenues, such as Greece, Italy, and 
Slovakia. There is a negative correlation between the LTV coefficients and the share of 
households with mortgages (-0.47); also, LTV ratios have a bigger influence on wealth 
inequality in countries with less mortgage credit. Their policy implication is that LTV ratios 
could be more effective in reducing wealth inequality in countries with an underdeveloped 
mortgage market. However, easy credit (larger LTV ratios) in these countries could increase 
wealth inequality more rapidly. 
Frost and van Stralen (2018) examined the relationship between macroprudential policies and 
the Gini coefficient to capture both market income inequality350 and net income inequality,351 
using panel regressions 352  over the period 2000-2013. They find a positive relationship 
between some macroprudential tools and both market and net income inequality. More 
specifically, concentration limits, reserve requirements and interbank exposure limits have a 
positive effect on market income inequality (increase inequality); LTV and debt to income 
limits have a positive effect on net inequality. Limits on foreign currency lending and the 
leverage ratio have a negative impact on inequality, especially in EMs, when the full sample is 
split between AEs and EMs.   
The general, but not much tested hypothesis is that macroprudential regulation could reduce 
income inequality by decreasing the frequency and severity of financial crises, which are 
normally followed by periods of recessions, giving rise to unemployment (Barwell, 2017).353  
 
350  the Gini coefficient of income inequality before redistributive policies 
351 inequality after redistribution 
352352 Using GLS with fixed effects. 
353  Barwell, R. (2017). Macroeconomic Policy After the Crash: Issues in Microprudential and Macroprudential Policy. 
Palgrave Macmillan, Switzerland.  
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Another argument is that ex ante credit booms - rather than income inequality - is the main 
driver for systemic risk, and that policies that prop up asset prices during systemic crises benefit 
the rich. This is why the distributional impact of macroprudential policy and its effect on 
inequality - ex post and ex ante - is crucial for systemic risk (Freixas et al., 2015).   
Financial inclusion and inequality  
One criticism regarding the use of the GINI coefficient is the inconsistent reporting of data on 
a yearly basis, which may affect the robustness of the results and, consequently, the 
conclusions. An alternative that could capture and proxy trends in inequality is financial 
inclusion. Cross-country studies over the last decade show that higher financial development354 
is linked to lower inequality in the medium to long term.355 Less so has been the literature on 
access to finance. Some studies have presented inconclusive results (Dabla-Norris et al., 
2015)356 while others suggest that increased access boosts growth and lowers income inequality 
and poverty (Beck, et al., 2009). Similar works suggest that the lack of access to financial 
services is one of the main factors explaining persistent poverty (Levine, 2008), and its 
presence – and accessibility –  decreases inequality (Haber and Perotti, 2007, Benmelech and 
Moskowitz, 2010, Rajan and Ramcharan, 2011 and Agneollo and Sousa 2012b) via Agnello et 
Al (2012) for sources. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) argue that income inequality is reduced 
because access to finance is a vital determinant of household welfare and productivity. More 
broadly, the literature on the effects of financial inclusion on inequality and poverty reduction 
has been mixed and tends to differ according to the type of financial services under study. 
Below, we outline some of the main studies in the literature that examine this relationship. 
Using cross-sectional estimations on a sample of 70 advanced countries and EMs, Mookerjee 
and Kalipioni (2010) test the impact of financial inclusion - proxied by the number of bank 
branches per 1000 adults - on income inequality. They find that an increased access to bank 
branches significantly lowers income inequality across countries, and that barriers to bank 
access sharply raise income inequality.  
 
354 Which is captured by measures of financial depth, health, and efficiency. For a more detailed literature, please refer to    
355 For more detail on financial development and inequality, see Beck et. Al (2007) 
356 Using the Gini coefficient as a measure of income inequality in their calibration, Dabla-Norris et. Al, (2015) find that higher 
financial inclusion primarily worsens income inequality, and then lowers it in low-income countries. Theoretically, Dabla-
Norris et. Al. (2015) use a micro-founded general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, calibrating the model 
separately for six developing countries. Broader findings point towards the fact that different aspects of financial inclusion - 
they consider broader aspects of financial development such as depth, and efficiency - have varying impacts on GDP and 
inequality, with trade-offs existing. 
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Neaime and Gaysset (2017) study the effect of financial inclusion on income inequality, 
poverty, as well as financial stability in the Middle East and North Africa. Using GMM and 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) on data for eight MENA countries over the period 2002-
2015, the authors find that although financial inclusion does indeed reduce income inequality, 
it has no impact on poverty. The inclusion measures examined were ATMs and banks per 
100,000 adults, while the inequality indicators used were the GINI coefficient and the log 
difference of the poverty headcount ratio. Their proxy for financial stability was the standard 
deviation of the growth rate of deposits. Both financial inclusion and financial stability 
indicators were regressed on a similar set of control variables, which were the standard ones: 
gross enrolment ratio (secondary), population, inflation rate, trade openness, GDP per capita 
growth, and female labour force (% of all). Financial inclusion was also found to have a positive 
impact on financial stability. Population size and inflation increased income inequality, while 
population, inflation, and trade openness increased poverty.   
Among the most recent studies examining the impact of financial inclusion on inequality is that 
of the IMF (2018, forthcoming) over the period 2004-2014. Using OLS, GLS, GMM, and 2SLS 
for around 100 countries, they find that financial inclusion contributes to lowering economic 
inequality, and that strong macroeconomic performance, financial development and stable 
financial conditions increase the benefits of financial inclusion.  
Other lines of study focus on enterprise data, as well as more disaggregated country-specific 
data and inequality. While these strands are beyond the scope of this chapter,357 we highlight 
some of the work linking enterprise access and disaggregated data to inequality. Using random 
effects on firm level data for 54 countries, Beck et al. (2005) find that insufficient access to 
adequate finance disproportionately harms smaller firms, and more intensely, compared to 
other types of obstacles.358 Ayyagari et al. (2008) hold that limits to access to finance substially 
curb firm growth. Using enterprise survey data, Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper (2012) find that 
improvements in the operations of the formal financial sector in Africa can decrease financing 
constraints for SMEs, thereby contributing to less inequality. Pal and Pal (2012) hold that 
 
357 Enterprise data is work in progress though.  
358 The others focus on financial, legal, and corruption obstacles, finding that all three types of obstacles adversely affect firm 
growth, even after controlling for financial development.  
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limited access to finance indirectly increases inequality by harming small firms,359 and acts as 
a significant bottleneck for new entrepreneurs, thus indirectly amplifying inequality.360  
Financial inclusion is thought to be leading to higher household income, especially when 
looking at more disaggregated data. Using state-level data in India over the period 1977-1990, 
Burgess and Pandey (2005) find that a state-led bank branch expansion program in rural, 
previously unbanked areas, reduced India’s poverty headcount ratio. Kochar (2011) used 
district-level data on a state in India and found that social banking programs helped reduce 
poverty.  
Using microcredit data, Banerjee, Karlan and Zinman (2015) conducted six randomized control 
trials/evaluations (in Morocco, Bosnia, Mongolia, India, Ethiopia, and Mexico), and found a 
direct relationship between financial inclusion and poverty alleviation, especially that 
increased access to credit increases business activity/scale, consumption and occupational 
choice, and improved risk management. None of their studies, however, found significant 
increase in total household income, which is crucial for poverty reduction. Although the authors 
acknowledge that their results lack precision, especially when it comes to individual studies,361 
they concluded that their results are not transformative for the average borrower. In other 
words, while increased access to finance leads to business expansion, it does not necessarily 
lead to poverty alleviation or significant improvement in social indicators or standards of 
living. Although there are several micro studies available, such as the work of Clamara et al. 
(2014), they go beyond the scope of this study and will not be examined here.  
If financial markets are underdeveloped, access to finance is limited to “dynastic assets”362 
(Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot, 2011), thus leading to barriers to 
entry, lower prospects for the poorest, lower growth prospects, and higher income inequality 
(Rao, 2006; Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot, 2011). Financially developed markets, on the other 
hand, foster competition among financial institutions, enhance resource mobilization, expand 
 
359 Especially as SMEs face more financing constraints relative to larger firms. 
360 Using maximum likelihood estimations, the authors find that financial inclusion is more common among higher income 
groups, and that bigger proportions of poor households do not use formal financial services. Their results show that banking 
services play an important role to promote financial inclusion among poor households.   
361 Beck (2016) and Banerjee (2013) discuss the reasons behind the limited impact of access to financial services on micro-
entrepreneurs, which include the fact that micro-entrepreneurs may not be credit constraint, but rather face other obstacles 
related to the business environment, which prevent them from seeking credit. Diminishing returns on micro-enterprises could 
limit their capacity to grow, as they establish micro-enterprises due to the absence of other employment opportunities and 
operate a micro-enterprise until they find different employment opportunities, and are thus not interested in expanding their 
businesses.  
362 Comprising personal wealth, and connections.  
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the “entrepreneurial base”, and help with (household) saving, and consumption smoothing 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009 and Gimet and Lagoarde-Segot, 2011). 
More macroprudential policy work linking financial inclusion include works done on low 
income countries on stressing that increased banking coverage (one measure of inclusion) 
should be coupled with the necessary, domestic macro-prudential policies that reduce systemic 
risk (CGD, 2016).  Another hypothesis that has not been tested yet is that poor regulation is a 
significant hurdle to financial inclusion (ODI, 2016).  
Financial inclusion is brought into the picture as a potential cause for financial instability. 
Among the shocks that could lead to financial instability is that related to worsening financial 
sector (or nonfinancial) balance sheets, especially when financial institutions are exposed to 
risks from low-income markets. The argument here is that financial inclusion offers new 
business areas with idiosyncratic risk profiles that can be aptly regulated. (Hanning and Jansen, 
2010).   
As the literature on the link between financial inclusion and inequality rises, while the link 
between macroprudential policies and financial inclusion remains understudied, we propose 
examining macroprudential policies in relation to inequality, using financial inclusion as the 
missing link.  
Determinants of Inequality 
Most studies identify the drivers of inequality to be 1) deep structural factors; societal 
preferences; demographic; 2) global mega-trends such as technology and trade; and 3) 
economic policies such as fiscal policies, capital account liberalization, labour-market policies, 
as well as monetary and other financial policies (Loungani, 2016). As highlighted by O’Farrell 
and Rawdanowicz (2017), increases in income inequality have also been linked to “skill-biased 
technical change” (Acemoglu, 2002), higher global trade (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004), lower 
unionization (Jaumotte and Buitron, 2015), and an ageing population (Heathcote et al., 2010; 
Karahan and Ozkan, 2013).363  Kim and Lin (2011) examined the relationship between income 
inequality and financial development364 and found that financial development has a non-linear 
threshold effect on income inequality. That is, banks and stock markets disproportionately 
 
363 Via OECD( 2016) 
364 Using GMM and instrumental variable regressions, they regress the growth of income inequality on financial development 
and a set of control variables including measures of financial development (private credit, liquid liabilities, and bank assets), 
measures of stock market development, initial values of income inequality, per capital real GDP growth, educational 




support the poor, and improve income distribution when a country reaches a certain level of 
financial development. Below this level, financial development further harms those in poverty, 
and aggravates income inequality, implying that a certain level of financial development is 
necessary for improvement of income distribution through financial intermediary and/or stock 
market development. 
Impacts of Monetary and Fiscal Policies on Inequality 
The literature on income inequality finds that inequality lowers the durability of growth, leads 
to less social cohesion, and constrains the political process among the elite (see IMF, 2017). 
Given their broader macroeconomic impacts, the role of monetary and fiscal policies, as well 
as their effect on income inequality (see IMF, 2014, for example), has been widely studied in 
the literature, contrary to macroprudential policies. Among the main findings is that policies, 
especially on the fiscal side, should be cautiously designed to ensure that a balance is achieved 
between distributional and efficiency objectives. Tighter monetary policy, in contrast, tends to 
increase income inequality. Monetary policy tends to affect inequality through its effect on 
inflation (O’Farell and Rawdanowicz, 2017), something macroprudential policies do as well.365  
O’Farell and Rawdanowicz (2017)366 hold that theoretical channels and empirical evidence are 
ambiguous in terms of their effects, with insignificant effects in low-inflation countries. Yet, 
the unexpected inflation could decrease wealth inequality by relocating wealth from lenders to 




365 Although macroprudential policies appear to affect more housing-related CPI (see Chapter one on this) 
366 They examine two-way interactions between monetary policy and inequality in selected AEs, over a business cycle. They 
focus on the effects of monetary policy on asset prices, and returns, as well as debt servicing costs.  The main findings of this 
paper is that monetary policy easing has an unclear impact on income and net wealth inequality, as the estimated effects were 
small. Property price increases lower net wealth inequality, while increases in stock and bond prices increase net wealth 
inequality. Higher inequality limits the effectiveness of monetary policy stimulus in increasing private consumption, but once 
again, the effects estimated were small (O’Farell and Rawdanowicz, 2017).  
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Annex III: Splitting the Sample between Advanced and Emerging 
Markets  
 
Table 1: Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Access to Financial Institutions and Financial Markets (Principal Component of variables 
related to financial institutions and financial markets based on the IMF’s Classification)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
AR(1) 0.962*** 0.971*** 0.957*** 0.968*** 0.978*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0285) (0.0292) (0.0259) (0.0277) 
Unemployment  -0.00156*** -0.00132*** -0.00181*** -0.00142** -0.00115** 
 (0.000488) (0.000400) (0.000507) (0.000564) (0.000452) 
secondaryenrollment 0.000363** 0.000314** 0.000411*** 0.000297** 0.000230 
 (0.000137) (0.000124) (0.000135) (0.000132) (0.000161) 
urbanization 0.000127 0.000109 0.000113 0.000112 0.000216 
 (0.000141) (0.000142) (0.000152) (0.000251) (0.000159) 
openness -3.09e-05 -2.99e-05 -2.39e-05 -1.12e-05 -4.12e-05 
 (5.25e-05) (5.14e-05) (5.39e-05) (6.82e-05) (4.63e-05) 
Counter-cyclical Capital 
Requirements 
0.00253     
 (0.00924)     
levies  0.00376    
  (0.00768)    
Surcharges on 
Systemically Important FIs 
  0.0148   
   (0.0156)   
Concentration Limits    0.00351  
    (0.0114)  
Foreign Currency Limits     -0.0120** 
     (0.00486) 
      
Observations 419 419 419 419 419 
Number of code 48 48 48 48 48 
Standard errors in parentheses 

























Table 2: Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Financial Access (Principal Component of Bank Branches, ATMs, and Bank Accounts)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
         
AR(1) 0.951*** 1.027*** 1.034*** 1.033*** 0.944 1.024*** 1.040*** 0.952*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0126) (0.0224) (0.0196) (278.7) (0.188) (0.0178) (0.0405) 
Unemployment  -0.274 -2.491* -2.814 -2.933** -0.265 -2.588 -4.018** 0.937 
 (0.763) (1.200) (1.673) (1.122) (7,885) (5.237) (1.753) (1.558) 
Secondaryenrollment  0.00396 -0.00511 -0.202 0.0716 0.212 0.454 0.302 -0.115 
 (0.191) (0.346) (0.441) (0.267) (574.0) (5.422) (0.382) (0.230) 
Urbanization  0.237 0.370 0.600 0.326 0 0.185 0.196 0.356 
 (0.202) (0.316) (0.481) (0.252) (0) (5.534) (0.291) (0.303) 
Openness  0.163 -0.0163 -0.0161 -0.0822 0.163 -0.253 -0.135 0.123 
 (0.101) (0.114) (0.159) (0.121) (1,763) (2.077) (0.135) (0.0990) 
lt_liquidity  0       
  (0)       
lt_DTI   29.95      
   (50.85)      
lt_provisioning    25.49*  22.30   
    (13.27)  (13.32)   
prov_dp (Dynamic 
Provisioning) 
    0 -47.66*   
     (0) (25.77)   
lt_exposure limits       58.27  
       (36.43)  
RRR_actual        -0.353 
        (0.983) 
         
Observations 196 70 70 70 123 69 70 181 
Number of code 32 15 15 15 25 14 15 32 
Standard errors in parentheses 






























Table 3: Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Financial Access (Principal Component of Bank Branches, ATMs, and Bank Accounts)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
AR(1) 0.944*** 0.940*** 0.951*** 0.962*** 0.953*** 1.028*** 0.964*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0381) (0.0354) (0.0192) (0.0346) (0.0158) (0.0251) 
Unemployment -2.350* -2.251* 0.125 -0.553 -1.447** -2.510* -0.0548 
 (1.183) (1.131) (0.762) (0.671) (0.677) (1.242) (0.703) 
secondaryenrollment 0.344 0.0532 -0.0570 0.0242 0.255* 0.000207 -0.0688 
 (0.363) (0.333) (0.225) (0.202) (0.146) (0.349) (0.134) 
Urbanization  0.121 0.422 0.261 0.264 -0.169 0.364 0.141 
 (0.430) (0.510) (0.205) (0.227) (0.233) (0.319) (0.193) 
Openness  0.197 0.235 0.156 0.122 0.235* -0.0195 0.131 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.120) (0.0963) (0.116) (0.126) (0.0848) 
Taxes -28.88       
 (25.30)       
Domestic Loan Limits  -22.52      
  (21.03)      
RRRs   1.592     
   (20.56)     
RRR magnitude    -4.452    
    (4.021)    
Inter-bank Exposure Limit     20.04   
     (14.36)   
lt_LTV      0.355  
      (8.624)  
Provisioning       0.0910** 
       (0.0444) 
        
Observations 144 144 196 182 144 70 170 
Number of code 28 28 32 31 28 15 29 
Standard errors in parentheses 























Table 4: Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Financial Access (Principal Component of Bank Branches, ATMs, and Bank Accounts)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
AR(1) 1.022*** 0.948*** 0.950*** 0.945*** 0.950*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0344) (0.0228) (0.0328) (0.0374) 
Unemployment  -0.550 -0.835 -0.662 -1.049 -2.014* 
 (0.582) (0.738) (0.935) (0.742) (1.102) 
Secondaryenrollment  -0.0575 0.144 0.120 0.157 0.372 
 (0.145) (0.263) (0.280) (0.250) (0.355) 
Openness  0.0367 0.179 0.183 0.142 0.137 
 (0.0879) (0.113) (0.201) (0.124) (0.108) 
Urbanization  0.163 0.0574 0.128 0.100 0.0339 
 (0.157) (0.272) (0.313) (0.257) (0.306) 
RRR Change 0.782*     
 (0.409)     
LTV  9.362    
  (9.870)    
DTI   -3.673   
   (8.492)   
LTV Cap    16.86  
    (10.60)  
Dynamic Provisioning      -12.87 
     (16.57) 
      
Observations 176 144 144 144 144 
Number of code 30 28 28 28 28 
Standard errors in parentheses 






























Table 5: Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Usage of Financial Services (Principal Component of Borrowers and Depositors per 1000 
adults from Commercial Banks)   
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
AR(1) 1.010*** 1.018*** 1.005*** 1.038*** 1.018*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0264) (0.0276) (0.0231) (0.0293) 
Unemployment  0.926 -0.871 0.300 -1.634 -0.122 
 (1.628) (1.927) (2.128) (1.727) (2.117) 
Secondaryenrollment  -0.449 -0.406 -0.620 -0.357 -0.652 
 (0.388) (0.512) (0.541) (0.719) (0.700) 
Openness  -0.174 -0.0457 -0.0294 -0.0619 -0.0794 
 (0.145) (0.130) (0.180) (0.128) (0.177) 
urbanization 0.964* 1.220** 1.107* 1.018 1.134* 
 (0.483) (0.507) (0.561) (0.712) (0.631) 
RRR change -2.206     
 (1.928)     
LTV  -34.68    
  (26.28)    
DTI   12.08   
   (24.53)   
LTV Cap    -36.92*  
    (19.13)  
Dynamic Provisioning      11.14 
     (20.41) 
      
Observations 177 156 156 156 156 
Number of code 26 26 26 26 26 
Standard errors in parentheses 












Table 6: Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Borrowers from Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
AR(1) 1.021*** 1.042*** 1.005*** 0.994*** 1.044*** 0.976*** 0.992*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0276) (0.0236) (0.0192) (0.0244) (0.0448) (0.0357) 
Unemployment  -0.420 -0.696 -0.507 0.329 -0.396 1.539 1.238 
 (0.738) (0.808) (1.012) (0.738) (0.440) (1.717) (1.227) 
Secondaryenrollment  0.0629 0.433 -0.595 0.0515 0.100 -0.124 -0.200 
 (0.252) (0.256) (0.357) (0.205) (0.199) (0.317) (0.247) 
urbanization 0.276 -0.337 0.00580 0.195 0.0895 0.321 0.193 
 (0.354) (0.337) (0.339) (0.214) (0.442) (0.287) (0.222) 
Openness  -0.0841 -0.152 -0.201** -0.106 -0.0920 0.00733 -0.0149 
 (0.0776) (0.116) (0.0984) (0.0948) (0.146) (0.100) (0.102) 
Taxes  -34.48       
 (24.80)       
Domestic loan limits  23.26      
  (17.06)      
RRR   86.09**     
   (40.24)     
RRR change 
(magnitude) 
   -0.823    
    (1.293)    
Interbank exposures     -6.873   
     (38.65)   
lt_LTV      11.39  
      (8.281)  
Provisioning        0.0913 
       (0.0904) 
        
Observations 208 208 269 252 208 99 226 
Number of code 32 32 35 34 32 18 32 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Usage of Financial Services (Borrowers per 1000 adults from Commercial Banks)   
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
AR(1) 0.989*** 1.001*** 1.016*** 1.016*** 1.036*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0275) (0.0179) (0.0304) (0.0227) 
Unemployment  0.310 -0.314 -0.0670 -0.305 -0.771 
 (0.951) (1.184) (1.246) (0.796) (1.053) 
Secondaryenrollment  0.0475 0.140 0.0617 0.132 0.254 
 (0.214) (0.201) (0.260) (0.168) (0.198) 
openness -0.101 -0.0403 -0.0767 -0.0485 -0.103 
 (0.0935) (0.0735) (0.0795) (0.0803) (0.0884) 
urb 0.216 -0.0105 0.182 0.0319 -0.0266 
 (0.213) (0.220) (0.219) (0.215) (0.198) 
drr_act -0.915     
 (1.176)     
ltv  12.92    
  (16.41)    
dtid98   -11.05   
   (9.268)   
ltv_cap    1.264  
    (8.004)  
Dynamic Provisioning      -12.07* 
     (6.606) 
      
Observations 248 208 208 208 208 
Number of code 33 32 32 32 32 
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 8: Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Depositors in Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
AR(1) 0.982 0.971*** 0.980*** 0.978*** 0.980*** 0.987 0.963*** 0.953 0.956*** 
 (9.512) (0.0385) (0.0311) (0.0297) (0.0253) (39.41) (0.0329) (6.122) (0.0280) 
unemployment 0.00590 1.644 3.266 4.640 3.787 3.969 4.514 3.653 4.016 
 (7,019) (2.950) (2.729) (2.944) (2.574) (2,255) (4.159) (385.0) (3.269) 
secondaryenrollment -0.613 -0.796 -1.276 -1.458 -0.570 0.557 -0.597 0.0910 -0.378 
 (2,213) (1.071) (1.080) (1.015) (0.536) (2,609) (1.115) (682.9) (0.876) 
urbanization 1.914 2.096* 2.328* 2.510** 1.408** 0 1.147 0 1.278 
 (3,878) (1.094) (1.126) (0.997) (0.595) (0) (0.955) (0) (1.636) 
Openness  0.107 0.208 0.173 0.126 -0.0375 0.160 0.321 0.651 0.290 
 (603.2) (0.448) (0.409) (0.335) (0.308) (3,091) (0.379) (721.6) (0.408) 
lt_RR 3.015         
 (12,260)         
lt_Credit Limits  -113.6        
  (217.7)        
lt_taxes   40.71       
   (30.74)       
lt_Risk Weights    77.90**      
    (31.92)      
lt_rr2     -22.94     
     (24.34)     
MPI Index      -7.721    
      (21,833)    
Borr-Targeted Index       7.679   
       (28.96)   
Countercyclical RRR        50.31  
        (26,222)  
Fin-Inst Targeted 
Index 
        -2.954 
         (19.85) 
          
Observations 218 146 146 146 291 259 259 259 259 
Number of code 31 21 21 21 38 37 37 37 37 




Table 9: Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Depositors in Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
     
AR(1) 1.016*** 0.967*** 0.964*** 0.960*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0386) (0.0574) (0.0334) 
Unemployment  0.156 2.207 3.217 4.848 
 (2.318) (2.807) (42.09) (3.738) 
Secondaryenrollment  -0.161 -0.454 -0.499 -0.713 
 (0.451) (0.689) (17.87) (0.786) 
Openness  -0.297 0.314 0.326 0.362 
 (0.182) (0.452) (46.72) (0.393) 
Urbanization  1.011* 1.752 1.341 1.286 
 (0.557) (1.071) (84.86) (0.798) 
Change in RR -0.857    
 (3.065)    
LTV  -62.91*   
  (37.25)   
LTV_caps   -19.58  
   (1,514)  
Dynamic Provisioning    18.17 
    (28.83) 
     
Observations 275 259 259 259 
Number of code 37 37 37 37 
Standard errors in parentheses 












Table 10: Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Advanced Economies 
Dependent variable: Access to Financial Institutions and Financial Markets (Principal Component of variables related to financial institutions and financial 
markets based on the IMF’s Classification)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES         
         
AR(1) 0.931*** 0.871*** 0.955*** 0.892*** 0.975*** 0.878*** 0.938*** 0.907*** 
 (0.0436) (0.0705) (0.0485) (0.0649) (0.0943) (0.108) (0.0541) (0.0524) 
Unemployment  -0.00203 -0.00238 -0.00120 -0.00187 -0.000826 -0.00152* -0.00178 0.000619 
 (0.00197) (0.00145) (0.00110) (0.00149) (0.00193) (0.000884) (0.00111) (0.00161) 
Secondaryenrollment  0.000172 0.000652 0.000140 0.000564 0.000127 0.000637 0.000299 3.69e-06 
 (0.000386) (0.000422) (0.000354) (0.000429) (0.000632) (0.000473) (0.000350) (0.000248) 
Urbanization  0.000567*** 0.000387* 0.000331** 0.000311** 9.55e-05 0.000295 0.000276 0.000768** 
 (0.000194) (0.000190) (0.000127) (0.000147) (0.000246) (0.000350) (0.000182) (0.000369) 
Openness  -1.72e-05 4.87e-05 -1.26e-06 3.72e-05 -3.11e-06 7.21e-06 1.58e-05 -1.71e-05 
 (3.98e-05) (4.99e-05) (3.94e-05) (4.78e-05) (3.69e-05) (2.90e-05) (4.20e-05) (4.77e-05) 
lt_liquidity   0.0505       
  (0.0387)       
lt_DTI   -0.0102      
   (0.0159)      
lt_provisioing     -0.0287*  0.000802   
    (0.0166)  (0.0335)   
Dynamic Provisioning     0.0148 0.0361   
     (0.0126) (0.0313)   
lt_exposure limits       -0.0141  
       (0.113)  
RRR (actual)        -6.13e-05 
        (0.00665) 
         
Observations 374 305 305 305 258 230 305 374 
Number of code 30 29 29 29 27 26 29 30 
Standard errors in parentheses 








Table 11: Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Advanced Economies 
Dependent variable: Access to Financial Institutions and Financial Markets (Principal Component of variables related to financial institutions and financial 
markets based on the IMF’s Classification)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
AR(1) 0.912*** 0.919*** 0.885*** 0.890*** 0.925*** 0.926*** 0.947*** 0.952*** 0.951*** 
 (0.0555) (0.0572) (0.0532) (0.0644) (0.0499) (0.0442) (0.0357) (0.0416) (0.0408) 
unemployment -0.00228 -0.00208 -0.000420 -0.00121 -0.000958 -0.00198 -0.00155 -0.00175 -0.00170 
 (0.00187) (0.00137) (0.00137) (0.00126) (0.00130) (0.00189) (0.00150) (0.00134) (0.00137) 
secondaryenrol 0.000476 0.000426 0.000355 0.000468 4.93e-05 0.000469 0.000274 0.000308 0.000297 
 (0.000396) (0.000382) (0.000291) (0.000364) (0.000287) (0.000305) (0.000271) (0.000283) (0.000276) 
urbanization 0.000302* 0.000295* 0.000509** 0.000383** 0.000705*** 0.000201 0.000246 0.000174 0.000180 
 (0.000157) (0.000157) (0.000185) (0.000180) (0.000244) (0.000167) (0.000165) (0.000163) (0.000193) 
Openness  1.36e-05 2.26e-05 2.75e-05 2.95e-05 -3.39e-05 -8.03e-08 3.20e-06 -6.05e-06 -4.62e-06 
 (4.07e-05) (4.40e-05) (4.32e-05) (4.70e-05) (4.11e-05) (1.78e-05) (2.18e-05) (2.23e-05) (2.58e-05) 
lt_RRR -0.0226**         
 (0.00953)         
lt_credit limits  0        
  (0)        
lt_taxes   -0.00910       
   (0.00648)       
lt_risk weights    -0.00208      
    (0.0391)      
lt_rr2     -0.0207     
     (0.0124)     
MPI      -0.00112    
      (0.00221)    
Borrower-Tgt 
Instruments 
      -0.00431   
       (0.00777)   
Countercyclical 
RRR 
       0  
        (0)  
Fin-Tgt 
Instruments 
        0.000724 
         (0.00334) 
          
Observations 307 305 305 305 369 315 315 315 315 
Number of code 29 29 29 29 30 27 27 27 27 





Table 12: Access to Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Advanced Economies 
Dependent variable: Access to Financial Institutions and Financial Markets (Principal Component of variables related to financial institutions and financial 
markets based on the IMF’s Classification)  




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
AR(1) 0.953*** 0.952*** 0.931*** 0.925*** 0.948*** 0.895*** 0.976*** 
 (0.0430) (0.0416) (0.0483) (0.0452) (0.0398) (0.0702) (0.0674) 
Unemployment  -0.00142 -0.00175 -0.000720 -0.000386 -0.00168 -0.00207 0.000694 
 (0.00134) (0.00134) (0.00139) (0.00198) (0.00120) (0.00157) (0.00120) 
Secondaryenrollment  0.000270 0.000308 0.000112 -2.64e-06 0.000309 0.000538 2.65e-05 
 (0.000241) (0.000283) (0.000305) (0.000315) (0.000254) (0.000434) (0.000750) 
Urbanization  0.000184 0.000174 0.000565* 0.000724** 0.000174 0.000360** -3.77e-05 
 (0.000181) (0.000163) (0.000293) (0.000294) (0.000140) (0.000151) (0.00131) 
Openness  -8.31e-06 -6.05e-06 -1.45e-05 -3.00e-05 1.49e-06 2.93e-05 -3.94e-05 
 (1.82e-05) (2.23e-05) (4.86e-05) (4.22e-05) (2.53e-05) (4.21e-05) (8.53e-05) 
Taxes  0.00423       
 (0.00899)       
Domestic Loan Limits  0      
  (0)      
RRR   -0.00412     
   (0.0420)     
RRR change    -0.0138    
    (0.0130)    
Interbank expousre     0.00274   
     (0.00798)   
lt_ltv      -0.0174  
      (0.0248)  
Provisioning        0.000205* 
       (0.000120) 
        
Observations 315 315 374 373 315 305 301 
Number of code 27 27 30 30 27 29 29 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 13: Usage of Financial Services & Macroprudential Policies in Emerging Markets 
Dependent variable: Depositors in Commercial Banks (per 1000 adults)  
Estimation Method: Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel System GMM. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
AR(1) 1.011*** 0.979*** 0.984*** 0.911*** 1.286 1.001*** 0.842 0.986*** 0.879*** 
 (0.0526) (0.0181) (0.0238) (0.0835) (0.803) (0.195)  (0.0673) (0.224) 
Unemployment  1.577 1.462 0.223 -0.337 -3.882 -1.019 0.0142 1.753 -1.890 
 (3.553) (4.562) (5.354) (4.058) (17.87) (4.269) (5.392) (4.346) (3.365) 
secondaryenrol -0.833 -2.623* -1.726 -4.759 -3.423 0.647 -0.196 -1.345 0.841 
 (2.423) (1.483) (1.994) (3.320) (2.967) (1.518) (2.205) (1.413) (3.552) 
urb 0.179 3.985* 2.556 10.24 -21.86 -2.236 5.238 1.714 2.676 
 (5.612) (2.214) (3.449) (8.246) (68.37) (7.817)  (3.044) (9.180) 
openness 0.567 0.394* 0.501* -0.260 -2.665 0.926 0.306 0.561* 0.294 
 (0.361) (0.194) (0.280) (0.768) (4.595) (0.657)  (0.302) (1.418) 
lt_RR 22.83         
 (22.30)         
lt_Credit Growth 
Limits 
 0        
  (0)        
lt_taxes   59.38       
   (70.34)       
lt_risk weights    174.1      
    (206.6)      
lt_RR(2)     26.32     
     (163.6)     
MPI      25.84    
      (18.48)    
Borr-Tgt Index       131.4*   
       (61.83)   
Countercyclical RRR        0  
        (0)  
Fin-Tgt Index         37.18 
         (41.68) 
          
Observations 113 113 113 113 152 126 126 126 126 
Number of code 16 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 
Standard errors in parentheses 






This thesis empirically answered a number of questions related to the effectiveness and 
cyclicality of macroprudential policies, their impact on capital flows, their inter-
connectedness to sovereign risk- via sovereign ratings- and their impact on financial 
inclusion, as part of their redistributive, or even unintended effects beyond their primary 
mandates. Each chapter highlighted the mixed effects, and nature, of macroprudential 
policies on the various variables of interest, confirming the testament of their equivocal 
nature.  
The second chapter of this thesis analyzed the effectiveness and cyclicality of 
macroprudential policies across selected EMs.  Within a SVAR context, we saw that 
macroprudential policies behave diversely, both in terms of their cyclicality, and 
effectiveness across different macroeconomic aggregates. Their operation is thus country-
specific, and depends on the initial conditions, fundamentals of the country in question, as 
well as the number of macroprudential policies in operation. The difficulty in drawing 
generalized conclusions does not prevent us from observing common patterns. RRRs and 
LTV ratios were mostly counter-cyclical in selected EMs.  RRRs were the most frequently 
used macroprudential tool, and they broadly managed to lower industrial/economic activity, 
prices, and in some cases, inflation.  LTV ratios were usually counter-cyclically in response 
to shocks to economic activity and credit but were pro-cyclical on in response to price 
shocks. Provisionings were found to be more effective if implemented counter-cyclically, 
and they were more effective in lowering credit relative to the other variables.  Regulatory 
capital/capital requirements were countercyclical mainly in response to a shock to 
economic activity and responded either pro-cyclically or counter-cyclically to shocks in 
inflation and credit depending on the country examined. A common observation is that the 
countercyclical implementation of macroprudential policies, particularly LTV ratio, 
lessened their adverse effect on various macroeconomic aggregates. Inversely, it could be 
argued that pro-cyclical policies were more effective in curbing credit or economic activity, 
which leaves scope for additional research to confirm the above findings. Employing 
alternative identification strategies- excluding monetary policy, using sign and/or long run 
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restrictions- and using panel VARs are potentially future areas that would pave the way for 
additional research. Using existing databases- such as those of Cerutti et al. (2015), Shim 
et al. (2013), as well as that of Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018) within a proxy SVAR 
context could help test the effectiveness and cyclicality of macroprudential policies across 
a broader range of macroprudential policies than the ones in this chapter. Our regressions 
singled out various macroprudential policies at a time, whereas there could be more than 
one tool in operation, making it difficult to attribute all the results to a specific 
macroprudential tool, so taking the regressions above one step further would involve the 
interaction of multiple macroprudential tools together to test for their overall effectiveness 
and impact would be key.  
The third chapter revisited sovereign ratings, capital flows, and financial contagion among 
EMs, and linked macroprudential policies to capital flows, through the lens of sovereign 
ratings. In this sense, this chapter analyzed the link between systemic risk- proxied by 
macroprudential policies - and sovereign risk- proxied by sovereign credit ratings. Our 
results shed light on the important, but largely unnoticed, impact of sovereign ratings 
changes on the ability of EMs to access international capital markets. Sovereigns is an 
important pull factor whereby ratings upgrades tend to attract both FDI and portfolio 
inflows to EMs. Ratings changes among the big EMs, particularly the BRICS also lead to 
a contagion effect in terms of driving more (or less) capital inflows to EMs, and the effect 
appears to be the strongest on Asian economies, who already are in receipt of a bulk of 
capital inflows to EMs. This chapter shed light on the fact that the effect of sovereign ratings 
almost doubles during bad (or crisis) times, relative to their effect during good (or tranquil) 
times, and that sovereign ratings should not lag behind market conditions when taking a 
rating action. This lagging attitude has been the reason behind the repeated scrutiny rating 
agencies face during crisis periods. The link between sovereign ratings and macroprudential 
policies has not been previously examined, even though the literature highlights the 
presence of a sovereign component in systemic risk, and that investors tend to monitor both 
sovereign ratings, and financial conditions when deciding upon investing in EMs. This 
chapter also shed light on the equivocal relationship between macroprudential policies and 
capital (portfolio) flows- and that the interaction between sovereign ratings and 
macroprudential policies clarifies some of the dynamics between them. Further research 
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would involve introducing bank flows into the picture despite the fact that they have not 
been flowing into EMs to their pre-global financial crisis levels. A further area of research 
not directly linked to the above is examining the macroprudential regulation of the exposure 
of banks to the sovereign among EMs.  
The fourth chapter asked a rather novel set of questions on the impact of macroprudential 
policies on financial inclusion. Financial inclusion is an area gaining significant attention 
alongside macroprudential policies and given the interconnectedness of financial inclusion 
both to income inequality, and to financial stability, we recognized the gap in addressing 
the question on the link between financial inclusion and macroprudential policies. This 
chapter showed that macroprudential policies continue to have mixed effects on financial 
inclusion, but specific tools, particularly the RRR, and broader instruments targeting 
financial institutions tend to increase financial inclusion. On the other hand, instruments 
targeting borrowers, such as the DTI and LTV ratios lower financial inclusion. The behavior 
of macroprudential policies was found to differ among AEs and EMs. In AEs, with higher 
levels of financial inclusion, macroprudential policies did not increase access to financial 
intermediary, but they increased it in EMs. Differing measures of macroprudential policies 
had differing effects on financial inclusion among both AEs, and EMs. For example, tighter 
reserves increased inclusion in EMs, and decreased in AEs. These results point to the 
different nature- and conditions- in which macroprudential policies are implemented, and 
that results should be carefully analyzed. On introducing financial development and 
governance indicators to capture institutional and regulatory quality in our model, 
macroprudential policies helped increase access to, and usage of, financial intermediation 
services, one of the ultimate goals of macroprudential policies (Bank of England, 2009). 
Financial development in particular appears to bolster usage of financial intermediation 
services in the presence of macroprudential policies, among those already financially 
included.  Our results shed light on the importance of the regulatory environment and level 
of financial development when designing and implementing macroprudential policies. This 
is a novel area with scope for more work to understand further the dynamics through which 
macroprudential policies and financial inclusion are related. Further research suggestions 
include splitting financial inclusion into firm and household access to finance to further 
understand how macroprudential policies affect borrowers by type. Also, macroprudential 
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policies, in their quest to curb credit growth, increase credit constraints that could lead to 
financial exclusion. The World Bank and the IMF has extensive data on constraints to 
access finance, so examining how macroprudential policies affect these constraints is 
important. Given the rising literature of the link between financial inclusion and financial 
stability, linking these two with macroprudential policies becomes a next- and natural step- 
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